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Angel ika Hamacher 
An In t e rna l Market fo r E l e c t r i c i t y and the 
European Competit ion Rules 
- Study on the Appl i ca t ion of Ar t i c l es 85-90 EEC Trea ty 
to the E l e c t r i c i t y Supply Indus t ry w i t h Emphasis on the 
Legal S i tua t ion in England and Germany -
The thesis examines which legal ins t ruments the European 
Community has to support the establishment of an i n t e r n a l 
e l ec t r i c i t y market. The main emphasis l ies on the appl ica t ion 
of the EEC Trea ty rules on competi t ion (Ar t ic les 85-90) to the 
e l ec t r i c i t y supply indus t ry . The paper i n pa r t i cu la r assesses 
to what ex tent the European competi t ion law is a sui table 
ins t rument to support the completion of an i n t e rna l e l e c t r i c i -
t y market i n r e l a t ion to the present l eve l of in t eg ra t ion . 
The thesis comes to the conclusion t h a t A r t . 85 (1) as wel l as 
A r t . 86 EEC Trea ty can be applied and indeed have to be 
applied to a l l an t icompet i t ive measures on the e l ec t r i c i t y 
market . In doing so, special considerat ion has to be given to 
the technical and economic pecul ia r i t ies of th i s branch. 
Moreover i t w i l l be shown t h a t the commercial arrangements 
made i n connection w i t h the p r i v a t i s a t i o n of the ESI i n 
England and Wales do not i n f r i n g e A r t . 85 (1) or 86 EEC Trea ty 
whi le some of the agreements on the German e l ec t r i c i t y market 
cont radic t these provis ions. 
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An Internal Market for Electricity and the 
European Competition Rules 
Study on the Application of Articles 85-90 EEC Treaty 
to the Electricity Supply Industry with Emphasis on the 
Legal Situation in England and Germany -
Chapter 1 Introduction 
The goal of the Single European Act is to establish by January 1, 1993 
a single market, an area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured. 
According to the President of the European Commission, M. Jacques 
Delors, "[...] the energy sector will form an essential part of the 
single market which we are building"1. 
This statement is typical of the importance now attached to the energy 
sector by the European Comission. Though i t has been mentioned neither 
in the Single European Act nor in the Commission's White Paper On 
Completing The Internal Market (COM (85) 310 final, 14.6.1985), there 
is agreement that energy is an essential element of the challenging 
single market exercise. The existence of a modern industrial nation 
depends on a sufficient energy supply. Technical, economic, and 
cultural developments are impossible without a secure and reliable 
power supply; a power shortage would affect the entire economy. 
1 (1988) Energy in Europe, no. 11 p. 7 as cited in P. Cameron, "An 
Internal Energy Market in Europe?" in W. Harms (ed) Konturen eines 
EG-Energlemarktes, pp. 13-32, p. 13. 
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Being an important element of the internal market the Community is 
building, energy has received quite a lot of attention lately. 
A number of Directives have been issued within the last months that 
are meant to support the Integration of the energy markets. The 
Commission has proposed several additional provisions and plans to put 
forward more proposals. Some of the provisions suggested not only 
concern the Member States but the whole of Europe including the USSR. 
r J- 1 1 j.1 n i * * /-> 1 r\ «4-4 4-4 K „ Iv n rt « ^ ^ t r n M 1 T 
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active towards the energy markets. It Intends to attack the monopoli-
stic structures that exist on the electricity and gas markets within 
the Community, in order to support the free flow of those energies 
across borders. In this connection the Comission has recently started 
several proceedings against a number of Member States. The crucial 
question for the Commission is why "[...1 a company, town or another 
large consumer (can] not freely buy electricity or gas supplies in the 
next door country in the same way as we can buy other goods and 
services without let or hindrance anywhere in the European Community 
I?)" 2 
The present thesis examines which legal Instruments the European 
Community has, to support the establishment of an internal electricity 
market. The main emphasis lies on the application of the EEC Treaty 
rules on competition (Articles 86-90) to the electricity supply 
industry. The paper in particular assesses to what extent the 
European competition law is a suitable instrument to support the 
completion of an internal electricity market in relation to the 
present level of integration, and how Articles 85-90 EEC Treaty 
accomodate the peculiarities of this branch. 
2 "Competition in the European Community's Electricity and Gas Mark-
ets", Speech by Sir Leon Brittan, Vice-President of the Commission 
of the European Communities, Europe-Documents, No 1708, 25.4.1991, 
p. 2. 
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In connection with the application of Articles 86-90 EEC Treaty to the 
electricity market, the legal situation in England and Wales as well 
as in Germany are of particular interest. 
The electricity supply industry in England and Wales has recently been 
privatized with the aim to transform the formerly monopolistic elec-
tricity market into a competitive one. 
The German electricity supply industry on the other hand st i l l is 
charcterized by supply monopolies rooting in commercial agreements 
between the utilities. Germany, at the same time, is one of the 
strongest opponents of the introduction of competition to the elec-
tricity market. 
The main body of this paper begins with an examination of the aims of 
an internal energy market (Chapter 2). This is followed by an evalua-
tion of the status electricity has on the European energy market. The 
next part scrutinizes the electricity market as i t shows itself today. 
Special attention will thereby be paid to existing trade barriers and 
other obstacles for the completion of an internal electricity market. 
Following on, the legal instruments of the European Community to 
support a further integration will be discussed, and the steps taken 
already, will be evaluated. It also has to be examined which Treaty 
rules are relevant for the introduction of competition to the electri-
city market, and what the relationship between them is. This Includes 
an assessment of the status the European Competition Law (Articles 85-
90 EEC Treaty) has in connection with the completion of an Internal 
electricity market. Other questions that will be discussed are; for 
which groups of customers can competition become relevant and what 
are conceivable models of competition? 
Chapter 3 looks at the legal problems linked with the application of 
Articles 85-90 EEC Treaty to the electricity supply industry. In doing 
so, i t is necessary to examine whether the application of Articles 85 
and 86 EEC Treaty to anticompetitive measures on the electricity mar-
ket, is subject to any kind of restriction. The argument, for example, 
has been raised that the approximation of national energy laws must be 
given priority over the application of Articles 85 and 86 EEC Treaty 
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to the electricity supply industry. It also will be discussed what 
implications the lack of measures under Art. 87 (2) (c) EEC Treaty has 
for the application of those provisions. The main empasis of this 
part, however, lies on the question whether the English and Welsh as 
well as the German electricity utilities are covered by Art. 90 (2) 
EEC Treaty, and whether those undertakings thus are excluded from the 
certain Treaty rules. In this connection, i t will be instructive to 
analyse the Commission's approach to Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty, which can 
be deduced frnrn its recent Decision concerning Dutch electricity 
supply undertakings. It also is of interest to scrutinize whether 
different outcomes in the interpretation of Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty, 
lead to different overall results in the application of the European 
Competition Law to the electricity market. 
In Chapter 3 G the discussion turns to the interpretation of Articles 
85 and 86 EEC Treaty with respect to the electricity supply industry. 
It will be examined whether, and how, those provisions provide for the 
opportunity to take the peculiarities of the electricity market into 
account. In connection with Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty, this leads to the 
question whether that rule contains a "rule of reason". Following on, 
chapter 3 H discusses which Treaty objectives other than competition 
are of particular importance for the electricity market. In this part 
i t will be established which anticompetitive measures in general are 
compatible with Community values, and thus do not infringe Art. 85 (1) 
or 86 EEC Treaty. 
Finally, Chapter 4 deals with anticompetitive agreements and conducts 
that exist on the electricity markets in England and Wales as well as 
in Germany. This chapter examines whether those measures contradict 
Articles 85 (1) or 86 EEC Treaty, or whether they find compensatory 
justification under higher Treaty objectives relevant for the electri-
city market. As far as certain restraints are justified, the question 
arises whether they are inevitable and thus always will find j u s t i f i -
cation, or whether a further integration of the electricity market 
will lead to a cessation of their justification. 
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The paper considers the legal situation as on July 1, 1991. 
EC documents have been taken into account as far as they were 
published in the Official Journals before July 1, 1991. 
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Chapter 2 The European Dimension of the Energy Market 
A. The Aim of an Internal Market for Energy 
I. The European Energy Policy Towards the Completion of the 
Internal Market 
P.cccgnizing the Importance of the energy sector3 in connection with 
the single market programme, the EC Council of Ministers in September 
1986 adopted a resolution4 concerning New Community Energy Policy 
Objectives for 1995. This resolution emphasizes the necessity of a 
greater integration of the energy market, which should be free from 
barriers, to trade "with a view to improving security of supply, 
reducing costs and improving economic competitiveness"9. 
On the basis of this resolution the EC Commission in June 1987 started 
an initiative to promote the completion of a single market for energy. 
This step by the Commission was welcomed by all Member States.6 
Thereupon the Commission published a paper on the feasability of an 
internal energy market.7 In this document the Commission listed up 
both existing trade restrictions and other obstacles to energy trade 
In the EC. The Commission also presented a political strategy for the 
removal of these obstacles. 
3 For the development of the European Energy Policy see P.J.G 
Kapteyn, P. VerLoren van Themaat, Introduction to the Law of the 
European Communities, pp. 755-764. 
4 Council Resolution of 16 September 1986 concerning new Community 
energy policy objectives for 1995 and convergence of the policies 
of the Member States, OJ No C 241, 25.9.1986, p. 1. 
9 Ibid., p. 2. 
6 T. Damm, "Pladoyer fur einen Binnenmarkt auch im Energiesektor", 
(1988) EG-Magazln No 10 supplement p. I I . 
7 The Internal Energy Market (Commission Working Document), COM (88) 
238 final, 2. May 1988. 
page 6 
Starting out from that working document the Commission made several 
proposals for reasonable steps towards the completion of an internal 
market for energy.8 On the basis of these proposals the EC Council 
recently has passed three new Directives9. 
In addition to that, the Commission has made two proposals in connec-
tion with the energy market during the present Intergovernmental 
Conferences. One was a proposal for a Energy Charter to be adopted by 
all European countries, including the USSR.10 This charter should, in 
the Commission's view, cover access and exploitation of energy resour-
ces, Investment rules, freer trade in energy products, safety norms 
and research and development. 
The Commission also proposed that the revised Treaty should specifi-
cally consider an internal energy market and mention the security of 
supply.11 
8 See for example -.Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation 
(EEC) No 1056/72 on notifying the Commission of investment pro-
jects of Interest to the Community in the petroleum, natural gas 
and electricity sectors, COM (89) 335 final, 15.September 1989. 
9 Council Directive of 29. June 1990 concerning a Community procedu-
re to improve the transparency of gas and electricity prices 
charged to industrial end-users, OJ No L 186, 17.7.1990, p. 16; 
Council Directive of 29. October 1990 on the transit of electrici-
ty through transmission grids, OJ No L 313, 13.11.1990, p. 30; 
Council Directive of 31. May 1991 on the transit of natural gas 
through grids, OJ No L 147, 12.6.1991, p. 37. 
1 0 Communication from the Commission on the European Energy Charter, 
COM (91) 36 final. 14.2.1991; If the proposal gets approval from 
EC governments, i t will be the basis on which the Community calls 
an International conference In the second half of 1991. 
1 1 Europe-Documents, No. 5440, 27.2.1991, p. 9. 
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II. Benefits of an Internal Energy Market 
The fact that there is no common energy market in Europe yet, causes, 
according to the Cecchlnl Study12, expenses of 20-30 billion ECU a 
year. In other words, the establishment of an internal market for 
energy could lead to costsavings that correspond to 0,5 - 1,0 % of 
the Community Gross Domestic Product (GDP).13 This is equivalent to 
around the whole of Ireland's GDP. 
The economical benefits of a better integrated energy sector are 
obvious. The removal of obstacles for the exchange of energy would 
advance the development of a more competitive market. As a result 
energy resources would be better allocated14, which would lead to a 
decrease of energy prices. Lower prices benefit individual customers. 
They also make the power using industries more efficient 1 8 and thereby 
enhance their competitiveness in the world markets. 
The Community's energy industry itself would also benefit from a 
common energy market. More integration would enhance the rationaliza-
tion of production, transmission and distribution of energy.16 This in 
turn leads to lower production prices which would support the competi-
tiveness of European power supply enterprises in international 
markets. 
Last but not least, an internal energy market would also improve the 
security of supply in all Member States. More interconnections in the 
energy industry would raise the flexibility of the energy companies as 
well as the solidarity between the Member States. 
1 2 P. Cecchini, The European Challenge 1992 - The Benefits of a 
Single Market. 
1 3 P. Faross, "The Internal Energy Market" in W. Harms (ed) Konturen 
eines EG-Energlemarktes, pp. 3-12 (p. 4); see also COM (88) 238 
final, p. 6. 
1 4 Faross, op. cit. n. 13, p. 4. 
1 9 In some industry sectors like steel and glass energy presents 25 -
30 % of the production cost; see COM (88) 238 final, p. 5. 
16 Ibid., p. 5. 
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B. Electricity as Part of the Energy Market 
Electricity is an exceedingly Important element of the energy supply 
in the European Community. There are several reasons for this. 
The electricity share of the community's final energy consumption 
amounts to 16,4 %1 7 and experts expect that, by the end of the 
century, electricity will account for well over 20 % of the final 
energy dsiuarid." 
This demonstrates how essential electricity is for the standard of 
living, the productivity of the industries and the security of energy 
supply. 
Other reasons for the importance of electricity are connected with the 
fact that electricity is the principal area for the use of primary 
energies19; in 1986, 33 % of all primary energies were used to 
generate electricity. 2 0 
The production of electricity is the only significant area for the use 
of renewable, non-polluting sources of energy like wind and water.21 
The importance of those energy sources will further increase with the 
growing awareness of people for the necessity to protect the environ-
ment. 
17 Ibid., Annex VI Table 5. 
1 8 (1988) Energy in Europe, "Improving the efficiency of electricity 
use", No 10 pp. 53-55, p. 53. 
19 Primary energy is the content of energy in natural energy carriers 
for example coal, oil, gas etc. 
Energy that Is obtained by the transformation of primary energy 
into heat, mechanical work or electricity is called seeundary 
energy, Brockhaus, Naturwlssenschaften und Technlk. vol. 4, p. 
124. 
2 0 COM (88) 238 final, p. 68. 
2 1 H. Steeg, "Elektrizitatserzeugung und -versorgung aus internation-
aler Sicht" in R. Lukes (ed) Eln Binnenmarkt fur Elektrizlt&t. pp. 
117-131 (p. 120). 
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The fact that one can use several primary energies to generate 
electricity raises the political significance of this type of energy. 
Nearly every Member State has its own favourite source of energy for 
the generation of electricity. Germany for example prefers coal, Great 
Britain wants to use its oil and coal, the Netherlands rely on gas and 
France and Belgium favour nuclear power.22 
The possibility of using several energy sources also, makes a contri-
bution iu the security of supply. 
Firstly, It causes a certain amount of flexibility in case of supply 
bottleneck for a particular primary energy. 
Secondly, the pushed deployment of energy sources other than oil 
enables the dependence on oil to be reduced. The importance of this 
aspect was proven once again in the Gulf crises. Though i t is true 
that oil today is less important to the industrial world's economy 
than i t was during the two oil crises of 1973 and 197923, the rise in 
oil prices during the Gulf crisis nevertheless has affected the world 
economy considerably. 
How much the European economy is influenced by any kind of crisis 
concerning oil is illustrated by the fact that the crude oil imports 
from Iraq and Kuwait together only account for 11 % of the overall 
Community imports of crude o i l . 2 4 
The great significance of electricity for the energy balance of the 
Community shows its importance in the establishment of an internal 
energy market in Europe. The aims of a single energy market, such as 
2 2 R. Schavoir, "Energie-Binnenmarkt verlangt Opfer", (1988) EG-
Magazin no. 10 supplement p. VI. 
2 3 "Global shadow lenthens", Financial Times 12.12.1990. 
2 4 1990 Rapid Reports, Energy and Industry, no. 11 p. 1; 
In answer to the Communltiy's proneness to oil crises the Commis-
sion has proposed that the Member States should build up strategic 
oil stocks to help to ensure price stability and security of 
supply at times of crises; "Brussels urges EC strategie oil 
reserves", Financial Times 29.5. 1991. 
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lower costs and better security of supply, can in particular be 
achieved through the promotion of an internal market for electricity. 
The EC Commission expects that a greater integration of the national 
grids, as well as a better planning and operation of the generation 
and transmission systems, would bring remarkable economic benefits.2 3 
It follows that there is every economic Justification for the Member 
States to create an internal electricity market. 
C. Survey of the Present Situation on the Electricity Market 
I. Introduction 
The European Community has several opportunities to promote the 
establishment of an internal market for electricity in Europe, the 
details of which will be discussed below26. 
In order to evaluate the pros and cons of the individual solutions i t 
will first be necessary to scrutinize the present structure of the 
European Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) as well as to analyse the 
existing trade barriers and other obstacles to the completion of an 
internal electricity market. 
2 8 The potential annual savings between 1992 and 2000 are estimated 
to be ECU 56 billion; see Communication from the Commission: 
Increased Intra-Community electricity exchanges: a fundamental 
step towards completing the Internal energy market, COM (89) 336 
final 29. September 1989, p. 10; see also the calculations in M. 
Emeron, "The economics of 1992" (1988) European Economy no. 35 
pp. 84-85. 
26 Infra, chapter 2 part D; see also the Commission's strategy for 
action, set out in COM (88) 238 final, pp. 13-29. 
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II. Structure and Ownership of the Electricity Industry 
The first feature of the electricity market is a substantial govern-
mental control over the electricity utilities everywhere in the EC27. 
It is true for all Member States that the ESI is highly influenced by 
public interventions and restrictive regulations. The German state, 
for example, defines aims of the electrcity supply as well as its 
framework in a number of statutes.2 8 
Apart from the omnipresent governmental control, however, the Member 
States of the European Community have, related to their historic, 
social and economic development, adopted different structures for 
their ESIs. 
These structures can be divided into three main groups and they range 
from public monopolies, as in France, through diversified systems 
with public as well as private ownership, as in Germany, to a system 
in Great Britain which recently has been entirely privatised.2 9 
It would go beyond the scope of this thesis to give a detailed 
description of the structure and ownership of the ESI in all twelve 
Member States. As the ownership structure in the Member States is 
27 Communication from the Commission on the Community regime for 
porcurement in the excluded sectors: water, energy, transport and 
telecommunications, COM (88) 376 final, 11. October 1988, p. 34. 
2 8 Examples for those laws are: Energiewlrtschaftsgesetz = Law on 
Ener- gy Industries, Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschr&nkungen = 
Anti-Cartel-Law, Bundeslmmissionsschutzgesetz = Law on Environmen-
tal Protection against Obnoxious Substances, Atomgesetz = Atomic 
Energy Law. 
2 9 This statement up to now is only correct for England, Wales and 
Scotland. The ESI in Northern Ireland has not been privatised yet. 
The only uti l i ty, Northern Ireland Electricity, s t i l l is a public 
undertaking. The present government, however, plans to privatise 
the Irish ESI in the foreseeable future; see "Government plans to 
split uti l i ty in two for privatisation", Financial Times 
21.3.1991. 
page 12 
either similar to the French model or else contains elements of the 
German structure, i t is possible to confine the survey to those two 
countries which are typical proponents of their respective groups. 
Great Britain is at present the only country with a totally pivatised 
ESI and must thus be dealt with separately. 
1. Public Monopolies 
In some EC-Member States30 the electricity supply is nationalized. The 
vertically integrated public monopolies cover generation, transmission 
and distribution of electricity. Sometimes, for example in Italy, not 
only the national electricity util i ty but also local government bodies 
have the right to supply their areas with electricity. 3 1 
2. The German Diversified System 
a. Former Federal Territory 
The ESI in the former federal territory is an example for a decentra-
lised system.32 
There are eight so called "Verbundunternehmen" that generate most of 
3 0 France, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and up to now Northern 
Ireland. 
3 1 H.P. Hermann, "Ordnungsgrundlagen der Elektrlzitatswirtschaft in 
den Mitgliedsstaaten der Europaischen Gemeinschaft", (1986) 49 RdE 
pp. 110-119 (p. 112). 
3 2 Spain, Denmark, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands as well 
have more or less dezentralized ESIs. For details see: Hermann, 
"Ordnungsgrundlagen", op. cit. n. 31, pp. 112-115; H.W. Arndt, 
"Common Carrier bei Strom und Gas", 1989 RIW supplement to No 10, 
pp. 5-6; J. Grawe, "Eln gemeinsamer Strommarkt in der EG - Aus der 
Sicht der Elt-VU", (1987) 48 RdE pp. 242-244 (p. 242); COM (88) 
376 final, pp. 29-31; for the Dutch ESI in particular see: M. 
Derlks, "Das Recht der Elektrizitatsversorgung in den Niederlan-
den", (1988) 48 RdE pp. 66-91. 
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the high voltage electricity. Most of these enterprises have mixed 
capital, the majority being public sector and the remainder being 
private capital. 3 3 
In addition, there are 41 "Regionalunternehmen" that transport the 
electricity generated by the "Verbundunternehmen" together with their 
own production to the local distribution boards. Some large consumers 
receive their electricity directly from the "Verbundunternehmen" or 
the "Regionalunternehmen". 
The 1000 or so local distribution boards supply their customers via 
their own grids. These companies predominantly are in the hands of the 
local government bodies.34 
b. Territory of the Former GDR 
The power Industry of the former East Germany, like the entire 
economy, passes through a period of radical change. The central guided 
planned economy has to be transformed into a competitive profit 
system. 
The ESI of East Germany consisted of 18 "Kombinaten"39, two of which 
were responsible for the generation of electricity and one for the 
maintenance of the high voltage grid. In addition there was one 
regional energy company in each of the 15 districts supplying electri-
city to the customers.36 
From July 1, 1990 all energy-"Kombinate" were transformed into private 
3 3 A. Sykes/C. Robinson, Current Choices - good ways and bad to 
prlva- tlse electricity. Centre for Policy Studies, (1988) Study 
No 87 p. 29. 
3 4 Arndt, op. cit. n. 32, p. 3. 
3 0 A "Kombinat" is a combination of industrial manufacturing plants 
that usually can be found In countries with a planned economy. 
3 6 M. Geberding, "Das Energierecht der DDR", (1990) 51 RdE, pp. 70-73 
(71). 
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stock corporations.37 The two entities generating electricity and the 
one responsible for the high voltage grid were combined to a single 
"Verbundunternehmen". There are now also 15 "Reglonalunternehmen". 
These will enter into contracts with the "Verbundunternehmen" stipula-
ting that for the next 20 years they obtain 70 % of their demand from 
the "Verbundunternehmen". 
The electricity utilities already have started to plan and construct 
new high voltage grids in order to reconnect the West German with the 
East German grid. Sometimes i t is only necessary to revitalize old 
communications that existed until the nineteen f i f t ies . 3 8 
3. The Privatised ESI in Great Britain39 
a. England and Wales 
Until recently the ESI in England and Wales was nationalized. The 
Central Electricity Board (CEGB) was responsible for generation and 
transmission of electricity, while the twelve Area Boards had to deal 
with distribution and supply. All these enterprises were public 
companies. 
This structure of the ESI was changed fundamentally on March 31, 1990 
by the 1989 Electricity Act. The British ESI now appears as follows. 
The CEGB is split into four companies. 
3 7 E. Hoffmann, "Zur Energieversorgung der neuen Bundeslander", 
(1990) 51 RdE. pp. 215-219 (p.216); see also H. Heck, "DDR: Strom-
und Erd- gasvertrage" (1990) 40 ET pp. 612-613 (p. 613). 
3 8 A. H8h, "Deutsche Versorgungsnetze wachsen zusammen", (1990) 40 ET 
pp. 377-378 (378). 
3 9 This account does not concern Northern Ireland. It is based on the 
White Paper, Privatising Electricity CM 322 (London: HMSO, 1988), 
the 1989 Electricity Act; B. Sas, "Regulation and the Privatised 
Electricity Supply Industry" (1990) 53 The Modern Law Review pp. 
485-498; and a prospectus "The Regional Electricity Companies 
Share Offers" from November 21, 1990. 
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Firstly, there is the National Grid Company. This enterprise has 
several tasks such as operating the national transmission system and 
the two pumped storage power stations of the former CEGB, and 
coordinating the operation of all major power stations. 
Secondly, there are National Power and PowerGen. These companies now 
own and operate the CEGB's fossil fuelled power stations, which have 
been divided between them.40 
Thirdly, Nuclear Electric runs the thirteen nuclear power stations of 
the CEGB. 
The businesses of the twelve Area Boards were transferred to the 
twelve Regional Electricity Companies (REC). The RECs essentially 
serve the same regional areas as their predecessor Area Boards and 
they are responsible for their local distribution networks. 
National Power, PowerGen and the twelve Regional Electricity Companies 
have been transformed into private companies by floating them on the 
stock market.41 The National Grid Company is owned by a holding 
company which in turn is jointly owned by the 12 RECs. Nuclear 
Electric will remain within the public sector. 
b. Scotland 
Until March 31, 1990 two publicly owned utilities generated, transmit-
ted and distributed electricity in Scotland. The North of Scotland 
Hydro-Electric Board was the vertically integrated company reponsible 
for northern Scotland. The South of Scotland Electricity Board sup-
plied the south. 
Under the 1989 Electricity Act this structure was changed. There are 
now two seperated companies, Scottish Power and Scottish Hydro-Elec-
4 0 PowerGen is the smaller company with 20 fossil fuel generation 
stations and 1 hydro station. National Power owns 34 fossil fuel 
and 4 hydro stations. 
4 1 The shares of the twelve Regional Electricity Boards have first 
been traded on the London stockmarket on December 11, 1990. The 
shares of National Power and Power Gen were first traded on March 
19, 1991. 
page 16 
trie. These companies have taken over the businesses of the old pub-
licly owned enterprises. Both are stil l vertically integrated but they 
are now private undertakings.42 The two Scottish nuclear stations that 
belonged to the South of Scotland Electricity Board now are owned by 
Scottish Nuclear Ltd. a company which will remain in public ownership. 
III. Economical and Technical Framework 
Apart from the differences in ownership and structure of electricity 
utilities in the twelve Member States, the European electricity market 
is characterized by considerable similarities that concern the techni-
cal and economical framework. 
1. Three-Part Structure 
The first common feature is the three-part structure of the electrici-
ty industry which corresponds to its main tasks: generation, transmis-
sion and distribution. 
Generation is the production of electricity. 
Transmission is the bulk transfer of electricity at higher voltages 
across the transmission grids4 3. 
Distribution is the transfer from the high voltage grid and the 
delivery on local distribution networks to the customers.44 
These three elements can be found in the ESI of any Member State. 
4 2 Dealings with the shares of the two Scottish electricity companies 
began on June 18, 1991. 
4 3 High voltage grids transport electricity of 5-220 kV, extra high 
voltage grids transport electricity from 220 kV; see Brockhaus, op 
cit n. 19, vol. 2, p. 6. 
4 4 See prospectus "The Regional Electricity Companies Share Offers" 
from November 21, 1990. 
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2. Technical Peculiarities 
Apart from this general characteristic, the ESI in all Member States 
is marked by its technical peculiarities. 
The supply with electricity can only take place by the transport 
through a grid from the generator to the customer. A supply without a 
grid is impossible. 
The amount, as well as the time, of electricity consumption are solely 
determined by the customers. They switch their electrical appliances 
on or off whenever they want, and hence determine the amount of 
electricity their premise is supplied with. The electricity utilities 
therefore have no influence on the amount of consumption. As opposed 
to the supply with other goods or services the electricity supplier 
can not wait until he is able or ready to supply. There is no such a 
thing as an engaged tone i f one switches on the light. 
The fact that the electricity utilities have no influence on the 
consumption, makes their task particularly difficult, because a safe 
supply with electricity depends on a balance between the total 
production and the total consumption at any given time. If the amount 
generated is larger than the consumption the mains frequency rises. 
Under reversed conditions the mains frequency falls. In both cases the 
electricity supply collapses i f the frequency allowance exceeds narrow 
limits. 4 8 
The next fact that demonstrates the peculiarities of the electricity 
supply is that i t is almost impossible to store electricity. The poor 
storage capability of electricity leads to a simultaneity of produc-
tion and consumption.46 
4 3 E.h.G. Klatte, "Wettbewerb und EG-Binnenmarkt", (1988) 38 ET pp. 
412-421 (p. 414). 
4 6 H. Magerl, "Abkehr vom Gebietsschutz", (1989) 50 RdE pp. 154-158 
(p. 154). 
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Therefore i t is necessary at any given time to keep generation and 
distribution capacities ready that meet the highest imaginable de-
mand.47 This results in the need to run generation and distribution 
facilities that normally are not working to capacity but that are 
needed in times of peak demand. The running of those facilities is 
inevitable to avoid an overloading of the whole system in peak times. 
To buy extra power in other European countries is often difficult as 
the reasons for high demands, like a cold winter, are basically the 
same, and therefore times of peak load coincide. The effect is that 
hardly any generator has surplus capacities.48 Because of the depen-
dence on the grid i t is also impossible to buy extra power from 
markets like the USA that are not interconnected with the European 
grid. Therefore i t is up to the electricity utilities themselves to 
make sure that sufficient spare capacities are available at all times. 
3. Economical Peculiarities 
These technical peculiarities also cause an exceptional economic 
situation for the ESI. 
In order to have enough generation, transmission and distribution 
capacities available at any time, the electricity utilities are forced 
to plan new power plants and grids in the long term. To build or 
modernize power stations or construct networks takes several years49 
4 7 H. Heitzer, "Das System leltungsgebundener Energieversorgung in 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland" in J. Baur (ed.) Neue Strukturen 
in der Energleversorgung, pp. 99-109 (p.102). 
4 8 G. Klatte, "Mehr Wettbewerb in der Elektrizitatsversorgung durch 
Aufhebung der Demarkatlonen und Verpflichtung zur Durchleitung", 
(1979) 29 ET pp. 131-134 (p. 132). 
4 9 The new British gas power plants for example which are right now 
in their planning or first construction phase ("A new generation 
of power stations", Financial Times 6.12.1990) are not expected to 
be connected to the grid before 1993/4 ("Power groups dim long-
view", Financial Times 2.2.1991). 
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and extremely large investments. 
Therefore the ESI is a very capital-intensive economic area that 
requires detailed long-time planning.80 It also depends on the fore-
seeability of developments in order to ensure the profitability of 
investments.91 
IV. Supply Monopolies 
The structure of the electricity market in the European Community 
today is characterized by another Important feature that is very much 
connected which the technical and economical peculiarities of the ESI. 
There are electricity supply monopolies nearly everywhere in Europe.32 
1. Description of the Feature 
In a system of supply monopolies every small customer has to buy his 
electricity from the local electricity supply company. Big customers 
too are either tied to their local distributors or in case of them 
being directly connected to the high voltage grid they have to obtain 
their electricity from a certain generation ut i l i ty . 8 3 
Thus, no customer can choose his supplier. That means that the 
distributors do not enter into competition with each other for 
customers, but every distributor has a constant number of electricity 
consumers. 
8 0 C. Stewing, Gasdurchleltungen nach europalschem Recht, p. 104; 
Arndt, op. cit. n. 32, p. 8. 
3 1 Stewing, op. cit. n. 50, p. 104. 
9 2 COM (88) 238 final, p. 74. Great Britain constltues to a certain 
extent an exception from this rule; for details see infra, chapter 
2 part CIV.3. 
9 3 COM (89) 336 final, p. 6. This only is different when large 
industrial end users generate their own electricity. In this case 
they usually sell their surplus capacities to the public grid. 
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In addition, local distributors too usually cannot shop around for the 
electricity they then supply to their customers. Generally they are 
forced to buy electricity from the generator responsible for their 
region."4 
One could ask whether there is a connection between the existence of 
supply monopolies on the electricity market and the respective owner-
ship structure. 
In those countries where the ESI is organized as a vertically 
integrated monopoly and the national electricity undertaking is 
responsible for all tasks concerning the supply with electricity, the 
organizational structure alone stipulates supply monopolies.85 
However, supply monopolies also exist in countries where the ESI has a 
more pluralistic structure.3 6 The exclusion of competition for elec-
tricity customers in those Member States is either based on laws or on 
agreements between undertakings. 
The existence of supply monopolies, thus does not depend on a certain 
structure of ownership In the ESI.87 
Exemplary for the establishment of supply monopolies by the means of 
private agreements is the German ESI. 
2. Legal Position In Germany 
In Germany two types of contracts are utilized to safeguard supply 
monopolies: the Demarcation Contracts and the Concession Agreements, 
both of them having a maximum duration of twenty years. 
Concession Agreements are concluded between the electricity supply 
companies and the local government bodies. The agreements stipulate 
84 Ibid. 
8 8 D. Kuhnt, "Atomstrom aus Frankreich" (1987) 37 ET, pp. 761-765 (p. 
763). 
8 6 See enumeration in: Hermann, "Ordnungsgrundlagen", op. cit. n 31, 
pp. 112-115. 
8 7 COM (88) 238 final, p. 4. 
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that the municipality permits the electricity company the use of all 
public paths and roads belonging to the municipality to lay cables.38 
The local bodies also commit themselves to not granting similar 
usufructs to other electricity supply companies in return for an 
annual concessionary payment by the electricity undertaking.39 
Parallel to the Concession Agreements, the electricity supply companies 
agree Demarcation Contracts between themselves. 
In Demarcation Contracts the companies mutually recognize each others 
supply areas. They agree not to supply customers located in the 
service area of their contract partners. 
These contracts exist between electricity supply undertakings on the 
same level, for example between two or more "Verbundunternehmen" or 
between "Regionalunternehmen". But there are also Demarcation Con-
tracts for example between companies generating electricity and compa-
nies distributing electricity, containing a mutual recognition of the 
respective tasks.60 Generating companies for instance, commit them-
selves to not supplying endusers other than certain big industrial 
consumers within the area of the distribution company directly. In 
return the distribution utilities agree to buy a certain percentage of 
their consumption from that generator. 
This complementary system of Demarcation and Concession Contracts 
ensures that the German electricity supply companies enjoy supply 
monopolies. Neither end users nor local distributors can choose their 
suppliers.61 
9 8 Arndt, op. cit. n. 32, p. 4. 
3 9 Cameron, op.cit. n . l , p. 21. 
6 0 Arndt, op. cit. n. 32, p. 4. 
6 1 H. Recknagel, "Mehr Wettbewerb 
ET pp. 220-225 (p. 222). 
in der Energiewlrtschaft", (1990) 4 
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3. Legal Position in England and Wales 
The statement that there are closed systems of electricity supply 
everywhere in Europe is no longer entirely true for England and 
Wales.62 
Premises having an average monthly demand63 above 1 MW are free to 
choose their supplier.64 This means that large consumers are no longer 
automatically customers of a Regional Electricity Board (REC) but that 
others, including National Power, PowerGen and certain non-local RECs, 
can enter into competition with the local REC for the supply of those 
consumers. When the Electricity Act 1989 will have been in force for 
four years, customers using more than 0.1 MW will be also allowed to 
shop around for an electricity supplier. After a period of eight 
years, these restrictions are expected to disappear altogether and 
there will no longer be supply monopolies for the RECs. 
In addition, the 12 RECs are no longer forced to buy their entire 
demand from one particular generator. For specified quantities of 
their consumption, they can choose to contract with National Power or 
PowerGen or to receive their electricity from private generators 
including generators from abroad. 
Summing up, large customers in England and Wales in principle can 
choose their suppliers and, in turn, suppliers can choose the genera-
tors from which they purchase their electricity. 6 0 
This does not mean, however, that there are no restraints to competi-
6 2 The same applies to Scotland. 
6 3 The average monthly demand is estimated on the basis the of the 
figures from the three months of highest demand over the last 
year; for details see J. Capel, The New Electricity Utilities in 
England and Wales, passim. 
6 4 The restriction to customers with a demand of 1 MW (called "1 MW-
Club") results from the licences that have been issued for 
suppliers and generators in connection with the restructuring of 
the ESI. 
6 8 For details see Capel, op. cit. n. 63, passim. 
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tion on the electricity market in England and Wales at all. A number 
of commercial agreements have been entered into by various parties in 
the ESI which have repercussions on the possibility of competing for 
the supply of customers.66 
4. Summary 
Apart from the English example the electricity enterprises, within the 
Community at present, usually enjoy a monopoly of supply in their 
geographic areas. This is true for the distribution to individual 
customers of all seizes as well as for the supply of the local 
distribution boards. This situation results in a relative lack of 
electricity trade between regional networks, as well as across fron-
tiers. 6 7 
V. Legal and Administrative Framework 
Apart from the ownership structures, the technical and economical 
peculiarities and the supply monopolies, the ESI is also very much 
influenced by the respective national framework governing the energy 
policy. 
This framework has evolved over a long period of time and reflects the 
economic, political and social history of each Member State. Therefo-
re, the national conditions for the electricity supply differ substan-
tially. Those differences result in considerable variations as to 
electricity production costs. 
Above all, the following aspects have a decisive influence on the 
production expenses for electricity. 
The costs of electricity generation depend on the standards and 
strictness of environmental protection measures. These requirements 
are significant in the costs of building and running a power plant. 
6 6 For details as to these agreements see infra, chapter 4 part B. 
6 7 "The economics of 1992" (1988) European Economy no. 36, p. 84. 
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The legal framework concerning the planning and construction of power 
plants is also important. Protacted consent and appellate procedures 
cause an enormous rise in building costs. This in turn affects the 
realization of investment programmes. 
Another factor of importance for the production costs of electricity 
is the choice of fuels. 
Since nearly all Member States favour different sources of energy for 
electricity generation, there are significant differences as to pro-
duction costs within the European Community. A comparison between 
Germany and France can serve as an example for this fact. 
It was part of the political programs of all West German governments 
since 1965 to make sure that the ESI uses a certain quantity of German 
mineral coal for the electricity production.68 This is why the so 
called Jahrhundertvertrag was agreed between the ESI and the coal 
mining industry. This contract determines delivery and purchase com-
mitments for a term of 15 years and ends in 1995. Parallel to the 
Jahrhundertvertrag, the 3. Verstromungsgeset&9 was issued, providing 
for a subsidy to the purchase of German mineral coal until 1995. 
Nevertheless, German mineral coal st i l l is more expensive than impor-
ted coal or, for that matter, most other fuels. Therefore the German 
production costs for electricity are quite high. 
As opposed to that, France has built an entire depot of nuclear power 
stations since 1975. At the same time there is no obligation to use 
high-cost indigenous coal for generating electricity. 
This, combined with other factors is the reason for 30-40 % lower 
electricity prices in France than in Germany.70 
6 8 J. Seelinger, "Gemeinsamer Strommarkt aus der Sicht der deutschen 
Steinkohlebergbaus" in R. Lukes (ed) Eln EWG-Binnenmarkt fttr Elek-
trlzltat, pp. 186-194 (p. 191). 
6 9 Law on the Transformation of Coal into Electricity. 
7 0 F. Braun, "Der Binnenmarkt in der Gemeinschaft", in R. Lukes (ed) 
Eln EWG-Blnnenmarkt fur Elektrlzitat. pp. 43-52 (p. 50). 
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Finally electricity production costs depend on the fiscal treatment of 
the enterprises, because this factor also influences the revenue 
required by utilities. Again a comparison between Germany and France 
is Informative. 
The French electricity enterprise Electricite de France (EdF) is, as a 
public company, obliged to run its business without making profits. 7 1 
Therefore the French taxlaws applied to EdF do not provide for any 
taxes on profits. 
in contrast to this, a German electricity supply enterprise is taxable 
like every other company, without any exceptions. For the output 
produced by EdF, a German util i ty would therefore have to pay a 
considerable amount of corporation tax, commercial tax, general pro-
perty tax etc. This example shows that the fiscal treatment of the 
electricity supply enterprises also influences the financial situation 
of these companies. 
All the above named factors influence the electricity production 
expenses and consequently the electricity price payable by consumers. 
Because of the great differences in these factors which are part of 
the respective national energy policies, there are considerable price 
variations in the electricity sector.72 
These variations are further intensified by different rates of Value 
Added Tax (VAT) and other specific taxes73 imposed on electricity in 
some Member States. 
Denmark has, with 22 %, the highest VAT rate on electricity. Other 
Member States like Great Britain and Ireland don't levy VAT for 
electricity at a l l . 7 4 
7 1 H. Michaelis, "Gesamtwirtschaftliche Aspekte eines gemeinsamen 
Marktes" in R. Lukes (ed.) Ein EWG-Blnnenmarkt fur Elektrlzitat, 
pp. 196-210 (p. 203). 
7 2 COM (88) 238 final, p. 71. 
7 3 For details about specific taxes on electricity ibid., Annex VI 
Table 4. 
7 4 See list of VAT-rates ibid., Annex VI Table 4. 
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VI. Lack of Price Transparency 
Another characteristic of today's electricity market in Europe is a 
lack of price transparency. 
Although the prices charged for electricity have reached a high degree 
of transparency there are st i l l quite a number of price and cost 
factors that are not transparent: electricity transfer prices, fuel 
prices for electricity production and production costs from individual 
production units. 7 3 
The missing information about these price and cost factors complicates 
a comparison of prices and research into the reasons for differences, 
as well as an assessment of the possibilities to increase the 
electricity transfer. 7 6 
VII. Existing Exchange of Electricity among the Member States 
The present situation on the electricity market is not just character-
ized by supply monopolies, differences in the national frameworks for 
the ESI and a lack of price transparency. It is also characterized by 
the fact that there has been a well working electricity exchange 
between the electricity utilities of the Member States for many years. 
This electricity exchange across the borders Is managed by bodies that 
function as a forum for the co-operation of the national electricity 
utilities. 7 7 The most important organization of this kind is the 
Union pour la Coordination de la Production et du Transport de 
l'Electricite (UCPTE), which was founded in 1961 on recommendation of 
the OECD.78 In this body, the electricity utilities of twelve west 
7 9 COM (88) 238 final, p. 75. 
76 Ibid., p. 75. 
77 Ibid., p. 69. 
7 8 H. Lichtenberg, "Der Europaische Stromverbund" in R. Lukes (ed) 
Eln EWG-Binnenmarkt fttr Elektrlzlt&t. pp. 86-108 (p. 90). 
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European countries are joined together.79 Nine out of these twelve 
countries are Members of the European Community. 
However, there are st i l l two Member States of the European Community 
that have no direct interconnections with any other Member State, 
Ireland and Greece80. 
UCPTE has neither executive powers81 nor a financial budget82. It only 
deals with technical questions like load dispatchment; all economic 
details are arranged on a bilateral basis between the individual co-
operation partners. Accordingly the actual exchange of electricity is 
solely based on voluntary agreements between the electricity enterpri-
ses. 
The economic and technical advantages of Interconnected grids, are a 
more efficient use of production facilities and greater safety of 
supply. The latter is achieved due to the fact that the partner 
utilities put electricity reserves at each others disposal. This 
system is especially helpful in case of a failure in a generation 
facility and in times of peak demand. 
But inspite of these advantages, the level of exchange only amounts to 
less than 4 % of the electricity consumption in the European Communi-
ty . 8 3 
7 9 Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Yugolsavia. 
8 0 Greece though is interconnected with Yugoslavia, Albania and 
Bulgaria; see COM (89) 336 final, p. 5. 
8 1 For details as to UCPTE's powers see: COM (88) 238 final, p. 69. 
8 2 Lichtenberg, op. cit. n.78, p. 105. 
8 3 COM (89) 336 final, p. 12; see also COM (88) 238 final, Annex VI 
Table 6. 
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D. Instruments of the European Community to achieve an Internal 
Electricity Market 
Corresponding to the variety of characteristics of todays electricity 
market, the European Community has several legal instruments to 
support a further integration of the European electricity market. 
These instruments are not strictly separated but sometimes are condi-
tion to one another or simply overlap. 
The legal framework for the promotion of an internal electricity 
market is the EEC Treaty. It does not matter in this connection which 
fuel has been used to generate electricity. Even i f coal or atomic 
energy have been deployed neither the ECS Contract nor the Euratom 
Treaty are relevant but electricity solely is subject to the EEC 
Treaty.8 4 
I. Harmonization of National Frameworks 
The national frameworks for the ESI and the energy policies in the 
Member States differ considerably and therefore form obstacles for the 
completion of a single electricity market.88 
As long as different national frameworks lead to price variations, 
market forces on the electricity market cannot work normally and the 
electricity markets in the Community will stay fragmented. 
Because of that, one way to promote the establishment of an internal 
electricity market is to approximate these frameworks and policies. 
The competence for the European Community to harmonize the legal 
systems of the Member States follows principally from Articles 100-102 
EEC Treaty. There are, however, some more articles within the Treaty 
8 4 CD. Ehlermann, "Die rechtllchen Instrumentarien zur Verwirklichung 
eines gemeinsamen Marktes nach dem EWG-Vertrag" in R. Lukes (ed) 
Ein EWG-Blnnenmarkt fur Elektrizitat. pp. 28-42 (p. 28). 
83 Supra, chapter 2 part C.V. 
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providing authorization to harmonize special areas.86 
The subject of approximation are all provisions that form part of the 
legal system of the Member States. This includes written and unwritten 
law, state law, laws of political subdivisions and self-governing 
bodies etc.87 
1. Harmonization of Environmental Protection Measures 
The harmonization of environmental protection measures would be of 
considerable significance for the integration of the electricity 
market. 
Some progress has been made by the means of a new Directive on the 
limitation of emissions of certain pollutants into the air from large 
combustion plants.8 8 
This Directive fixes the limit values for the emission of sulphur 
dioxides, oxides of nitrogen and dust for existing and new plants. 
The Council has also issued a Directive on the assessment of effects 
of certain projects on the environment.89 According to this Directive, 
the Member States have to adopt measures which ensure that projects, 
likely to have significant effect on the environment, are made subject 
to an assessment, with regard to these effects before consent is 
given. Power stations are covered by this requirement.90 This Directive 
thus supports the harmonization of national frameworks concerning the 
8 6 For example Articles 27, 57 (1), 69, 70, 99, 118a EEC Treaty. 
8 7 J. Pipkorn, in B. Beutler et. al., Die Europaische Gemelnschaft 
- Rechtsordnung und Polltik - , p. 375. 
88 Council Directive of 24 November 1988 on the limitation of 
emissions of certain pollutants into the air from large combustion 
plants, OJ No L 336, 7.12.1988, p. 1. 
89 Council Directive of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects 
of certain public and private projects on the environment, OJ No L 
175, 5.7.1985, p. 40. 
90 Ibid., Annex I . 
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environmental aspect of consent procedures for new power plants. 
But in spite of these Directives the approximation of technical and 
environmental protection standards in the Member States is st i l l in 
its initial stages. Much more will have to be done within the next few 
years. The safety regulations for nuclear power stations, for example, 
urgently need to be harmonized because they considerably influence the 
construction and the operating costs of these plants.9 1 
Harmonizing measures in the field of environmental protection can not 
only be based on Art. 100a EEC Treaty but also on Art. 130S EEC Treaty 
which was inserted by the Single European Act. The Directive on large 
combustion plants in its preamble refers expressivly to Art. 130s EEC 
Treaty. 
In connection with the harmonization of environmental protection laws 
Art. 100 a (4) EEC Treaty is also important. According to this rule 
each Member State that deems i t necessary to apply national provisions 
relating to protection of the environment shall notify the Commission 
of these provisions and, after confirmation by the Commission, is 
entitled to keep them in force. 
2. Harmonization of Taxes 
For the electricity market the approximation of VAT rates as well 
would be of great Importance. 
Being a turnover tax VAT is covered by the area of application of Art. 
99 EEC Treaty. Provisions of harmonization in accordance with this 
rule only can be passed unanimously by the Council. 
VAT has been the object of several harmonization measures. The sixth 
Council Directive on the harmonization of the laws relating to 
turnover taxes introduced a common system of VAT by fixing a uniform 
9 1 Michaelis, op. cit. n. 71, p. 205. 
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basis of assessment.92 This Directive has been amended several times93 
and many areas were harmonized. 
Not yet approximated are the rates of VAT. 9 4 
While the VAT rates on electricity vary between 0 % in Great Britain 
and Ireland and 22 % in Denmark93, the standard VAT rates in the EC 
range between 12 % in Luxembourg and Spain and 22 % in Denmark. The 
reason why VAT rates have not been subject to harmonization yet is 
that corresponding measures would constitute a severe intervention in 
the tax structure and hence in the sovereignty of the Member States. 
Nevertheless, significant progress in negotiations to reach an outline 
agreement on minimum VAT rates has been made during presidency of 
Luxembourg in spring 1991. All EC Finance Ministers, with exception of 
the UK, agreed on a 15 % minimum standard rate of Value Added Tax for 
the Community from 1 January 1993. However, the crucial decision will 
only come when the Council has to adopt a formal legal regulation 
giving effect to the agreement on VAT. 9 6 
92 Sixth Council Directive of 17 May 1977 on the harmonization of the 
laws of the Member States relating to turnover taxes, OJ No L 146, 
13.6.1977, p. 1. 
9 3 It was last amended by the Eighteenth Directive, OJ No L 226, 
3.8.1989, p. 21. 
9 4 The Commission made several proposals for a Directive containing a 
standstill clause with a ban of altering the number as well as the 
level of VAT rates; see for example: Proposal for a Council 
Directive imposing a standstill on VAT and exise duties, OJ No C 
313, 4.12.1985, p. 5. 
9 8 At 1.1.1987, see COM 88 (238) final, p. 88. 
9 6 This is, according to the Commission, unlikely before winter 
1991/92. 
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3. Harmonizing Administrative and Procedural Law 
To support the further development of an internal electricity market, 
i t also would be helpful to approximate the consent procedures for the 
authorization of construction of new power plants and grids. For that 
purpose i t will be necessary to harmonize the administrative law as 
well as the procedural law and again the enviromental protection law. 
With regard to the approximation of administrative law some progress 
has been made within the last few years.97 
This progress, however, concerns, apart from the Directive on the 
assessment of environmental aspects98, no legal provisions particu-
larly dealing with the authorization of new plants or grids. 
I I . Increasing Price Transparency 
In order to promote a more integrated market for electricity in 
Europe, i t also will be necessary to improve cost and price transpar-
ency. This factor too reinforces the conditions ensuring that competi-
tion is not distorted in a common market. 
A lack of price transparency, for example, could lead to a discrimina-
tion of certain industrial end-users that do not know how much a 
supplier charges other customers. Price discrimination in turn consti-
tutes distortion of competition. This is why the EC-Council has 
passed a new Directive "concerning a Community procedure to improve 
the transparency of gas and electricity prices charged to industrial 
9 7 Pipkorn, op. clt. n. 87, p. 387; for the development of general 
principles of administrative law see J. Schwarze, "Tendencies 
towards a Common Administrative Law in Europe" (1991) 16 EuLRev 
pp. 3-19; see also M. Hilf, "Mbglichkelten und Grenzen des Ruck-
griffs auf nationale verwaltungsrechtliche Regeln bei der Durchfiih-
rung von Gemelnschaftsrecht" in J. Schwarze (ed.) Europaisches 
Verwaltungsrecht 1m Werden, pp. 67-92. 
9 8 Supra, n. 88. 
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end-users".99 
This Directive requires companies supplying gas or electricity to 
industrial end users to inform the Statistical Office of the European 
Community (SOEC) about prices and conditions of sale as well as about 
price systems in use. 
But despite the progress that has been made through this Directive the 
EC will st i l l have to introduce more price transparency to the 
electricity market.1 0 0 
The EC's ability to make the price structures on the electricity 
market more transparent follows from Art. 213 EEC-Treaty.101 This rule 
provides for the right of the Commission to collect information and 
carry out checks within the limits detailed by the Council. 
I I I . Intensifying the Electricity Transit on Large Networks 
Although there has been an exchange of electricity between the 
electricity utilities for nearly forty years now, this exchange only 
amounts to 4 % of the total electricity consumption in the Community. 
Therefore i t is necessary to support an increase in the wholesale 
trade with electricity. 
Such an increase would have several advantages which promote the 
completition of an internal electricity market, such as a more 
efficient use of the entire infrastructure. Besides more exchange of 
electricity could lead to a better cooperation between the companies 
concerning the construction of new grids or power plants. Those 
developments would help to reduce costs and could lead to lower 
electricity prices as well as to an improvement in the security of 
supply. 
99 Council Directive of 29 June 1990 concerning a Community procedure 
to improve the transparency of gas and electricity prices charged 
to industrial end-users, OJ No L 185, 17.7.1990, p. 16. 
100 Supra, chapter 2 part C.VI. 
1 0 1 The new Directive also was based on Art. 213 EEC Treaty. 
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Since a greater transit through transmission grids would be advanta-
geous for the electricity market i t is one of the most important tasks 
of the EC to press for the establishment of a high-tension intercon-
nection between Ireland and the continent, as well as between Greece 
and the rest of the Member States. 
The advantages of an increase in the electricity exchange through 
transmission grids also led to a new Council Directive concerning the 
exchange of electricity between the electricity uti l i t ies. 1 0 2 
The term electricity transit according to Art. 2 of the Directive 
stands for the transport of electricity through high voltage grids, 
Involving the crossing of at least one lntra-Community frontier. 
Entitled and committed to join this kind of electricity transit are 
the entities in the Member States which are listed in the Annex. 
The Directive provides for contracts involving the transit of electri-
city to be "negotiated between the entitles responsible for the grids 
concerned..." (Art. 3 para. 1). The entities are compelled to give 
notice of "any request for transit in connection with contracts for 
the sale of electricity..." to the European Commission and to national 
authorities (Art. 3 para. 3). The utilities also have to Inform these 
bodies about the progress being made in the compulsary negotiations 
concerning the electricity transit. Furthermore all entitles involved 
have the right to make the conditions of transit subject to a 
concilitation which is carried out by a body the Commission will set 
up. 
Finally the Commission is entitled to implement procedures provided 
for by Community Law i f the reasons for the failure of the negotia-
tions appear to be "unjustified and insufficient" (Art. 4). 
With the new directive the EC creates a controlling body to supervise 
the conclusion, as well as the conditions of transit contracts. The 
declared Intention of these means is to make the transfer of electri-
city through grids compulsory and hence to reduce obstacles to this 
102 Council Directive of 29 October 1990 on the transit of electricity 
through transmission grids, OJ No L 313. 13.11.1990, p. 30. 
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kind of trade1 0 3. This in turn is supposed to result in an Increase in 
electricity transfer on large networks.104 
The new Transit-Directive introduces no competition for the supply of 
customers. The transit through transmission grid only concerns the 
exchange of electricity between utilities. The Directive does not 
enable customers to choose a non-local supplier. It therefore leaves 
the existing supply monopolies on the electricity markets untouched.103 
IV. Applying the Principle of Competition to the Electricity Market 
Another instrument to support the further development of an internal 
electricity market could be the introduction of more competition to 
this economic area. 
More competition would lead to a greater exchange of electricity 
between the local and International networks and hence result in a 
better integrated electricity market. 
When talking about the introduction of more competition i t is useful 
to have a look at conceivable models of competition. 
1. Conceivable Models of Competition on the Electricity Market 
What is meant when the introduction of competition to the electricity 
market is discussed, is the competitive supply of large industrial 
consumers and local electricity distributors. A competitive electrici-
ty market would thus be a market situation in which generators, as 
well as suppliers have to enter into competition with each other to 
103 Ibid., Preamble. 
1 0 4 L. Eckert, "Die Gesetzgebungsvorschlage der EG-Kommission vom Juli 
1989 fur den Gassektor" in J.F. Baur (ed) Leitungsgebundene Energle 
und der gemeinsame Markt, pp. 11-18 (p. 12). 
1 0 3 R. Dehmer, "Europa auf dem Weg zu einem europaischen Energierecht" 
(1989) 39 ET, pp. 661-654 (p. 651); H. Ellasmbller, "Der Energie-
Binnenmarkt" (1990) 40 ET, pp. 754-757. 
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supply large end users and local distributors. 1 0 6 Those customers would 
no longer be tied to a local distributor, but could shop around for 
their supplier. 
Apart from competition in the supply of those customers, one could 
also think of a competitive supply of domestic consumers as a 
conceivable model of competition. This model, however, is bound to 
remain a theoretical one for the time being. Due to considerable 
fixed costs and technical shortcomings that are rooted in the techni-
cal peculiarities of the electricity supply, i t is still uneconomical 
to supply small customers on a competitive basis.107 This is even more 
true as far as competition on the European level is concerned. It is 
hardly thinkable for example, that the French electricity util i ty EdF 
would be interested to enter into competition with a Spanish undertak-
ing for the supply of individual domestic customers in Spain. The 
supply of domestic customers hence will probably remain a so-called 
1 0 6 COM (89) 336 final, p. 14; M. Seidel "Die Elektrizltatswlrtschaft 
im System des Gemeinschaftsrechts" (1988) 23 EuR, pp. 129-143 (p. 
136); W. Engels et al, Mehr Markt in der Energiewlrtschaft, p. 39. 
1 0 7 In place of many J. Buderath, "Strom im Wettbewerb" (1989) 19 ET, 
pp. 138-140 (p. 139). 
This fact also is acknowleged by the English ESI, though every 
customer in England, Wales and Scotland from 1998 onwards in theory 
will be able to choose a supplier. This possibility is not expected 
to change the fact that all domestic customers are supplied by 
their local distribution board. The other utilities are not inter-
ested to enter into competition as far as that supply is concerned. 
As one executive put i t : "It is not our intention totally to 
integrate vertically and sell to Granny Smith" ("Why price will be 
the ultimate determinant", Financial Times 30.1.1991); see also 
"National Grid Company tops risk rating", Financial Times, 
15.2.1991 in this article is says: "Local electricity distribution 
is likely to remain a natural monopoly [...)" 
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natural monopoly10*. 
"Competition on the electricity market" as used in this thesis 
therefore means competition for large industrial consumers109 and local 
distributors. 1 1 0 
There are two ways to introduce competition for the supply of local 
distributors and large end users, and hence to break up the existing 
suppiy monopolies. 
The first way is to build new grids in addition to the existing ones, 
in order to connect customers with a non-local electricity undertak-
ings. 
The other model of competition that has been discussed a lot recently 
is called "common carrier" system. "Common carrier" stands for a 
system where customers and non-local suppliers have access to the 
existing transport networks.111 Customers can choose their suppliers 
108 The phenomenum of natural monopoly was first described by John 
Stuart Mill (Principles of Political Economy, p. 143) In connection 
with the London gas and water supply. Natural monopoly describes a 
situation in which operating costs and prices to the consumer would 
be higher i f competition were permitted, and where, moreover, 
uti l i ty firms cannot compete because they are monopolistic by 
nature; see W.J. Primeaux, "Electricity Supply: An End To Natural 
Monopoly", in C. Veljanovskl, Privatisation and Competition, pp. 
129-134 (p. 129) and M. Prohaska, Efflzlenz der Energlewlrtschaft, 
p. 89. 
109 The monthly electricity consumption above which somebody is consi-
dered a large end user cannot exactly be determined here. In 
England, however, the supply of customers with a demand of at least 
1 MW per month is regarded worthwhile to be handled on a competiti-
ve basis. This figure thus shall serve as guide line for what is 
meant by a large end user. 
1 1 0 This circumscribtion coincides with the one made by the European 
Commission, see COM (89) 336 final, p. 14. 
1 1 1 COM (88) 238 final, p. 22. 
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and are allowed to use the existing grids to transport the electricity 
they bought from non-local utilities. 
Apart from the expression "common carrier", another wording turns up 
in this connection. Whilst the term "common carrier" can be found in 
about every comment on the internal electricity market written in 
English, the German literature prefers the expression "Durchleitung"112 
that has to be translated as "through transport".1 1 3 
These different terms nevertheless describe the same structure of 
electricity supply. The expression "Durchleitung" is used in cases 
concerning the transport of electricity from a third party, to a 
customer relying, on the networks of the local distributer. 1 1 4 As 
"common carrier", the expression "Durchleitung" thus describes the 
phenomenom of third party access to transport networks. Thus "common 
carrier" and "Durchleitung" deal with the same problem. 
It has to be borne in mind, though, that the expression "through-
transport" is not accurate as i t gives a wrong impression about 
technical facts as they are. In reality there is no such thing as a 
"through-transport" of electricity through a grid. 1 1 3 Actually, all 
power stations are interconnected through the transmission and distr i-
bution systems. Therefore, i t is impossible to distinguish electricity 
generated by one station, from those fed into the system by an other 
plant. Thus, electricity cannot be transported through a grid without 
being mingled. Hence no "through-transport" but an exchange of certain 
amounts of electricity, takes place.116 
It is technically possible, however, to measure the amounts of 
electricity involved in the exchange very accurately. Thus, the grid 
1 1 2 In place of many G. Kl&tte, "Mehr Wettbewerb", op.cit. n. 48, p. 
131. 
1 1 3 Cameron, op.cit. n. 1, p. 21. 
1 1 4 H. Fischerhof, "Stromdurchleltung" iiber fremde Netze als Rechtspro-
blem, p. 17. 
1 1 3 See for example E.h.G. Klatte, op.cit. n. 45, p 414. 
1 1 6 G. Klatte, "Mehr Wettbewerb", op.cit. n. 48, p. 132; Fischerhof, 
"Stromduchleitungen", op.cit., n. 114, p. 19. 
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operator can make a precise invoice about the amounts of electricity 
fed into his system, as well as about the costs of services he has 
performed to provide system stability 1 1 7 . 
Therefore, the term "through-transport", although not accurate in a 
technical-physical sense, may be used to describe this sort of co-
operation between electricity utilities, as the outcome is the same.118 
2. Treaty Provisions Relevant for the Introduction of Competition to 
the Electricity Market 
The question arises, which legal instruments the European Community 
posesses to promote the introduction of competition to the electricity 
market. 
The availability of legal Instruments depends on the way in which 
competition on the electricity market is obstructed. 
Hardly anywhere in the European Community is the market order for the 
ESI based on competition. Irrespective of structure and ownership, 
nearly all Member States have adopted a structure providing practical-
ly no place for competitive elements. 
The prevention of competition takes place in different ways. 
Firstly, the laws of some Member States provide rules that obstruct 
the trade with electricity, and thus prevent competition.119 
Secondly, competition is distorted by state monopolies providing for 
exclusive rights of import and export, or transport and distribution 
1 1 7 Engels, op.cit. n. 106, p. 40. 
1 1 8 For the use of this term see in place of many D. Kuhnt, "Obertra-
gung von Strom nach deutschem und europaischem Recht", in H. LeB-
mann et al. (eds.) Festschrift fur Rudolf Lukes, pp. 411-424, 
passim. 
1 1 9 This applies for example for the Netherlands; see the recent 
Commission Decision concerning the Dutch ESI (Commission Decision 
of 16. January 1991 relating to a proceeding under Article 85 of 
the EEC Treaty), OJ No L 28, 2.2.1991, p. 32. 
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of electricity. 1 2 0 
Finally, barriers to competition on the electricity market are caused 
by certain agreements and conducts of undertakings, whether public or 
private. 
This shows that impairments of competition in general may stem from 
three distinct sources or directions. The EEC Treaty has taken this 
into consideration, and provides different sets of rules to protect 
competition from undue interference. 
The roiiowing provisions are 
particularly relevant for the introduction of competition to the 
electricity market: the rules ensuring the free circulation of goods 
(Articles 30-36 EEC Treaty), those in respect of state monopolies 
(Art. 37 EEC Treaty) and the rules of competition (Articles 85-90 EEC 
Treaty). 
3. Excursus: Electricity as "Good" or "Service" within the EEC Treaty 
The application of Articles 30-36 EEC Treaty and hence the classifica-
tion of electricity as "good" and not as "service" within the system 
of the EEC-Treaty is the outcome of the following considerations. 
A conceivable categorization of electricity as "service" is supported 
by the fact that power supply depends on a grid, the provision and 
maintenance of which is a service anyway. Besides, the ESI not only 
produces electricity but i t also is concerned with tasks like the 
provision of sufficient capacities at any given time. These tasks can 
also be considered as "services". This Is why some authors classify 
the whole electricity supply as "service" within the meaning of 
Articles 59-66 EEC Treaty. 1 2 1 
1 2 0 See enumeration in COM (88) 238 final, p. 21. 
1 2 1 Seidel, op.cit. n. 106, p. 185; B. B6rner, "Rechtsfragen zu Art. 90 
I I " in idem, Studlen zum Deutschen und Europalschen Wlrtschafts-
recht, p. 254. 
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The European Court of Justice (ECJ), however, in a case dealing with 
the nationalization of the Italian ESI incidentally treated electrici-
ty as a "good".122 
This position is perfectly Justifiable. 
Any other kind of energy, such as coal, oil and gas, is classified as 
a "good". An equal treatment of electricity and the other energies is 
reasonable. 
Another argument for the classification of electricity as good is 
that one can commercialize and trade electricity in the same way as 
any other good. It is for example possible to sell specified quanti-
ties of the product electricity. The supply with electricity thus is, 
considered from an economic point of view, equal to the supply with a 
good.123 The ECJ is also geared to the possibility to trade the asset 
in question, i f i t comes to the distinction between goods and 
services. In SacchP24 i t regarded a television signal, by reason of 
its nature, as provision of services. The trade in all products 
connected with a television signal (sound recordings etc.) however, 
is, according to the ECJ, subject to the rules relating to freedom of 
movement for goods. 
It follows that, in conformity with the prevailing view, 1 2 3 electricity 
has to be treated as a "good" within the system of the EEC Treaty and 
hence is subject to the application of Articles 30-36. 
1 2 2 Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [19641 ECR 585. 
1 2 3 U. Everling, "Der Binnenmarkt nach der Rechtsprechung des Gerichts-
hofs der Europaischen Gemeinschaften" in R. Lukes (ed.) Ein EWG-
Blnnenmarkt fur Elektrizltat, pp. 132-154 (p. 142). 
1 2 4 Case 155/73 ECR [19741 409 (427, considerations 6-7); 
for the distinction between goods and services see also case 62/79 
Coditel v Cine Vog Films ECR [19801, 881 and case 262/81 Coditel v 
Cine Vog Films II ECR [19821, 3381. 
1 2 0 See for example: Arndt, op.cit. n. 32, p. 13; Hermann, 
"Ordnungsgrundlagen", op.cit. n. 31, p. 116; Everling, "Binnenmarkt 
nach der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs", op.cit. n. 123, p. 142 
and R. Linkohr, "Versorgungssicherheit geht vor Geschaft" (1988) 
EG-Magazln No 10 p. IV. 
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4. The Present State of Application of the Relevant Provisions 
It has been established that Articles 30-36, Art. 37 and Articles 85-
90 EEC Treaty are the relevant Treaty provisions i f i t comes to the 
introduction of competition to the electricity market. The question 
arises what the present state of developments in the application of 
these provision by the institutions of the European Community is. 
The first calls for the breaking up of supply monopolies, and hence 
for the introduction of more competition to the electricity market, 
were voiced in about 1983128. They came especially from the German 
power intensive industry, which wanted to import cheap electricity, 
and, understandably, from the French public electricity undertaking 
Electricity de France (EdF) which was able to sell electricity at 
almost unbeatable prices.127 Until that time, the electricity industry 
and the European Competition Policy had existed peacefully side by 
side without paying much attention to each other. 
To the great dismay of some executives in the electricity industry, 
the "sleeping dog" embodied by the Directorate General for Competition 
was awoken by these demands and started making threatening gestures 
towards the de facto exception area ESI. 1 2 8 
In its working document "The Internal Energy Market", the Commission 
announced its plan to apply the rules of competition strictly to the 
electricity market forthwith. 1 2 9 
Recently, there has been one Commission Decision concerning the elec-
tricity market. Making use of its power under Art. 3 of Regulation 
1 2 6 R. Lukes, "ErSffnung und Einfuhrung" in Lukes (ed.) Eln Binnenmarkt 
fur Elektrizitat, pp. 1-11 (p. 4). 
1 2 7 See P. Montagnon, "Regulating the Utilities", in idem, European 
Competition Policy, pp. 52-75 (p. 59). 
1 2 8 W. Harms, "Deutsches und Europaisches Wettbewerbsrecht" (1989) 39 
ET, pp. 82-89 (p. 84). 
1 2 9 COM (88) 238 final, p. 18-24. 
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17/62 the Commission scrutinized the consistency of certain agreements 
in the Dutch ESI with the European Rules on competition130. I t also at 
present examines the compatibility English, Welsh and Scottish agree-
ments with Articles 85 and 86 EEC Treaty. 1 3 1 
In addition, the Commission has opened proceedings against a number of 
Member States, contesting the lawfullness of their electricity monopo-
lies in relation to Art. 37 EEC Treaty. 1 3 2 
These activities reflect the intention of the EC Commission to apply 
the rules on competition vigorously to the electricity market. The 
Commission, according to its own statement, will not "hesitate to take 
whatever action necessary to enforce the treaty rules".1 3 3 
It has also set up special committees of energy suppliers, consumers 
and national governments which have just reported on whether, and how, 
to introduce more competition to the European energy market. Following 
on these reports the Commission will now draft proposals and put them 
to the energy ministers in the next few months.134 
130 Commission Decision of 16. January 1991 relating to a proceeding 
under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, OJ No L 28, 2.2.1991, p. 32. 
1 3 1 See notices pursuant to Art. 19 (3) of Regulation 17/62 (JO 1962, 
13/204 OJ 1959-62, 87) in OJ No C 191, 31.7.1990, p. 9 concerning 
the reorganization of the electricity industry in England and Wales 
and OJ No C 245, 29.9.1990, p. 9 concerning the reorganization of 
the electricity industry in Scotland. 
132 i , n e countries involved are: Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom; see 
Europe-Documents, 22.3.1991, p. 8 and "EC Nails Energy Monopo-
lies", International Herald Tribune 22.3.1991. 
133 "power Momopolies are Threatened by EC Dutch Ruling", International 
Harald Tribune, 19/20.1.1991, see also Commission of the European 
Community, (1989) Nineteenth Report on Competition Policy, pp. 49-
50. 
134 n E C divided o v e r energy competition", Financial Times, 28.5.1991; 
see also Europe-Documents, No. 5498, 25.5.1991, p. 13 and No. 5499, 
27./28.5.1991, p. 10. 
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During the present Intergovernmental Conferences, the Commission, 
moreover has proposed that the revised Treaty should specifically en-
visage an internal energy market and mention the security of supply.1 3 3 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has not yet decided a case dealing 
with the application of the rules on competition to the electricity 
market. Since the Dutch electricity utilities, however, have brought 
action against the recent Commission Decision before the ECJ136, the 
first judgement on the application of Articles 85-90 EEC Treaty to the 
electricity industry can be expected in the forseeable future. 
Summing up, the institutions of the European Community have only just 
started to apply the relevant Treaty provisions to the ESI. A clearly 
defined, detailed European competition policy for the electricity 
market has not been formulated yet. 
5. Relationship between the Relevant Provisions 
It now has to be examined what relationship exists, between the 
Treaty rules that are relevant for the introduction of competition to 
the electricity market. 
Dealing with the ESI i t is necessary to take Articles 30-36, Art. 37 
and Articles 85 - 90 EEC Treaty Into consideration. 
All these provisions form part of the general principle of competition 
within the EEC Treaty 1 3 7 because they all are designed to protect 
competition against distortion in accordance with Art. 3 f EEC Treaty. 
But the respective directions of protection of these provisions are 
different. 
Articles 30-36 EEC Treaty prohibit any measures by the Member States 
which constitute a barrier to the trade within the Community, no 
133 Europe-Documents, No. 6440, 27.2.1991, p. 9. 
1 3 6 OJ No C 101, 18.4.1991, p. 10. 
1 3 7 Hermann, "Ordnungsgrundlagen", op.cit. n. 31, p. 116. 
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matter whether these measures obstruct the trade "directly or indir-
ectly, actually or potentially". 1 3 8 Thus, Articles 30-36 EEC Treaty 
protect against obstacles to free trade that have been build up by 
states. 
The same is true for Art. 37 EEC Treaty, which relates to state 
monopolies and to trade restrictions forming part of, or linked to, 
the former. Those restrictions too, have their origin in certain 
measures by Member States. 
Articles 85-90 EEC Treaty, on the other hand, protect the intra-
community trade against barriers caused by the conduct of enterprises. 
The direction of protection of these provisions are not rules made by 
States but measures that have been taken up by undertakings, regard-
less whether they are public or private. 
The difference in the scope of protection results In the two types of 
provisions complementing one another. 
It would be of l i t t le use to prohibit public measures that affect the 
free movement of goods, i f undertakings were allowed to f ix prices or 
share markets and thereby infringed the trade between the Member 
States.139 
The same is true the other way round. Rules that prohibit the 
distortion of competition caused by undertakings, would be rather 
useless i f the States were allowed to build up trade barriers. 
1 3 8 Case 8/74 Procureur de Roi v Dasonville (1974] ECR 837 (852). 
1 3 9 J. Steiner, Textbook on EEC-Law, p. 102; see also V. Korah, 
Competition Law of Britain and the Common Market, p. 15 and D. 
Vaughan et al., in Halsbury's Laws of England, vol. 52, European 
Communities, para. 19.02. 
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6. Consequences for the Interpretation of the Provisions 
Since Articles 30-37 as well as Articles 85-90 EEC Treaty, all form 
part of the general principle of competition within the EEC Treaty, 
they must all follow the same lines of interpretation. 1 4 0 
This interlocking of the two groups of provisions in the principle of 
competition, makes i t necessary to consider all of these regulations 
when dealing with a certain problem. The interpretation of Articles 
85-90 EEC Treaty for example, also has to pay attention to the 
provisions relating to the free movement of goods.141 The ECJ thus uses 
certain principles and formulas which were originally developed in 
connection with the free movement of goods also in relation to the 
rules on competition.142 
The close connection between the rules relating to the free movement 
of goods and to state monopolies, and those relating to competition, 
therefore leads to the conclusion that there can be no substantial 
difference, when one applies them to a certain economic branch. The 
circumstances under which trade obstacles arising from state interfer-
ence or state monopolies are considered as being inconsistent with 
Treaty objectives, must be the same as those applying to measures by 
undertakings.143 
1 4 0 For the relationship between Articles 30-36 and the Treaty rules 
on competition see also L.W. Gormley, Prohibiting Restrictions on 
Trade within the EEC, pp. 228-233. 
1 4 1 C.W. Bellamy / G.D. Child, Common Market Law in Competition, p. 27; 
see also Vaughan, op.cit. n. 139, para. 19.02. 
1 4 2 The formula of the basis principle In Procureur de Roi v Dassonvil-
le (case 8/74 [19741 ECR 837 (852)) is extremely similar to that 
which the ECJ uses in relation to Art. 85 (1). (see for example 
case 56/65 Sociite Technique Mlniere v Maschlnenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 
235 (249) In both cases the ECJ referres to actual or potential, 
direct or indirect attempts to interfere with the free flow of 
trade within the Community; see Gormley, op.cit. n. 140, p. 231. 
1 4 3 Hermann, "Ordnungsgrundlagen", op.cit. n 31, p. 118. 
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7. Treaty Provisions Relevant for the Electricity Markets In 
England and Germany 
The rule that there are no substantial differences in applying the 
provisions on the rree movement of goods, on state monopolies or on 
competition to a certain branch of the economy also applies to the 
electricity market. This fact apparently allows us to concentrate on 
one kind of these provisions in the further considerations. 
In practice, most barriers to the exchange of electricity within the 
European Community are caused by activities from undertakings, or 
result from the existence of state monopolies, while there are only 
very few trade restrictions in the electricity market that fal l under 
Art. 30 EEC Treaty. 1 4 4 
The legal situation in England and Wales as well as in Germany in 
particular, is not characterized by state monopolies but rather by 
commercial arrangements. The provisions of the EEC Treaty relating to 
trade restrictions caused by state monopolies therefore play no role 
for the further development of the ESI in these countries. 
This also is the reason why Germany was not amongst those Member 
States against which the Commission has recently started legal procee-
dings, in connection with Art. 37 EEC Treaty. 1 4 8 The same applies to 
the ESI in England and Wales146. The proceeding started against the 
United Kingdom concerns, according to the Commission, merely the 
public electricity monopoly that st i l l exists in Northern Ireland. 
This proceeding, however, becomes invalid as soon as the imminent 
1 4 4 H. Gorner, "Fortbestand geschlossener Versorgungsgebiete im EG-
Energiemarkt" in W. Harms (ed) Konturen eines EG-Energlemarktes, 
pp. 65-76 (p. 72). 
148 Supra, n. 132. 
1 4 6 And Scotland. 
page 48 
privatisation leads to the abolition of the public monopoly there. 
The main emphasis of the further examinations therefore will lie on 
the application of the rules of competition in the narrow sense of the 
expression (Articles 85-90 EEC Treaty) to the ESI in Germany and 
England and Wales. 
E. Summary and Conclusion of Chapter 2 
It has been established that electricity is an important element of 
the energy balance in Europe and thus, plays a significant role in the 
establishment of an Internal energy market. 
The present situation on the electricity market is characterized by: 
three main ownership structures of the electricity utilities, the 
technical and economical peculiarities of the supply with electricity, 
supply monopolies nearly everywhere, different national energy poli-
cies, a lack of price transparency, and a small, but well working, 
power exchange between the electricity utilities of the Member States. 
Corresponding to the variety of characteristics of today's electricity 
market, and to the resulting trade barriers, the European Community 
has several instruments to support the further integration of the 
electricity market. 
In some aspects like, the transport of electricity through high 
voltage grids, progress has been made. Others, such as the harmoniza-
tion of the national laws and the introduction of competition, are 
stil l in its initial stages. 
The prospects of future success of the two last-named instruments are 
quite different. 
As far as the approximation of laws is concerned, progress depends on 
the willingness of the Member States to pass Directives or Regulations 
in the EC-Council. Therefore, the prospect of further advances as to 
the harmonization of energy laws and policies are determined by 
political factors rather than legal ones. 
In contrast to that, the Commission has autonomous powers i f i t comes 
to the application of the European competition law. Articles 86-90 EEC 
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Treaty are the only Treaty rules of Importance concerning which the 
Community not only legislates, but also is in charge of administration 
and execution of the Directives and Regulations. The progress of 
integration on the electricity market thus lies, as far as the 
European competition law is concerned, in the hand of the Commission. 
Articles 85-90 EEC Treaty therefore are important legal instruments 
when i t comes to the promotion of an internal electricity market in 
Europe. 
page 50 
Chapter 3 EC Competition Law and the Electricity Supply Industry 
A. Introduction 
In the preceding chapter i t has been established that the application 
of the European Rules on competition is an important instrument in the 
hands of the Commission to support the further integration of the 
electricity markets. 
This chapter deals with legal problems that are connected with 
application of Articles 85-90 EEC Treaty to the ESI. 
It starts by looking at the individual Treaty provisions on competi-
tion (part B). 
After having examined what kind of agreements and conducts on the 
electricity markets could possibly infringe Articles 85 or 86 EEC 
Treaty (part C), the discussion turns to the arguments that are raised 
against the introduction of competition to the ESI (part D). 
Following on from these arguments, i t will be scrutinized whether the 
application of Articles 85 and 86 EEC Treaty to the ESI is subject to 
any kind of restriction (part E). The main focus of this examination 
lies on the question whether the German and English electricity 
utilities are covered by Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty, and whether those 
undertakings are thus excluded from the application certain Treaty 
provisions. 
In the next step, i t will be examined whether Art. 85 (1) and Art. 86 
EEC Treaty contain inherent limitations, that is, whether they provide 
for sufficient scope of interpretation to take the peculiarities of an 
economic branch into account. An affirmative answer to this question 
means that certain distortions to competition do not infringe Articles 
85 (1) or 86 EEC Treaty since they are necessary to secure objectives 
compatible with Community values, other than competition (part F). 
Finally, i t will be necessary to examine which Community objectives 
are capable of supplying a compensatory justification for restraints 
to competition on the electricity market (part G). 
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B. The European Rules on Competition 
The European rules on competition can be found in Articles 85 - 90 EEC 
Treaty. 
Of particular importance for the ESI are Articles 85 and 86 EEC Treaty 
because these provisions determine whether certain anticompetitive 
agreements or practices on the electricity market are compatible with 
the EEC Treaty. 
I . Articles 85 and 86 EEC Treaty 
Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty prohibits "(...] agreements between undertak-
ings, decisions of associations of undertakings and concerted practi-
ces which may affect trade between Member States and which have as 
their object or effect the preventation, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the common market [...]" as incompatible with the 
common market, 
According to Art. 85 (2) EEC Treaty "[alny agreements or decisions 
prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically void." 
Para. 3 of Art. 85 EEC Treaty provides for the exemption of those 
cartels from the general prohibition in Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty which 
contribute "(...] to improving the production and distribution of 
goods or to promoting technical or economic progress while allowing 
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit [...]". 
Art. 86 EEC Treaty concerns the abuse of a dominant position. 
According to this provision "[ajny abuse by one or more undertakings 
of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial 
part of i t shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market 
in so far as i t may affect trade between Member States. [...]" 
The ECJ has consistently held Articles 85 (1) and 86 EEC Treaty to be 
of immediate and direct effect 1 4 7. 
Whether or not a Treaty provision is directly effective is not 
regulated in the Treaty itself. The whole concept of direct effect is 
1 4 7 See case 13/61 Kledingverkoopbedrijf de Geusen Uitdenbogerd v Bosch 
[1962] ECR 45 (p. 71); case 37/79 Marty v Lauder [1980] ECR 2481 
(p. 2500, consideration 13); case 155/73 Sacchi [1974] ECR 409 (p. 
430, consideration 18). 
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a product of the case-law of the ECJ.148 
A rule of Community Law Is said to be directly effective i f i t creates 
rights for individuals which have to be protected by municipal 
courts.1 4 9 A precondition for direct effect Is the 'direct applicabili-
ty'iso 0 f a i a w > Directly applicable means that a Community provision 
becomes automatically part of a domestic legal system without the 
necessity of further national measures of incorporation. 
As Articles 85 and 86 EEC Treaty are directly applicable and also 
directly Effective any activities or agreements which are covered by 
these provisions are automatically void. Everybody can rely on this 
invalidity before a national court. 1 8 1 As far as agreements between 
undertakings are concerned this effect also follows from Art. 85 (2) 
EEC Treaty. 
However, in opposition, Art. 85 (3), has no direct effect and national 
courts thus can not decide whether Art. 85 (1) is inapplicable to a 
certain agreement.102 Art. 9 of Regulation 17 1 9 3 rather reserves the power 
to grant exemptions from Art. 85 (1) exclusively to the European 
Commission. 
1 4 8 It was first pronounced in the famous case 26/62 Van Gend and Loos 
v Nederlands Administratie der Belastingen [19631 ECR 1. 
1 4 9 Steiner, op.cit. n. 139, p. 20. 
1 3 0 For the relation of the two concepts see J.A. Winter, "Direct 
Applicability and Direct Effect: Two Distinct and Different Con-
cepts in Community Law", (1972) 9 CMLRev pp. 425-438. 
1 9 1 Steiner, op.cit. n. 139, p. 105. 
1 0 2 See in place of many: E. Steindorff, "Article 85, Para. 3: No Case 
For Application by National Courts" (1983) 20 CMLRev. pp. 125-130 
(p. 125); see also S. Kon who has proposed that national courts 
should be permitted to apply Art. 85 (3) EEC Treaty in "Article 85, 
Para. 3: A Case For Application by National Courts" (1982) 19 
CMLRev pp. 541-560. 
1 8 3 JO 1962, 13/204 OJ 1959-62, 87. 
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I I . Articles 87 - 90 EEC Treaty 1 9 4 
Art. 87 EEC Treaty provides for a competence of the European Council 
to "[...] adopt any appropiate regulations or directives to give 
effect to the principles set out in Articles 85 and 86 EEC Trea-
ty.!...]" 
Until the entry into force of provisions according to Art. 87 EEC 
Treaty, Art.. 88 EEC Treaty allows the authorities of the Member states 
to rule on the admissibility of anticompetitive behaviour. 
Notwithstanding Art. 88, Art. 89 EEC Treaty establishes the competence 
of the European Commission to ensure the application of the principles 
laid down in Articles 85 and 86 EEC-Treaty. 
Art. 90 EEC Treaty finally deals with public undertakings and underta-
kings to which the Member States have granted certain rights or tasks. 
Art. 90 (1) EEC Treaty bans in the case of these undertakings the 
enactment or maintenance of "(...J any measure contrary to the rules 
contained in this Treaty [...]". Art. 90 (2) EEC-Treaty provides for 
the possibility to restrict the application of Treaty rules to 
undertakings entrusted with a service of general economic interest. 
C. Agreements and Conducts In the ESI that could come Into conflict 
with the Articles 85 and 85 EEC Treaty 
The agreements and conducts on the electricity market that are at risk 
of coming into conflict with Articles 85 and 86 EEC Treaty, can be 
divided into two categories. 
1 3 4 Articles 87 -89 EEC Treaty are by their nature not capable of 
conferring individual rights and thus are not direct effective (L. 
Collins, European Law in the United Kingdom, p. 125.) Art. 90 (1) 
EEC Treaty is was held directly effective in conjunction with Art. 
86 EEC Treaty (case 155/73 Sacchi [1974] ECR 409 (p. 430, 
consideration 18). Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty was held not to be of 
direct effect (case 10/71 Ministere Public of Luxembourg v Muller 
11971] ECR 723 (p. 730). 
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Firstly, there are conducts of, and contracts between, electricity 
utilities according to which they, for example, buy specified amounts 
of electricity from certain generators158, or refrain from suppling 
customers in each others supply areas etc. 
Those, and similar agreements and conducts, affect competition on 
the electricity market directly since they have repercussions on the 
possibility to compete for big industrial end users, or local distr i-
butors.1 8 6 
Secondly, there are agreements like the German Jahrhundertvertrag that 
require electricity producers to consume a specified quantity of 
indigenous coal, and hence promote the use of certain sources of 
energy in power stations.1 8 7 
The second group of agreements does not directly affect the possibili-
ty to import electricity from other Member States. 
As far as the the Jahrhundertvertrag is concerned, i t is up to each 
customer to buy electricity wherever he wants. All the Jahrhundert-
vertrag says, is that the German electricity producers have to 
generate a certain amount of their capacity from coal mined in 
Germany. Thus, regulations promoting the use of certain primary 
energies do not directly affect the possibility to compete for the 
1 8 8 See for example the German Demarcation and Concession Agreements 
decribed above. Agreements with similar effects exist in the 
English ESI. See details infra, chapter 4 parts B and C. 
186 -phis statement in no way implies that those agreements and conducts 
actually Infringe Articles 85 or 86 EEC Treaty. Whether or not this 
is the case will be the subject of chapter 4 infra. 
1 8 7 There are similar agreements between English generators and British 
Coal. 
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supply of large customers and local distributors. 1 8 8 
Agreements like the Jahrhundertvertrag pose different kind of problems 
than the agreements of the first category, which require detailed 
examination. The present thesis will therefore concentrate on those 
contracts and conducts that have direct effect on competition for the 
supply of customers on the electricity market. 
D. Technical and Economic Difficulties connected with the Introduction 
of Competition to the Electricity Supply Industry 
Since the beginning of the discussion about the introduction of more 
competition to the electricity market, there constantly have been 
publications dealing with details of the application of EC competition 
rules to the ESI.1 9 9 Some authors1 6 0 speak up for an at least temporary 
complete exclusion of the electricity sector from the application of 
Articles 85-90 EEC Treaty. Others161 try to define concrete terms for 
1 8 8 C. Schalast, "Der Binnenmarkt fur Energie und das System zur 
F6rderung der Kohleverstromung In der Bundesrepublik Deutschland" 
(1991) 52 RdE. pp. 2-5 (p. 3); those agreements, however, do have 
effect on competition on the energy market as a whole and hence can 
contradict Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. This is why the Commission at 
present examines the compatibility of the German Jahrhundertvertrag 
(see Notice pursuant to Art. 19 (3) of Regulation 17/62 OJ No C 
159, 29.6.1990, p. 7 and OJ No C 116, 30.4.1991, p. 6.) and of the 
British Coal Contracts (see Notice pursuant to Art. 19 (3) of 
Regulation 17/62 OJ No C 191, 31.7.1990, p. 9) with the EEC Treaty. 
1 8 9 See for example conference reports R. Lukes (ed.) Ein EWG-Blnnen-
markt fur Elektrlzitat - Realitat oder Utople, W. Harms (ed.) 
"Konturen eines EG-Energiemarktes; idem Atomstrom aus Frankrelch. 
1 6 0 This is for example the essence of P. Speich, "Rechtsfragen eines 
Strommarktes aus Franreich" (1984) 45 RdE, pp. 122-127; E. Schwark 
"Struktur der deutschen Elektrlzitatswlrtschaft im Lichte der Art. 
30 ff . . Art. 85 f f . EWGV" in U. Htiffner et al. (eds.) Berg- und 
Energierecht vor den Fragen der Gegenwart, Festschrift fur Fritz 
Fabrlclus. pp. 203-217. 
1 6 1 For example Hermann, op.cit. n. 31, passim; Kuhnt, "Obertragung von 
Strom" op.cit. n. 118, passim. 
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the application of competition rules, in order to come to terms with 
the characteristics of this economic area. 
The starting point of all considerations concerning the "if" and "how" 
of the inclusion of the ESI to the EC competition law, are the 
technical and economical peculiarities of the electricity supply 
described above.162 
Following on these peculiarities, i t is usual to refer to some 
economical and technical problems163 that could occur i f competition 
for the supply of big industrial end users and local distributors were 
introduced everywhere in the European Community. 
Whether or not these difficulties would actually arise, and how they 
could be solved, is highly controversial. 
This also is the result of the reports by special committees which 
have just been submitted to the European Commission. These reports 
talk of "major differences of view over the advantages and disadvanta-
ges of allowing third parties access to EC [...] electricity net-
works"164 
It has to be borne in mind, though, that most of the arguments against 
competition are put forward by the electricity industry itself. 
Therefore they often emphasize the disadvantages of competition in a 
very one-sided way. 
The content of this point solely is an enumeration of possible 
problems that could occur i f i t comes to the introduction of competi-
tion to the electricity market. Whether and how these difficulties, 
caused by the peculiarties of the ESI, justify a restriction of the 
principle of undistorted competition layed down in Art. 3 f EEC 
Treaty, will have to be discussed at a later stage.163 
162 Supra, chapter 2 part C.III.2. 
163 These problems are the same in all European Countries and also were 
taken into considaration in the discussion about privatisation in 
Great Britain; see J.W. Cotterell, "Strukturveranderungen in der 
britischen Elektrizitatsversorgung" in J.F. Baur (ed.) Neue Struktu-
ren in der Energieversorgung. pp. 53 -63 (p. 61). 
164 "EC divided over energy competition" Financial Times 28.5.1991; 
Europe-Documents, No. 5498, 25.2.1991, and No. 5499, 27./28.2.1991. 
169 Infra, chapter 3 parts F and G. 
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Some of the problems that are discussed with regard to the application 
of Articles 85-90 EEC Treaty to the electricity market, have special 
names. 
I. "Cherrypicking" 
The first problem is known under the keyword "cherry-picking".1 6 6 
The electricity utilities fear that the introduction of competition 
could result iii Sumt; of their must a I tractive industrial end users 
("cherries") being supplied by non local suppliers, especially from 
France. 
Through that, the electricity undertakings would loose consumers whose 
consumption they had taken into account in their calculation of future 
demands. 
The grid, as well as the production capacities, have been geared to 
the foreseeable amount of consumption in an area with a supply 
monopoly.167 The loss of big consumers could therefore result in 
economic difficulties for the electricity companies whose facilities 
run less to capacity than usual. In addition the basis for calculation 
of prices and investments, changes. While the non-local supplier only 
picks the "cherries", the local electricity uti l i ty has to continue 
the cost-intensive supply of small customers.168 
II. "Prodigal Son" 
The second problem Is referred to under the expression "prodigal 
son".169 and concerns difficulties that could arise i f a customer 
insists on being supplied by his local distributor (which has the duty 
to supply everybody within its area), after having terminated a 
contract with a non-local supplier. 
The local distribution boards could have difficulties to provide 
sufficient capacity for those returning customers, since i t is neces-
sary for them to make demand assessments several years in advance in 
1 6 6 In place of many H. Recknagel, "Versorgungswirtschaft und Wettbe-
werb" (1988) 38 ET pp. 385-392 (p. 391); the Commission deploys the 
term "creaming-off", COM (88) 238 final, p. 73. 
1 6 7 Seidel, op.cit. n. 106, p. 136. 
1 6 8 Arndt, op.cit. n. 32, p. 9. 
1 6 9 Cotterell, op.cit. n. 163, p. 61. 
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order to plan and construct the required facilities. Therefore they 
might not be able to meet unexpected increases of demand. 
The danger of having to supply "prodigal sons" therefore makes the f u -
ture planning of the local distribution boards much more diff icul t . 1 7 0 
III. Services Performed by Grldowners 
Another problem that could occur i f i t comes to the introduction of 
competition, is connected with the fact that in reality there is no 
such thing as a through transport of electricity through a grid, but 
that, in fact, simply an exchange of electricity takes place. 
The customer that signs a supply contract with an non local company is 
not directly supplied by that utility. In fact, the new supplier only 
feeds the amount of electricity his customer consumes into the grid of 
the local distributor. There the electricity flows irrespective of the 
supplier's or the customer's intention. The feeding in of electricity 
by the supplier, and the taking out by the customer are events that 
have nothing to do with each other.1 7 1 Therefore i t is the local 
distributor and not the non local uti l i ty who actually supplies the 
customer with electricity. 
At the same time the local distributor has to compensate the voltage 
fluctuation that comes into being i f electricity is fed into the 
grid. 1 7 2 
Thus the local distributor not only puts his network at the non local 
supplier's disposal, but he also provides other services just to make 
the requested through transport of electricity possible. These servi-
ces cause costs that need to be considered i f i t comes to the calcula-
tion of the transmission charges. 
1 7 0 G. Klatte, "Mehr Wettbewerb", op.cit. n.48, p. 132. 
1 7 1 Grawe. "Ein Gemeinsamer Strommarkt" op.cit. n. 32, p. 243. 
1 7 2 Flscherhof, "Stromdurchleitung", op.cit. n. 114, p. 19. 
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E. Arguments against the Application of Articles 85 and 86 EEC Treaty 
to the Electricity Supply Industry 
I . Introduction 
Proceeding from the technical and economical difficulties that might 
arise from the introduction of competition to the ESI several argu-
ments have been developed to restrict or exclude the application of 
Articles 85 and 86 EEC Treaty to the electricity market. 
The aim of these arguments is to "save" the existing supply monopolies 
and other distortions to competition on the electricity market from 
the verdict of invalidity that could perhaps result from an unrestric-
ted application of Articles 85 (1) and 86 EEC Treaty to them. 
Some authors want to give priority to the approximation of national 
energy policies, over the application of Articles 85 and 86 to the ESI 
(part II). 
Others deduce arguments against the application of those rules to 
the electricity market from the absence of provisions under Art. 87 
(2) (c) EEC Treaty (part III). 
A restriction to the deployment of Articles 85 and 86 EEC Treaty in 
respect to the ESI could finally derive from Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty 
(part IV). 
It is, however, not possible in this connection to refer to express 
Treaty provisions that unambiguously exempt the ESI from the applica-
tion of the European rules on competition. 
As far as certain activities shall not at all be subject to Articles 
85-90, the EEC Treaty provides for corresponding express provisions. 
Art. 42 EEC Treaty determines such an exemption of the competition 
rules for the production of, and the trade with, agricultural pro-
ducts. A provision concerning the electricity market that follows the 
example of Art. 42 EEC Treaty, cannot be found within the Treaty. 
Thus, there is no doubt that Articles 85-90 EEC-Treaty in principle, 
can be applied to the agreements and conducts on the electricity 
market.173 
In place of many see E. Nlederleithinger, "Strommarktproblematik 
nach deutschem und europaischem Wettbewerbsrecht" in R. Lukes (ed.) 
Ein EWG-Blnnenmarkt fur Elektrlzlt&t. pp. 63-85, (p. 66). 
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Moreover, the Commission has, until now, not issued any block exemp-
tions under Art. 85 (3) according to which Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty 
would be declared inapplicable to a category of agreements on the 
electricity market. Hence, no group of contracts in the ESI in 
general, is excluded from the application of Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 
I I . Priority of Approximation of National Laws? 
The national frameworks for the electricity industry differ, consider-
ably. 1 7 4 The variations concern fiscal treatment, environmental protec-
tion standards, use of certain primary energies, state aids etc. and 
cause considerable differences in the production costs for electrici-
ty. This in turn results In very unequal starting conditions for 
competition on the European Market. Whilst the utilities of some 
Member States will be able to offer very low prices, and thus will 
pick a lot of "cherries", the utilities of other European countries 
find themselves in a disadvantageous position to compete. 
The different national frameworks therefore lead some authors1 7 3 to 
suggest that the application of the Articles 85 and 86 EEC Treaty to 
the anticompetitive conducts on the electricity markets should be made 
subject to prior harmonization of the national energy politics. In 
other words; the approximation of national laws should take precedence 
over the implementation of the prohibitory provisions of the European 
competition law. 
If a single market is desired, i t is not possible to agree with this 
opinion. 
Approximation of national laws as a rule has no priority over the 
application of Community law. Otherwise, the application of the Treaty 
rules and hence the creation of a single market would be put off for 
Supra, chapter 2 part C.V. 
See for example Recknagel, "Versorgungswirtschaft", op.cit. n. 166, 
p. 387. 
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an indefinite period. 1 7 6 If i t was necessary to wait until all Member 
States have agreed to harmonize their national laws concerning a 
certain economic branch before one could apply prohibitory Treaty 
rules like Articles 85 and 86 EEC Treaty, the progress in establishing 
a common market would be very slow. 
In addition, the multitude of legal provisions makes i t nearly 
impossible to reach a stage at which all national rules significant 
for a certain area are harmonized. The energy sector for example, is 
directly or indirectly influenced by a variety of different regula-
tions. This leads to the problem that one would have to define at 
which point the law is "sufficiently approximated", so that i t is 
suitable to apply prohibitory Treaty provisions. 
For these reasons, approximation of national provisions and Implementa-
tion of primary European law have to run parallel instead of giving 
priority to harmonization.177 
This is why the ECJ constantly has held that Treaty provisions such as 
Articles 9, 30, 48, 52, 59, 85 and 86 are applicable irrespective of 
prior approximation of national laws. 1 7 8 In Commission v Italy for 
example, i t stated "The fundamental principle of a unified market and 
its collary, the free movement of goods, may not under any circumstan-
ces be made subject to the condition that there first be an approxima-
tion of national laws for i f that condition had to be fullfi l led the 
principle would be reduced to a mere cipher."179 According to Advocate 
General Darmon this statement of the law, which was made in connection 
with the relationship between Articles 30 and 100 EEC Treaty, can be 
1 7 6 L. Ritter, "Der Fortbestand geschlossener Versorgungsgebiete im EG-
Energiemarkt" in W. Harms (ed.) Konturen eines EG-Energiemarktes, 
pp. 77-82 (p. 78); Idem, "Die Anwendung der EG-Wettbewerbsregeln 
auf den zwischenstaatlichen Handel mit Elektrlzitat" in W. Harms 
(ed.) Atomstrom aus Frankreich pp.45-52 (46-47); Ehlermann, op.cit. 
n. 84, p. 36. 
1 7 7 Ritter, "Fortbestand geschlossener Versorgungsgebiete", op.cit. n. 
176, p. 78. 
1 7 8 Case 2/74 Reyners v Belgium [1974) ECR 631 (p. 652); case 33/74 
van Blnsbergen v Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Metaalnijverheid [19741 
ECR 1299 (pp. 1311-1312). 
1 7 9 Case 193/80 Commission v Italy [19811 ECR 3019 (p.3033 consideration 
17). 
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transposed to the European rules on competition.180 
From the above, i t follows that the application of Articles 86 and 86 
EEC Treaty to the European electricity industry is not subject to 
prior approximation of the national energy policies.1 8 1 This does not 
mean, however, that approximation of national laws is not desirable, 
nor does i t mean that the differences in the national frameworks 
receive no attention at all. It rather is necessary to take the 
differences into account, in interpreting the T r e a t y rules on corupeti— 
tlon. 1 8 2 
in. Lack of Provisions under Art. 87 (2) (c) EEC Treaty 
An exemption of the anticompetitive conducts on the electricity 
markets from the application of Articles 85 (1) or 86 EEC Treaty could 
perhaps be lnfered from Art. 87 (2)(c) EEC Treaty. 
1. Introduction 
Articles 85 (1) and 86 EEC Treaty are generally directly effective. 1 8 3 
Thus, agreements and conducts Infringing these provisions are void. A 
possible exception from this rule for certain economic branches 
Including the ESI, however, could perhaps follow from Art. 87 (2)(c) 
EEC Treaty. 
Art. 87 (2)(c) EEC Treaty empowers the Council to pass Regulations 
that "define, i f need be, in the various branches of the economy the 
scope of the provisions of Articles 85 and 86". 
Such a provision regulating the situation of competition in the 
electricity market has not been passed yet. 
Thus Art. 87 (2)(c) EEC Treaty at first sight seems to offer no 
possibility to substantiate a restriction, let alone an exclusion of 
1 8 0 See his opinion in case 45/85 Verband der Sachverslcherer v 
Commission [1987] ECR 405 (p. 433). 
1 8 1 Like here Ritter, "Fortbestand geschlossener Versorgungsgebiete", 
op.cit. n. 176, p. 78; idem, "Anwendung der EG-Wettbewerbsregeln" 
op.cit. n. 176. pp. 46-47; Ehlermann, op.cit. n. 84, p. 36. 
182 Infra, chapter 3 part G and chapter 4. 
183 Supra, chapter 3 part B.I. 
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the rules on competition with regard to the electricity market. 
Nevertheless, a few authors base their legal concerns about the 
application of Articles 85 (1) and 86 EEC Treaty to the ESI on the 
absence of Council Regulations under Art. 87 (2)(c) EEC Treaty. 1 8 4 
2. Implication of a Lack of Measures under Art. 87 (2)(c) EEC Treaty 
Starting point of their argument is the fact that Regulations under 
Art. 87 (2)(c) EEC Treaty must aim at giving effect to the principles 
set out in Articles 86 and 86 EEC-Treaty (Art. 87 (1) EEC Treaty). 
Thus, these Regulations also have to take the principles that found 
expression in Art. 85 (3) EEC Treaty into account. This provision 
allows those cartels that contribute to the achievement of certain 
goals like "improving the production and distribution of goods" to be 
exempt from the general prohibition in Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty . 
Prom this rule the principle is deduced that the prohibition of 
cartels must be set aside where free competition does not yield 
optimum economic performance. Therefore Art. 87 (2)(c) EEC Treaty is 
interpreted as requiring a Council Regulation in cases where, due to 
certain peculiarities, sectors of the economy show poorer results 
under the unrestricted application of competition rules than under a 
custom-tailored system. 
As a result of this interpretation, the EC Council in these cases is 
obliged to pass a Regulation under Art. 87 (2) (c) EEC Treaty. 1 8 3 Until 
the adoption of such a provision, the prohibitions contained in Art. 
85 (1) and 86 EEC Treaty do not apply to the economic branch in 
question.186 
This line of reasoning was first put forward in connection with the 
1 8 4 In particular B. BQrner, "Die vorlaufige Nichtanwendbarkeit des 
Art. 85 EWGV auf die Assekuranz" in Kolner Schrlften zum Europa-
recht. pp. 66-104. 
1 8 8 Bflmer, "Assekuranz", op.cit. n. 184, p. 104. 
188 Ibid., p. 74. 
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application of competition rules to the insurance sector187, and is now 
also being used for the ESI.1 8 8 
The ESI, according to this opinion, is a sector where free competition 
leads to poorer results than a system allowing several restraints of 
competition.189 This statement is usually backed up by a reference to 
the possible consequences competition for customers might have on the 
electricity market.190 
Therefore, these authors come to the conclusion that the European 
rii lf is on competition cannot be applied to the ESi until the EC Council 
has passed a Regulation under Art. 87 (2)(c) EEC Treaty. 
In other words, i t is claimed that Articels 85 and 86 EEC Treaty are 
not directly effective for the ESI. 
3. Direct Effect of Articles 85 (1) and 86 EEC Treaty for all Economic 
Branches 
In order to assess whether this claim could be justified i t is useful 
to look closer at the concept of direct effect. 
The EJC has developed a number of criteria 1 9 1 as to when a Community 
provision produces direct effect: 
a) The provision must not by its nature indicate that i t concerns the 
Member States only in their relations inter se. 
b) The provision must be clear and precise. 
c) It must not leave any discretion to Member States. 
d) It must be either unconditional or the conditions must have been 
fulfilled. 
e) No further measures on the part of the Member States or of the 
Community Institutions, must be required. 
1 8 7 Again see Borner, "Assekuranz", op.cit. n. 184, pp. 66-104; see 
also Commission Decision 5.12.1984, OJ No L 35, 7.2.1985, p. 20, 
upheald in case 45/85 Verband der Sachversicherer v Commission 
(19871 ECR 405. 
1 8 8 Lukes, "Einfiihrung", op.cit. n. 126, p. 2. 
1 8 9 Schwark, op.cit. n. 160, p. 209. 
190 Supra, chapter 3 part D. 
1 9 1 H.G. Schemers, D. Waelbroeck Judicial Protection in the European 
Communities. § 247; Collins, op.cit. n. 154 , p. 48. 
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Conditions a) to d) are obviously met by Articles 85 (1) and 86 EEC 
Treaty. The case against the direct effect of the two provisions aims 
at the last requirement. The question is, whether Art. 87 (2)(c) EEC 
Treaty is to be understood as making the applicability of Articles 85 
(1) and 86 EEC Treaty for certain branches of the economy subject to 
implementing measures of the Council. 
This would only be the case i f the two provisions could only be made 
workable by prior action of the Council. But, i f Art. 87 (2)(c) is 
only meant to faciliate the application of the competition rules, then 
an action by the Council is not absolutely 'required': i t is conven-
ient, but not a precondition for the application of Articles 85 (1) 
and 86. The latter interpretation is supported by the wording of Art. 
87 (1) EEC Treaty (on which para 2 builds up), which shows that 
measures under (2)(c) have the function to ease the practical d i f f i -
culties in the application of the competition rules to different kinds 
of undertakings: "The Council shall [...) adopt any appropriate 
regulations or directives to give effect to the principles set out in 
Articles 85 and 86." 
The view that measures under Art. 87 (2)(c) are not required, but 
merely facilitate the application of Articles 85 and 86, is also 
supported by the judgement of the EC J in Verband der Sachversicherer v 
Commission192. Here, the EC J as well, was confronted with the "Art. 87-
argument" and rejected i t outright. The Court, however, did not give 
detailed reasons, but the decisive objection had been formulated by 
Advocate-General Darmon193: "The enabling power granted by Article 87 
(2) (c) cannot determine the applicability of the principles set out 
in Articles 85 and 86 [...]. In fact, Article 85 contains all the 
machinery necessary for encompassing, by means of Article 85 (3), the 
particular characteristics of cooperation in a specific economic 
sector in accordance with the objective of Article 2 EEC Treaty. (...) 
the effectiveness of Treaty rules which have direct effect cannot be 
impaired by delay on the part of the institutions or the Member States 
in adopting implementing measures which are solely intended to make it 
easier to give effect to the rules and not to be the condition on 
which implementation depends [italics supplied)". 
1 9 2 Case 45/85 [1987) ECR 405. 
1 9 3 [1987) ECR 405 (p. 432). 
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4. Conclusion 
Thus the initial question must be answered as follows: 
Art. 87 (2)(c) EEC Treaty does not make the applicability of Articles 
85 (1) and 86 EEC Treaty for certain branches of the economy, such as 
the electricity market, subject to prior measures of the Council.194 
Details of the application of these provisions to anticompetitive 
conducts in the electricity industry are not thereby anticipated.1 9 8 
1 9 4 Everling, "Der Blnnenmarkt nach der Rechtsprechung des Gerichts-
hofs", op.cit. n. 123, p. 146. 
1 9 0 Concerning the question whether and how Articles 85 (1) and 86 EEC 
Treaty take the peculiarities of the electricity market into 
account see infra chapter 3 part F and G. 
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IV. The Controversy on Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty 
A limited exemption of Articles 85 and 86 EEC Treaty with regard to 
agreements and conducts on the electricity market, could finally 
derive from Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty. 
1. Scope of the Provision 
Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty provides that "undertakings entrusted with the 
operation of services of general economic interest or having the 
character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the 
rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to the rules on 
competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not 
obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks 
assigned to them". 
Despite this positive formulation of the provision, its importance 
lies in the fact that i t excludes the application of the normal rules, 
to the extent that they would prevent the accomplishment of the tasks 
of those enterprises.196 
The possibility of exempting undertakings from the application of the 
Treaty rules 1 9 7 is subject to a two-stage reservation.1 9 8 
Firstly, the unrestricted application of the EEC Treaty would have to 
make the performance of the task of the undertaking In question 
actually or legally, impracticable. Secondly, a deviation from the 
Treaty is only possible i f this does not affect the development of 
trade to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the 
Community. 
1 9 6 P. Schindler, "Public Enterprises and the EEC Treaty", (1970) 7 
CMLRev pp. 57-71 (p. 67). 
1 9 7 It is generally agreed that Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty represents a 
legal exception from all provisions of the Treaty and not just from 
the rules on competition; see A. Deringer, "The Interpretation of 
Article 90 (2) Of The E.E.C. Treaty", (1964/65) 2 CMLRev pp. 129-
138 (136). 
1 9 8 I . Pernice in E. Grabitz, Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag, Art. 90 no. 51. 
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2. Necessity to Decide Each Case Separately 
Looking at the comments to Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty one often finds the 
electricity industry mentioned as an example for an economic branch 
that carries out services of general economic interest. 1 9 9 
However, i t cannot be concluded from these comments, that all electri-
city undertakings in every Member State fal l within the scope of that 
provision. It is, on the contrary, necessary to check with every 
Member State whether its electricity utilities are undertakings en-
trusted with services of general economic interest within the meaning 
of Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty. This means that i t is not possible to 
examine the European ESI as a whole. 
There is, however, one objection that could be raised against a 
separate examination and decision for each Member State. 
It is conceivable that a Member State intentionally, and unilaterally 
creates electricity utilities that fa l l within the scope of Art. 90 
(2) EEC Treaty. 2 0 0 Thus, Member States could, by the means of an 
interventional and planned policy, exempt their electricity undertak-
ings from the application of the European competition law while the 
power utilities of other Member States are entirely covered by these 
1 9 9 I . Hochbaum in H. von der Greoben et.al. Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag, 
Art. 90 no. 31; R. Bieber in B. Beutler et.al., Die europaische 
Gemelnschaft - Rechtsordnung und Politlk, p. 355; Pernice op.eit. 
n. 198 Art. 90 no. 90; critical V. Emmerich, Das Wirtschaftsrecht 
der offentlichen Unternehmen, p. 452. 
2 0 0 Possible example: the foundation of the electricity-company ENEL by 
the Italian state. In 1962 private Italian electricity undertakings 
were nationalized by statutes and their assets transfered to the 
Ente Nazionale per l'Energia Elletrica, ENEL. 
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rules. 2 0 1 This could result in prejudices against those undertakings 
that do not fa l l under Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty. 
Such fears are unjustified. 
Even i f i t is conceded that certain undertakings are covered by 
Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty, they have not won the day yet. The reason for 
this lies mainly in the wording of Art. 90 (2) sentence 2 EEC Treaty, 
according to which an exemption from the competition rules is only 
possible to the extent to which this would not "be contrary to the 
interests of the Community". 
What these Interests of the Community are, has to be inferred from the 
principles and goals of the EEC Treaty, and leaves considerable scope 
of interpretation for the community institutions. 2 0 2 
The details of an exemption from the Treaty rules under Art. 90 (2) 
EEC Treaty are thus subject to carefull considerations evaluating all 
circumstances of the individual case.203 
Part of the circumstances that thereby are taken into account, is the 
question whether similar undertakings in other Member States also have 
the opportunity to exclude the application of the European competition 
law. 2 0 4 
The European Community thus has sufficient instruments at hand to 
avoid injustices that could be caused by an individual classification 
of each national ESI with regard to Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty. 
The question whether Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty covers the electricity 
2 0 1 The relationship between national public authorities and public 
undertakings tends to be very complex and unfathomable. 
For that reason the Commission has, in accordance with Art. 90 (3) 
EEC Treaty, issued a Directive of 25. June 1980 on the transparen-
cy of financial relations between Member States and public underta-
kings (OJ No L 195, 29.7.1980, p. 35). 
2 0 2 Pernice, op.cit. n. 198, Art. 90 no 58; see also D. Birkenmaier, 
"Gemeinsamer Markt, nationales Interesse und Art. 90 EWGV" (1988) 
23 EuR pp. 144-157 (p. 148). 
2 0 3 See for example case 41/83 Italy v Commission (1985] ECR 873 (pp. 
887 et. seq.). 
2 0 4 D. Birkenmaier, op.cit. n. 202, p. 148. 
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utilities of one Member State, therefore has to be answered irrespecti-
ve of its application to the ESI of other Member States.203 
Since i t is necessary to check the applicability of Art. 90 (2) EEC 
Treaty with regard to the specific characteristics of the national 
ESIs, an examination including all twelve Member States would go 
beyond the scope of this paper. The present thesis therefore concen-
trates on the English and Welsh as well as the German electricity 
utilities. 
3. Interpretation of "Undertakings" 
The first question that arises is whether the English, Welsh and 
German electricity utilities are "undertakings" in the meaning of Art. 
90 (2) EEC Treaty. 
The EEC Treaty does not provide a definition of the term 
"undertaking". Since Art. 90 EEC Treaty is part of the chapter "Rules 
on Competition", i t is appropriate to refer to the interpretation of 
"undertaking" developed in connection with Articles 85 and 86 EEC 
Treaty. 2 0 6 
Apart from some minor differences of opinion, i t is commonly agreed 
that "undertaking" in the meaning of those provisions is any natural 
person or association engaged in commercial activities.207 
The English and Welsh, as well as the German electricity utilities are 
covered by that definition, because they are engaged in the generation 
of / or trade with, electricity. 
It nevertheless is questionable though, whether the electricity compa-
nies in England and Germany qualify as "undertakings" in the meaning 
2 0 8 Blrkenmaier, op.cit. n. 202, p. 148; Stewing, op.cit. n. 50, p. 150. 
2 0 6 H. Smit/P. Herzog, The Law of the EEC: A Commentary on the Treaty 
vol. 3, para. 90.08 b. 
2 0 7 U. Everling in E. Wohlfarth et al. Europaische Wirtschaftsgemein-
schaft; Kommentar zum Vertrag. Art. 85 no. 1. 
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of Art. 90 EEC Treaty. 
According to the wording of its para. (1), this provision concerns 
"public undertakings", whereas the English and German electricity 
utilities are mainly privately owned.208 In contrast to Art. 90 (1) EEC 
Treaty, Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty however, is not addressed expressly to 
"public undertakings" but to "undertakings", albeit of a particuar 
kind. This is why i t is generally agreed that Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty 
applies not only to public, but also to private undertakings.209 The 
ECJ has stated that explicitly in BRT v SABAM.210 Referring to Art. 90 
(2) EEC Treaty i t held: "Private undertakings may come under that 
provision [ . . ] " 2 U . 
It follows that the English and German electricity utilities, despite 
their private status, are "undertakings" within the meaning of Art. 90 
(2) EEC Treaty. 2 1 2 
4. Interpretation of "Operation of Services" 
The next question that arises is whether the electricity companies in 
England and Germany perform the "operation of services" within the 
meaning of Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty. 
In the system of the EEC Treaty, the supply with electricity has to be 
classified as supply with a "good" and not as "service" in the meaning 
of Articles 59-66 EEC Treaty. 2 1 3 
The tasks of the electricity undertakings therefore could not be 
regarded as a "service" In the meaning of Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty, i f 
208 Supra, chapter 2 part C.II.2.-3. 
2 0 9 Bellamy/Child, op.cit. n. 141, p. 573; Hochbaum, op.cit. n. 199, 
Art. 90 (2) no. 28. 
2 1 0 Case 127/73 [1974] ECR 313. 
211 Ibid., p. 318 consideration 20. 
2 1 2 For the German electricity undertakings see in place of many: 
Arndt, op.cit. n. 32, p. 21. 
213 Supra, chapter 2 part D.IV.3. 
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the expression "operation of services" in this provision had the same 
meaning as "services" in Articles 59-66 EEC Treaty. 
The main argument in favour of the view that only "services" according 
to the definition in Art. 60 EEC Treaty, fall under Art. 90 (2) EEC 
Treaty, is that this interpretation would narrow the scope of Art. 90 
(2) EEC Treaty. 2 1 4 This outcome is welcome, because Art. 90 (2) EEC 
Treaty provides for an exception to the application of Treaty rules 
and therefore must not be given a wide construction.2 1 8 
At this point i t has to be asked though, whether that narrow 
interpretation of "services" corresponds to the function of Art. 90 
(2) EEC Treaty. 
The goal of this provision is to enable the Member States to perform 
certain tasks of public interest in a way that might contradict the 
achievement of Community objectives.216 These tasks of public interest 
can be services within the meaning of Art. 60 EEC Treaty but they also 
can concern goods, capital or persons. Whether the undertakings in 
question are dealing with services, goods or capital, therefore cannot 
make a difference for the question whether they are covered by 
Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty. 2 1 7 An exemption of undertakings dealing with 
goods or capital would be arbitrary. 2 1 8 
Thus, it is generally maintained that "operation of services" in 
Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty has to be interpreted in a much wider way than 
2 1 4 Smit/Herzog, op.cit. no. 206, vol. 3 para. 90.12 b. 
2 1 0 Vaughan, op.cit. n. 139, para. 19.109; C.S. Kerse, EEC-Antitrust 
Procedure, p. 20; Smit/Herzog, op.cit. n. 206, vol. 3 paras. 
90.11-90.12. 
2 1 6 E.J. Mestmacker, Europftisches Wettbewerbsrecht, p. 653. 
2 1 7 Smit/Herzog, op.cit. n. 206, vol. 3 para. 90.12 b; Hochbaum, op. 
cit. n. 199, Art. 90 no. 31. 
2 1 8 BSrner, "Artikel 90 II EWGV", op.cit. n. 121, p. 255. 
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"service" in Art. 60 EEC-Treaty.219 Apart from services in the narrow 
sense of the word, i t covers the providing, maintenance and distribu-
tion of goods. 
Therefore "service" in the meaning of Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty, covers 
all tasks that are connected with the supply of electricity although 
electricity as such, has to be regarded as "good".220 
It follows that in England and Wales as well as in Germany, the ESI 
as a whole performs the operation of a service within the meaning of 
Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty. 
5. Interpretation of "entrusted" with a Service of "general economic 
interest" 
The last requirement of Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty is that the undertak-
ings In question are "entrusted" with a service of "general economic 
interest". 
a. Advantages of a Joint Application of "entrusted" and "general 
economic interest" 
The final decision of the question whether the German and English 
electricity utilities are covered by Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty requires a 
joint examination of the term "entrusted" and "general economic 
interest". 
An isolated examination of those elements is hardly reasonable since 
2 1 9 Hochbaum, op.cit. n. 199, Art. 90 no. 31; Smit/ Herzog, op.cit. n. 
206, vol.3 para. 90.12 b; Pernice, op.cit. n. 198, Art. 90 no. 35 
et seq; R. Lukes "Energiewirtschaftliche Demarkationsvertrage und 
EWG-Wettbewerbsrecht" (1987) 40 DB pp. 1925-1929 (p. 1926); H.P. 
Ipsen, Europalsches Gemelnschaftrecht, p. 908; Mestmacker, op.cit. 
n. 216, pp. 661 et seq.; A.A. Schweitzer, Per grenzuberschreltende 
Stromverbund in Europa. p. 133; Arndt, op.cit. n. 32, p. 21. 
2 2 0 Hochbaum, op.cit. n. 199, Art. 90 no. 31. 
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an entrusting cannot take place without a task and a task cannot be 
conferred upon someone without an act of conferring. 2 2 1 
Moreover, the formal act, although a necessary part, cannot be 
decisive for the existence of an enstrusting. Crucial for the classi-
fication of an entrusting rather is the substantive quality of the 
task conferred.222 
Therefore i t will be necessary to examine in a first step the 
interpretation of the terms "entrusted" (part b.) and "general econo-
mic interest" (part c.) and in a second step to jointly apply the 
findings to the German and English ESIs (parts d. and e.). 
b. The Meaning of "entrusted" 
The ECJ did not have to decide many cases yet, In which the 
interpretation of "entrusted" was at issue.223 Thus, i t has not 
developed a concise definition of that term. But, one nevertheless can 
derive certain rules from the decisions so far. 
aa. Act of Public Authority 
Until now, the European Court always has given the act of entrusting a 
narrow construction. 
Fundamental for this interpretation was the case BRT v SABAMP2*. Here 
the ECJ held that an undertaking can only be regarded as entrusted, i f 
a task is conferred upon i t by virtue of "an act of public authority". 
The Court substantiated its restriction of permissible national legal 
2 2 1 C. Stewing op cit n. 50 at p. 148. 
2 2 2 Emmerich, op.cit. n. 199, p. 446; Stewing, op.cit. n. 50, p.148, 
see also Mestmacker, op.cit. n. 216, p. 661 and Schlndler, op.cit. 
n. 196, pp. 68-69. 
2 2 3 See for example case 10/71 Ministere Public of Luxembourg v Muller 
[1971] ECR 723; case 127/73 BRT v SABAM and NV Fonior [1974] ECR 
313. 
2 2 4 Case 127/73 BRT v SABAM and NV Fonior [1974] ECR 313 (p. 318 
considerations 19-21). 
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institutions for an entrusting, with the argument that the reference 
in Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty "particular tasks assigned to them" also 
applies to undertakings having the character of a revenue-producing 
monopoly. 
In other words; since the assignment of certain tasks to revenue-
producing monopolies requires a special form, the entrusting of under-
takings has to meet the same requirements. 
With this judgement, the Court rules out a contract under private law 
being sufficient for an entrusting. The ECJ in any case, requires an 
act of public authority which either could be a statute 2 2 8, or an 
individual act 2 2 6. 
bb. Conferring of Obligations 
The second requirement for an entrusting, is that specific responsibi-
lities and obligations are conferred upon the undertakings in que-
stion. 2 2 7 
Therefore, a public allowance to carry out a certain business that 
does not provide for some kind of obligation, does not meet the 
requirements.228 
Neither is an obligation sufficient which merely repeats legal duties 
that exist anyway. This was the reason why the European Commission 
refused to regard GEMA, the German performing right society as 
"entrusted".229 GEMA claimed to be "entrusted" by the provisions of the 
2 2 8 In case 10/71 Ministere Public of Luxembourg v Muller (1971) ECR 
723 the Court regarded an undertaking as entrusted whose obligation 
was conferred upon i t by law. 
2 2 6 In case 172/80 Zilchner v Bayrische Vereinsbank 11981] ECR 2021 the 
Court simpy referred to "an act"; see Vaughan, op.cit. n. 139, 
para. 19.110 note 10. 
2 2 7 Case 127/73 BRT v SABAM and NV Fonior (1974] ECR 313 (p. 318). 
2 2 8 Lukes, "Demarkationsvertrage", op.cit. n. 219, p. 1927. 
229 Decision de la commission du 2 juin 1971 relative & une procedure 
d'application de l'article 86 du traitS CEE (GEMA), JO 1971, L 134, 
20.6.1971, p. 15. 
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Federal Law relating to the management of copyrights. It was true that 
GEMA had been granted authorization in accordance with § 1 of that 
law. The European Commission nevertheless rejected the plea that GEMA 
was "entrusted", because its obligation under the Copyright Law to 
contract, corresponded to a general rule of German law, according to 
which all monopoly enterprises are under a legal compulsion to enter 
into a contract.2 3 0 
cc. Summary of Part b. 
Summing up, the following formal conditions have to be met in order to 
regard the undertaking in question as "entrusted" in the meaning of 
Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty: There must be an act of a public authority 
that grants the right to carry out a certain task and imposes obliga-
tions which go beyond normal responsibilities under the general laws. 
c. The Meaning of "General Economic Interest" 
aa. Necessity to find a "European Interpretation" 
The expression "general economic interest" cannot be found in the law 
of any Member State.2 3 1 
Moreover, Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty gives li t t le guidance as to the 
interpretation of the term and the ECJ has not yet clearly defined the 
scope of "general economic interest"2 3 2. 
This is why some authors suggest that i t should be up to the Member 
States to define what their "general economic interests" are.2 3 3 
2 3 0 This obligation finds its roots in several rules like §§ 134, 138, 
242, 862 BGB (German Civil Code) and § 26 GWB (German Anti-Cartel 
Law). 
2 3 1 Hochbaum, op.cit. n. 199, Art. 90 no. 33. 
2 3 2 Vaughan, op.cit. n. 139, para. 19.111 note 7. 
2 3 3 See Smit/Herzog, op.cit. n. 206. vol. 3 para. 90.12 b; Deringer, 
op.cit. n. 197, p. 136. 
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This approach has to be rejected. 
Leaving the definition of their "general economic interest" completely 
to the Member States would result in a considerable lack of uniformi-
ty, since every task, apart from those conferred upon the European 
Community, could be classified as being of "general economic inter-
est".234 In this case, the application of Treaty provisions and thus 
the scope of intregration, would be subject to the discretion of the 
Member States. 
Therefore, i t cannot be left completely to the Member States to 
define "general economic interest". Rather, i t is necessary to inter-
prete the term uniformly. 
bb. "General Economic Interest" as Public Interest 
Following on the need to find a uniform Interpretation i t is necessa-
ry to examine in which context "general economic interest" is used. 
Though "general economic interest" cannot be found in the law of any 
Member State, i t is of interest to notice that the expressions 
"general" and "general public" are often used in conjunction with 
definitions of public interest. 2 3 0 
Therefore, some authors come to the conclusion that "general economic 
interest" has to be equated with public interest236 This opinion can 
be supported especially because the ECJ, In interpreting the term 
"general economic interest", also takes the purposes of public economy 
interests into account.237 
Thus, "general economic Interest" within the meaning of Art. 90 (2) 
2 3 4 Mestmacker. op.cit. n. 216, at p. 661. 
2 3 3 Stewing, op.cit. n. 50, p. 159. 
2 3 6 Mestmacker, op.cit. n. 216, p. 660; H.P. Ipsen, "Offentliche 
Unternehmen und gemelnsamer Markt" (1964) NJW p. 2336; K. Vygen 
Offentliche Unternehmen im Wettbewerbsrecht der EWG, pp. 97 et 
seq; C. Stewing op cit n. 50 at p. 160; Pernice, op.cit. n. 198, 
Art. 90 no. 36. 
2 3 7 MestmScker, op.cit. n. 216, p. 660; see for example case 10/71 
Ministere Public of Luxembourg v Miiller [1971] ECR 723 (p. 730). 
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EEC Treaty, has to be understood as corresponding to the public 
interest of the Member States.238 
The economic-political concepts of the individual Member States have 
hence to be taken into consideration after all. 
This is because the Member States, in determining what tasks are of 
public interest, cannot orient themselves at the goals of the Communi-
ty, but have to take their respective needs and special problems into 
account. 
The standards, however, according to which a public interest of a 
Member States can be accepted by the Community as a "general economic 
interest" within the meaning of Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty, have to be 
uniform and identical for all Member States.239 
The question arises as to what these standards are. 
cc. Standards for the Acceptance by Community Law 
Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty excludes undertakings that perform special 
tasks from the application of Treaty provisions. The reason for that 
exclusion lies in the assumption that those undertakings would have 
difficulties to continue the performance of their tasks, i f all Treaty 
rules were applied to them. 
But why does Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty try to protect these undertakings 
against difficulties? 
Obviously, the underlying idea behind Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty is that 
the tasks in question shall be performed in any case, even if this, 
due to the market conditions, is not profitable. 2 4 0 The goal of Art. 90 
(2) EEC Treaty thus is the maintenance of those services despite their 
possible uneconomicalness. 
Therefore a "general economic interest" in the meaning of Art. 90 (2) 
2 3 8 A. Page, "Member States, Public Undertakings and Art. 90", (1982) 7 
EuLRev, pp. 19-35 (p. 29); Schlndler, op.cit. n. 196, p. 70. 
2 3 9 Pernice, op.cit. n. 198, Art. 90 no. 35; Emmerich, op.cit. n. 199, 
p. 454; critical Page, op.cit. n. 238, pp. 29-30. 
2 4 0 Mestm&cker, op.cit. n. 216. p. 662. 
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EEC Treaty exists, i f an undertaking has the obligation to carry out 
the task conferred upon i t , even in cases were i t is not worthwhile to 
do so.2 4 1 
If a Member State values the public interest in the performance of a 
certain task, as more important than the interests of the undertaking 
in making and maximizing profit, this public Interest is a "general 
economic interest" within the meaning of Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty. 2 4 2 
The planning and interests of the undertaking have to be completely 
subordinated to the public interest. This requirement is only met i f 
the business has to be carried on, even i f this were not economically 
worthwhile from a profit orientated entrepreneur's point of view. It 
is not sufficient that the scope for profits is not quite as large as 
without the obligations conferred upon the untertaking in question.243 
dd. Summary of Part c. 
It follows that an undertaking carries out services of "general 
economic interest" according to Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty if: 
- the service lies within the public interest of the respective Member 
State and 
- the state interfers with the interests of the undertaking to such an 
extent that its (the undertakings) interests are subordinated to the 
public interests in the performance of the task. 
d. Application to the Electricity Undertakings in Germany 
aa. Introduction 
In order to be regarded as undertakings "entrusted" with a service of 
"general economic interest", the electricity utilities have to meet 
2 4 1 Stewing, op.cit. n. 50, p. 166; Mestmacker, op.cit. n. 216, pp. 
662-663. 
2 4 2 Mestmacker, op.cit. n. 216, pp. 662-663; Stewing, op.cit. n. 50, p. 
166; Emmerich, op.cit. n. 199, pp. 449 et seq. 
2 4 3 Mestmacker, op.cit. n. 216, pp. 662-663. 
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the following conditions: 
A task has to be conferred upon them by an act of public authority 
providing for obligations that go beyond normal responsibilities, under 
the general law. 
There must be a public interest in the performance of the task, and 
the undertaking must be obliged to continue i t , irrespective of a 
possible infringement of its own economic Interests. 
bb. Electricity Supply as Task of Public Interest 
The first question that arises is, whether the supply with electricity 
is regarded as a task of public interest by the German state. 
Fundamental for the legal framework of the electricity supply in 
Germany is the Energiewirtschaftsgesetz244. In its preamble, this 
statute declares that electricity must be utilized in a way that takes 
the public interest into account and guarantees an essential public 
influence upon its utilization. Thus, the electricity supply in 
Germany obviously is of public interest. 2 4 3 
The next question is whether the German electricity supply undertak-
ings are "entrusted" with their task. 
The first condition for an entrusting Is that the task has been 
conferred upon the electricity utilities by an act of public authori-
ty. 
2 4 4 Law on the Energy Industries (referred to as EnWG) from December 
13, 1935. 
2 4 8 Schwark, op.cit. n. 160, p. 206; Stewing, op.cit. n. 50, p. 160. 
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cc. Act of Public Authority 
§ 5 EnWG246 states that an undertaking taking up the supply of others 
with electricity, needs an authorization by the Minister of Economics. 
Thus, power supply in Germany is subject to approval. The authoriza-
tion by the Minister of Economics is an act of public authority, and 
therefore satisfies the conditions for the existence of an entrusting 
set up by the ECJ.247 
But such an act of public authority alone is not sufficient. The 
second condition is the conferring of an obligation or responsibility 
upon the undertakings.248 
dd. Conferring of Obligations 
- Obligations conferred by § 6 EnWG 
The required obligation of the electricity undertakings could ensue 
from § 6 EnWG, according to which the distribution utilities have the 
duty to connect all premises to their network, and to supply them. 
The function of § 6 EnWG, however, is mainly a clarifying one. In 
imposing an obligation to provide and maintain services for everybody 
this provision merely repeats a general concept of German law accor-
ding to which any monopolistic supply util i ty is under an obligation 
to enter into contract.2 4 9 Thus, the electricity utilities had to 
2 4 6 § 5 EnWG does not have much practical relevance. This is because 
this provision only concerns the commencement of power supply and 
when the EnWG entered into force in 1935 nearly all ulitities that 
today are engaged in the supply of electricity existed already; 
Nlederleithinger, op.cit. n. 173, p. 75. 
2 4 7 With the same result Lukes, "Demarkationsvertrage", op.cit. n. 219, 
p. 1927. 
2 4 8 BSrner, "Art. 90 I I " , op.cit. n. 121, p. 258; Everllng, "Der Bin-
nenmarkt nach der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs", op.cit. n. 123, 
p. 152. 
249 Supra, chapter 3 part E.IV.5.b.bb. 
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supply everybody, even before the EnWG came into force. 2 9 0 
The responsibilities conferred upon the electricity utilities by § 6 
EnWG hence do not go beyond the legal obligations under normal law, 
and therefore are not sufficient to regard the undertakings as 
"entrusted" In the sense of Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty. 2 9 1 
In addition, there is another argument which supports the view that 
the obligation under § 6 EnWG cannot justify the assumption of an 
enstrusting. 
An undertaking can only be regarded as "entrusted" with a service of 
"general economic interest", i f i t is obliged to continue its task 
even where and when this contradicts the economic interests of the 
company. 
This condition is not met by the German electricity utilities. It is 
true that they have to supply every customer even those that live in 
rural areas. In some cases the costs for providing the necessary lines 
or plants are much higher than the profit the uti l i ty ever can make by 
selling electricity to a certain customer. But this obligation does 
not interfer with the economical interests of the electricity underta-
king. This is because the electricity utilities are allowed to 
calculate the tariffs for domestic supply on the basis of a mean-
calculation which takes those "loss-producing" customers into account. 
Thus the tariff-prices always are high enough to ensure that inspite 
the "problem" customers, the electricity undertakings make profits on 
aggregate. 
Summing up, the obligation conferred upon the German electricity u t i -
lities by § 6 EnWG, does not allow for several reasons, the conclu-
sion that they are entrusted in the sense of Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty. 2 8 2 
The question arises whether an entrusting can be infered from other 
2 8 0 Niederleithinger, op.cit. n. 173, p. 77; Stewing, op.cit. n. 50, p. 
184. 
2 8 1 Arndt, op.cit. n. 32, p. 21. 
2 8 2 Like here Borner, "Art. 90 I I " , op.cit. n. 121, p. 263; Niederlei-
thinger, op.cit. n. 176, p. 77; Stewing, op.cit. n. 50, p. 185. 
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provisons of the German EnWG that provide for obligations of the 
electricity utilities. 
- Obligations conferred by 8 7 EnWG 
§ 7 EnWG enables a regulatory authority to influence the tariffs and 
conditions of domestic supply. The question arises whether the state, 
by the means of that competence, can subordinate the economical 
interests of the electricity undertakings to the interests of the 
general public. 
The tariffs have, according to § 7 EnWG, to be calculated in an 
economical way. It is generally maintained293 that this goal is 
achieved i f the tariff-calculation balances operational and economical 
interests of the undertakings with the customers interests. In spite 
of lots of differences of opinion concerning the details of this 
calculation2 8 4, there is agreement that at the end of the day, the 
interests of neither side should be set aside to an unacceptable 
extent. No party may be exposed to conditions which are economically 
unreasonable.288 Thus, the state cannot dictate tariffs that endanger 
the economic existence of the electricity undertakings. 
From the above, i t follows that the obligation conferred upon the 
electricity utilities by virtue of § 7 EnWG are not of such nature as 
to regard the undertakings as "entrusted".286 
Neither are there any other obligations conferred upon the electricity 
utilities by the EnWG that would justify to regard them as "entrus-
2 8 3 H. Fischerhof, "Von der alten zur neuen Tarifordnung fur Elektri-
zitat", (1972) 22 ET, p. 84. 
2 8 4 See the enumeration in Stewing, op.cit. n. 50, pp. 180-181. 
2 8 8 H. Fischerhof, "Stromdurchleitungen", op cit n. 114 at p. 84. 
2 8 6 Stewing, op.cit. n. 50, p. 182. 
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ted". 2 3 7 
ee. Summary to Part d. 
It follows that the German electricity undertakings are not "entrus-
ted" with a "service of general economic interest" within the meaning 
of Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty. 2 9 8 
e. Application to the Electicity Undertakings In England 
aa. Introduction 
The same conditions2 8 9 under which the German ESI would be regarded as 
"entrusted" with a service of "general economic interest" apply to the 
English electricity undertakings. 
bb. Electricity Supply as Task of Public Interest 
Again, the first step of the analysis is the question of whether the 
English electricity utilities perform a task of public interest. 
2 8 7 In this connection some authors examine §§ 3,4,8,9 and 11 EnWG but 
they don't reach an other outcome, see for example Stewing, op. 
clt. n. 50. pp. 174-186 and Borner, "Art. 90 I I " , op.cit. n. 121, 
pp. 258-266. 
2 8 8 Like here BSrner, "Art. 90 I I " , op.cit. n. 121, p. 266; Klaue, "Der 
Strombezug industrleller Sonderabnehmer nach deutschem und euro-
paischem Kartellrecht", (1986) VIK-Mitt. pp. 150-154 (p. 154); 
Birkenmaler, op.cit. n. 202, pp. 150 et seq; Stewing, op.cit. n. 
50, p. 188; Niederleithinger, op.cit. n. 173, p. 78; Lukes, 
"Demarkatlonsvertrage", op.cit. n. 219, p. 1927; unlike here 
Schwark, op.cit. n. 160, p. 216; Speich, op.cit. n.160, p. 127; 
Schweitzer, op.cit. n. 219 pp. 134 et seq; Hermann, "Ordnungs-
grundlagen", op.cit. n. 31, p. 21. 
209 Supra, chapter 3 part E.IV.5.d.aa. 
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Sec. 3 of the Electricity Act 1989 lays down general duties of the 
Secretary of State and the Director General of Electricity Supply. 
Amongst a number of other obligations, they have to exercise their 
function in a way that "secures that all reasonable demands for 
electricity are satisfied" (sec. 3 (l)(a)) and "protects the interests 
of the customers..." (sec. 3(3)(a)). These duties conferred upon the 
bodies responsible for the supervision of the ESI, signifies the 
importance the legislator attributes to the electricity supply. 
Moreover, a whole chapter of the Electricity Act (sections 32-38) has 
the headline "Protection of Public Interest". 
These provisions demonstrate that the power supply in England and 
Wales is considered as a task of public interest. 
It now has to be examined whether the electricity utilities are 
"entrusted" with that task. 
One condition for that is the existence of an act of public autho-
rity. 
cc. Act of Public Authority 
According to sec. 4 Electricity Act, i t is an offence to generate, 
transmit or supply electricity unless the person is "authorized to do 
so by licence or exemption". 
An exemption is granted by the Secretary of State under sec. 5 
Electricity Act and can be considered, for example, in cases of very 
small amounts of generation.260 People generating, transmitting or 
supplying electricity normally need a licence issued under sec. 6 
Electricity Act, by the Secretary of State or the Director General of 
Electricity Supply. 
Licensing is an administrative procedure by which the carrying out of 
a trade or business is authorized, which is not allowed to be carried 
2 6 0 Sas, op.cit. n. 39, p. 493. 
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out without such a licence.261 This public procedure can, for example, 
be used by the State in order to enforce or maintain technical stand-
ards or restrict the number of persons engaged in a certain aci t ivi-
ty . 2 6 2 
The granting of a licence under sec. 6 Electrcity Act is thus an act 
of public authority. 
However, just as an allowance under § 5 EnWG is not sufficient to 
create a case of entrusting, the licence according to sec. 6 Electri-
city Act alone cannot justify the assumption that the English electri-
city utilities are entrusted in the sense of Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty. 
Rather i t is necessary that obligations and responsibilities are 
conferred upon the undertakings which subordinate their own economical 
interests, to the interests of the general public. 
dd. Conferring of Obligations 
The Electricity Act contains far-reaching powers of intervention for 
the Secretary of State as well as for the Director General of 
Electricity Supply. Some of these powers of intervention flow directly 
from the Electricity Act. 2 8 3 With regard to others, the Electricity Act 
empowers the Secretary of State and the Director General of Electrici-
ty Supply to build them into the licences by imposing condtitions and 
2 6 1 For details see J.F. Garner/B.L. Jones, Administrative Law, pp. 26 
et. seq.; D. Foulkes, Administrative Law, pp. 93 et. seq.; J.A.G. 
Griffith/H. Street, Principles of Administrative Law, pp. 148-149, 
184-187. 
2 6 2 Garner/Jones, op.cit. n. 261, p. 26. 
2 6 3 See for example: sec. 9 Electricity Act concerning the general 
duties of all licence holders; 
sec. 25 Electricity Act giving the Director General of Electricity 
Supply the power to issue final orders to secure that a licence 
holder complies with all conditions and requirements; 
sec. 28 Electricity Act providing for a power of the Director 
General of Electricity Supply to require information etc. 
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obligations on the licensees.264 
Duties of the electricity utilities that might justify the assumption 
of an entrusting could above all ensue from sec. 7 or sec. 16 
Electricity Act. 
The question is whether those obligations imposed on the undertakings 
disregard their economical interests. 
- Obligations conferred by Sec. 7 Electricity Act 
Sec. 7 Electricity Act deals with conditions licences may contain. 
Firstly, licences can impose conditions that seem requiste with regard 
to the duties of the Secretary of State and the Director General of 
Electricity Supply laid down in sec. 3 Electricity Act. 
Sec. 3 Electricity Act obliges the Secretary of State and the Director 
General of Electricity Supply for example to exercise their functions 
in a manner which they consider is best calculated: 
"to secure that all reasonable demands for electricity are satisfied" 
(sec. 3 (l)(a)); 
"to secure that license holders are able to finance the carrying on of 
the activities which they are autorised (...) to carry on" (sec. 3 
(l)(b)); 
"[...] to promote competition in the generation and supply of electri-
city" (sec. 3 (l)(c)). 
The question arises whether the legislator does subordinate the 
economical interests of the electricity utilities to the public 
interest by allowing the imposing of those conditions on the licen-
sees. The provisions cited above demonstrate that the legislator tries 
to find a reasonable compromise between the interests of the electri-
city undertakings In making profits and the interests of the general 
2 6 4 See for example sec. 7 (2) (a) Electricity Act stating apart from 
other things that a licence can include conditions that require 
"[...] the licence holder to enter into agreements with other 
persons for the use of any electric lines and electrical plants of 
his". 
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public in a cheap and reliable power supply. 
This can be substantiated by looking at certain phrases like "[...] 
all reasonable demands for electricity shall be satisfied [italics 
supplied]" (sec. 3 (l)(a)) or "[...] to promote efficiency and economy 
I . . . ] " (sec. 3 (3)(b)). 
Secondly, sec. 7 (2) Electricity Act states that a licence " ( . . . I may 
require the licence holder to enter into agreements with other persons 
for the use of any electric lines and electrical plants of his". This 
condition, too, does not supersede the economical interests of the 
electricity undertakings because they are entitled to charge the 
person for the use of their lines and plants. 
Thus non of the conditions enumerated in sec. 7 Electricity Act 
Justify the assumption that the English electricity utilities are 
"entrusted" with a task of "general economic interest". 
- Obligations conferred by Sec. 16 Electricity Act 
Sec. 16 Electricity Act contains the general duty of the Public 
Electricity Suppliers (PES) 2 6 9 to supply every premise within their 
area on request (sec. 16 (l)(a)). Where necessary, electric lines and 
electrical plants have to be provided (sec. 16 (l)(b)). 
Thus, sec. 16 Electricity Act contains a general obligation to provide 
and maintain services similar to 8 6 EnWG. Also similar to 8 6 EnWG, 
the scope of application of sec. 16 Electricity Act is restricted to 
tariff customers. This can be infered from sec. 18 (1) Electricity Act 
which states that supply with electricity in pursuance of sec. 16 (1) 
Electricity Act, shall be in accordance with tariffs fixed by the PES. 
2 6 9 According to sec. 6 (9) the Public Electricity Suppliers are the 
Regional Electricity Companies. 
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Customers can also enter into special agreements with PES, different 2 6 6 
from those normal tariffs; customers with a demand exceeding 10 MW 
"shall" enter in such an agreement (sec. 22 (1) Electricity Act). 
Since the normal tariffs for domestic supply will not be attractive 
for big end users, they will make use of the possibility to enter into 
special agreements under sec. 22 Electricity Act. Thus, the obligation 
in sec. 16 (1) Electricity Act in practice only concerns tariff 
customers267. 
The general obligation under sec. 16 (1) Electricity Act to provide 
and maintain services would justify the assumption of an entrusting i f 
the electricity utilities were forced to continue their task even 
where and when that contradicts their interests in making profits. 
This is not the case. As in Germany, the English electricity tariffs 
are calculated on the basis of a mean calculation taking the fact that 
there always are some loss-producing customers into account.268 
Thus, the electricity utilities at the end of the day make no loss In 
supplying every customer and charging the normal tariffs even i f there 
are some "dead losses" among the customers. 
Moreover, sec. 19 (1) Electricity Act states "(wlhere any electric line 
or electrical plant is provided by a public electricity supplier in 
pursuance of section 16 (1) above, the supplier may require any 
expenses reasonably incurred in providing i t to be defrayed by the 
person requiring the supply [...]". Hence the PES can shift at least 
part of the expenses that arise i f i t supplys a customer in a rural 
area, to that customer. 
In addition, sec. 17 Electricity Act provides for exceptions from the 
2 6 6 The fact that the special agreements are different from the tariffs 
according to sec. 18 (1) Electricity Act follows from sec. 22 (3) 
Electricity Act stating that the rights and liabilities of the 
parties of the agreement shall be those arising from the agreement 
and not those provided for by sections 16-21 Electricity Act. 
2 6 7 For a definition of "tariff customer" see sec. 22 (4) Electrici-
ty Act. 
2 6 8 For the new regime see Capel, op.cit. n. 63, p. 9. 
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duty to supply. A PES for example is not obliged to supply i f " I . . . ] 
i t is not reasonable in all circumstances for him to do so". 
Thus, the legislator, although imposing a general duty to supply, has 
also taken reasonable interests of the PESs into account. Therefore 
the duty conferred upon the PESs in sec. 16 Electricity Act does not 
f u l f i l l the conditions that are necessary to regard the PES as 
entrusted. It is true that the utilities do make less profit i f they 
have to supply unprofitable customers. However, undertakings only can 
be considered as entrusted i f their interests are completely subordin-
ated to the public interest. 2 6 9 
- Obligations conferred by Sections 32-38 Electricity Act 
Obligations of electricity utilities are also contained in the secti-
ons 32-38 Electricity Act that form the chapter "Protection of Public 
Interest". 
Sec. 32 Electricity Act empowers the Secretary of State, after consul-
tation with the Director General of Electricity Supply, to require 
each PES to produce evidence showing that i t has made arrangements to 
take a certain percentage of his capacity from non-fossil fuel 
sources. 
Assuming that fossil fuel generated electricity is cheaper than power 
generated from non-fossil fuels, the obligation to take a certain ca-
pacity from non fossil fuel sources could interfer with the economical 
interests of the PESs. Sec. 33 Electricity Act therefore provides for 
the competence of the Secretary of State to make regulations imposing 
a fossil fuel levy on all persons holding any type of supply licence. 
This way, the costs can be balanced out amongst all suppliers and not 
Just PESs270. Thus, the legislator takes the financial interests of the 
PESs into account and does not totally ignore them. 
Therefore, the obligation to take a certain percentage of their 
269 Supra, chapter 3 part E.IV.5.C. 
2 7 0 Sas, op.cit. n. 39, p 492; Capel, op.cit. n. 63, p. 22. 
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capacity from non fossil fuel sources does not result in the PESs 
being entrusted with the task they perform. 
ee. Summary of Part e. 
None of the obligations conferred upon the English electricity under-
takings by the 1989 Electricity Act interfers with their economical 
interests in a way that would justify the assumption that they are 
entrusted with a task of general economic interest, in the sense of 
Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty. 2 7 1 
f. Summary of Part 5. 
Taking the narrow interpretation of the elements of Art. 90 (2) EEC 
Treaty by the ECJ into account, the better reasons support the view 
that neither the German nor the English and Welsh electricity u t i l i -
ties are entrusted with services of general economic interest in the 
meaning of that provision. 
6. The Commission's Appoach to Article 90 (2) EEC Treaty and 
Differences in the Overall Result 
a. The Commission's View 
In its recent Decision272 on the compatibility of agreements concluded 
between the Dutch electricity undertakings with Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty 
the European Commission also applied Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty. It found 
that the undertakings in question are entrusted with a service of 
general economic interest in the meaning of that provision. The 
Commission substantiated this result as follows. 
First i t stated that the main task of the undertakings in question "is 
2 7 1 Like here Birkenmaier, op.cit. n. 202, p. 147 note 16; left undeci-
ded Sas, op.cit. n. 39, p 498 note 89. 
2 7 2 OL L No 28, 2.2.1991, p. 32 (pp. 43 et seq). 
page 92 
to ensure a reliable and efficient operation of the national electri-
city supply at costs which are as low as possible and in a socially 
reasonable fashion"2 7 3. 
Because of that, the Commission accepted that the utilities are 
engaged in the operation of services of general economic interest. 
The Commission moreover, considered the undertakings concerned as 
being entrusted in the meaning of Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty since these 
tasks had been assigned to them by an act of public law. 
According to the European Commission, an electricity undertaking thus 
Is entrusted with a service of general economic interest i f the task 
to ensure a reliable and efficient public supply has been assigned to 
i t by an act of public law. There are no requirements apart from that. 
The question arises whether the German and English electricity u t i l i -
ties do meet the requirements set up by the Commission. In other 
words; can i t be assumed that the Commission would regard the German 
and English electricity utilities as entrusted with a service of 
general economic interest in the meaning of Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty?274 
The German as well as the English electricity undertakings are under 
the obligation to uphold an efficient and reliable electricity supply 
for all customers.273 These tasks have been conferred upon them by acts 
of public authority. 
Since the German and English electricity utilities therefore f u l f i l l 
273 Ibid., p. 43. 
2 7 4 I t should be pointed out here, though, that no Commission decisions 
concerning the application of Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty to the German 
and English ESI are to be expected in the forseeable future. The 
Commission has up to now not taken proceedings against the German 
electricity utilities. As far as the English ESI is concerned the 
Commission probably will not deploy Art. 90 (2) as the agreements 
in question do not infringe Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty in the first 
place; infra chapter 4 part B.I. 
273 Supra, chapter 3 part E.IV.5.d.and e. 
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the Commission's conditions set up in connection with the Dutch ESI, 
i t can be assumed that the Commission would regard them as being 
entrusted with the operation of a service of general economic interest 
in the meaning of Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty. 
b. Critical Commentary 
It is respectfully submitted that this opinion cannot be followed. 
The examination carried out by the Commission in the Dutch case seems 
to have been rather short. It did not consider what results the tasks 
conferred upon the undertakings have on their economical situation. 
Nor did the Commission take into account whether the state does 
subordinate the interests of the undertakings in making and maximizing 
profits completely to the public interest in the performance of that 
task. Thus, the Commission failed to consider aspects which, for 
reasons elaborated above276, are indispensable ingredients. 
Furthermore, the superficial approach demonstrated by the Commission 
in the Dutch case leads to a broad application of Art. 90 (2) EEC 
Treaty which contradicts the endeavour of the Court of Justice to give 
this provision a narrow interpretation. 
c. Possible Differences in the Overall Result 
In the next step, i t has to be examined whether the diverging approach 
adopted by the European Commission in connection with Art. 90 (2) EEC 
Treaty leads to differences In the overall result. 
If one assumes that the electricity undertakings in England and 
Germany are indeed entrusted with a service of general economic 
interest, i t becomes necessary to examine whether the application of 
the Treaty rules does obstruct the performance of the task assigned to 
them. 
That is what the Commission did in respect of the Dutch electricty 
276 Supra, chapter 3 part E.IV.5.C 
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undertakings.277 In doing so, i t considered the results competition has 
on the electricity market. The Commission, for example, scrutinized 
whether electricity imports by industrial endusers would interfere 
with the tasks of the public electricity suppliers and hence endanger 
the security of supply.2 7 8 
Thus, in applying Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty, one has to take the effects 
competition has on a certain branch and their compatibility with the 
goals and purposes of the Community into account. 
In this respect, the application of Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty does not 
differ from the application of the other Treaty rules on competition, 
because, as will be shown below279, the same aspects have to be 
considered in applying Articles 85 and 86 EEC Treaty to the ESI. 
In order to establish whether certain agreements or conducts infringe 
these provisions, i t has to be scrutinized whether they are necessary 
to ensure the achievement of Community goals and purposes.280 
The application of Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty to the ESI therefore has to 
deal with the same problems as the application of Articles 85 and 86 
EEC Treaty to this branch.2 8 1 
From this i t follows that i t makes no decisive difference whether one 
classifies the electricity undertakings as being covered by Art. 90 
(2) EEC Treaty and then restricts to the application of Articles 85 
and 86, or whether one applies these provisions directly to the 
undertakings in question. In both cases i t is necessary to consider 
the practical results competition has on the electricity market.282 
2 7 7 OJ No L 28, 2.2.1991, p. 32 (pp. 43 et seq). 
2 7 8 OL No L 28, 2.2.1991, p. 32 (p. 43). 
279 Infra, chapter 3 parts F and G. 
2 8 0 Lukes, "Demarkationsvertrage", op.cit. n. 219, p. 1927. 
2 8 1 Hermann, "Ordnungsgrundlagen", op.cit. n. 31, p. 119; see also C. 
Schalast, Die deutsche Elektrlzitatswlrtschaft und der EG-Binnen-
markt fur Energle, p. 48; Niederleithinger, op.cit. n. 173, pp. 79, 
83-84; Rltter, "Anwendung der EG-Wettbewerbsregel", op.cit. n. 176, 
p. 51. 
2 8 2 Schalast, "Kohleverstromung" op.cit. n. 158, p. 3. 
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Therefore, different outcomes in the interpretation of Art. 90 (2) EEC 
Treaty cannot lead to fundamental divergences in the overall result of 
applying the European competition rules to the electricity market.283 
The argument against the Commission's point of view therefore is not 
that i t makes an error in factual apprehension, but that there is a 
flaw in the inherent logic. Although this should not affect the 
outcome, i t is preferable to ask the important question within 
Articles 85 (1) and 86 EEC Treaty rather than in Art. 90 (2) EEC 
Treaty. 
V. Conclusion to Part E. 
The application of Articles 85 and 86 EEC Treaty to the ESI is not 
subject to prior harmonization of national energy laws or policies. 
Besides, the fact that the Council did not issue provisions provided 
for by Art. 87 (2)(c) EEC Treaty with regard to the ESI does not 
exclude the application of Articles 85 and 86 EEC Treaty from this 
economic branch. 
Finally, the electricity undertakings in Germany as well as in England 
and Wales are not "entrusted with the operation of a service of 
general economic interest" in the sense of Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty. 
Thus, this provision offers no possibility either to exclude the 
electricity industry from the area of application of the European 
rules on competition. 
From this, i t follows that there is no way to restrict the application 
of Articles 85 or 86 EEC Treaty to the electricity markets in England 
and Germany. 
2 8 3 Hermann, op.cit. n. 31, p. 119; Niederleithinger, op.cit. n. 173, 
pp. 79, 83-84. 
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F. The Inherent Limitations of Competition Rules 
I . Introduction 
In the preceding parts, two important points have been established. 
The first point is that there are agreements and contracts on the 
electricity market that restrict the possibility to enter into compe-
tition for the supply of big end users and local distributors. 
Second, i t has been shown that i t is not possible to exempt the 
electricity sector from the application of Articles 85 and 86 EEC 
Treaty. 
At a first glance, the conclusion to be drawn from these two 
observations seems to be obvious: Articles 85 (1) and 86 EEC Treaty 
provide that agreements restricting competition, and conducts abusing 
a dominant position, are prohibited. Thus, the anticompetitive agree-
ments and conducts on the electricity market are, according to these 
provisions, automatically void. 
This conclusion would be right i f neither Art. 85 (1) nor Art. 86 EEC 
Treaty had any scope for interpretation which allows additional 
circumstances to be taken into consideration. 
In the opposite case, that is, i f there were scope for interpretation 
in Articles 85 (1) and 86 EEC Treaty, the general applicability of 
competition rules would not automatically entail the verdict of 
Invalidity for anticompetitive conducts on the electricity market. In 
order to test restrictive measures against the competition rules, one 
would have to take the concrete circumstances of each individual case, 
and their exact effects on the market situation, into account. Thus, 
the agreements and practices which restrict competition or change the 
position to compete of undertakings otherwise would not be prohibited 
per se. In effect, this would amount to inherent limitations of the 
competition rules. 2 8 4 
Hermann, "Ordnungsgrundlagen", op.cit. n.31, p. 115; Kuhnt, "Ober-
tragung von Strom", op.cit. n. 118, pp. 418-419; Schwark, op.cit. 
n. 160, pp. 214-215. 
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Whether or not there is such scope for interpretation in Articles 85 
(1) and 86 EEC Treaty can be deduced from the function of the 
provisions and their interpretation by the ECJ. 
I I . Inherent Limitations In Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty 
1. Important Questions 
According Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty, agreements that have as their "[•..) 
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competi-
tion within the common market" are prohibited. 
With some agreements, i t is obvious and easy to decide that they aim 
at restricting competition in the common market. However, there are 
many cases in which i t is very doubtful whether the agreement in 
question actually has that object or effect. The reason for this lies 
mainly in i t being difficult to define what a "restriction of 
competition" is . 2 8 3 
One can think of hardly any commercial contract that does not cause 
some kind of restriction to competition.286 Thus, Neale and Goyder say: 
"There is a sense in which any one bargain excludes others: when a 
bargain is sealed, the competition for that particular portion of 
trade is at an end. It would be a reductio ad absurdum to call trade 
itself restraint of trade."2 8 7 
In addition, there might be desirable restraints on competition that 
should not be prohibited. This could for example, be true for 
agreements that clearly restrict competition but at the same time 
promote i t as well. Such a situation exists in cases in which two 
undertakings agree to work together (restriction of competition) in 
order to develop new technologies (promotion of competition) which 
2 8 9 Bellamy/Child, op.cit. n. 141, p. 62. 
2 8 6 Smit/Herzog, op.cit. n. 206, vol. 2, Art. 85 para. 85.27. 
2 8 7 A.D. Neale and D.G. Goyder, The Antitrust Laws of the USA, p. 25. 
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neither of them could develop on their own. 2 8 8 
The important question in connection with the definition of "restric-
tions of competition" therefore is whether Art. 85 (1) has to be 
understood as prohibiting every agreement between undertakings that 
has a restricting effect on competition, or whether there are some 
restraints that do not restrict competition within the meaning of 
Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty.™9 In other words; are there agreements that de 
facto restrict competition but nevertheless do not conflict with Art. 
85 (1) EEC Treaty? In the case of an affirmative answer, the 
subsequent question arises as to where to draw the line between 
restrictive measures that are and those that are not covered by Art. 
85 ( l ) . 2 9 0 
To answer these questions, one has to decide whether the term "re-
strictions of competition" is to be interpreted in a wide or in a 
narrow way. 
This problem is very much connected with the relationship of Art. 85 
(1) to Art. 85 (3) EEC Treaty. 2 9 1 In case of a wide interpretation every 
restraint of competition will be prohibited under Art. 85 (1) and the 
only way to avoid the verdict of invalidity is via Art. 85 (3) EEC 
Treaty. In contrast to that, the narrow interpretation does not 
consider every restraint on competition as falling under Art. 85 (1) 
2 8 8 See case 258/78 Nungesser v Commission [19821 ECR 2015; in this 
case exclusive distribution rights for seeds were at issue. The ECJ 
accepted that certain exclusive lecences are necessary to encourage 
agricultural innovations (see p. 2069). 
2 8 9 Bellamy/Child, op.cit. n. 141. p. 63; P. Ulmer, "Rule of Reason 
im Rahmen von Art. 85 EWGV" (1985) 31 RIW pp. 517-524 (518). 
2 9 0 Bellamy/Child, op.cit. n. 141, p. 63. 
2 9 1 I . Forrester, Ch. Norall, "The Laicization of Community Law: Self-
Help and the Rule of Reason: How Competition Law is and could be 
applied" (1984) 21 CMLRev. pp. 11-51, p. 20, see also M.C. 
Schlechter, "The Rule of Reason in European Competition Law" (1982) 
8 Legal Issues of European Integration no. 2 pp. 1-20 (p.3). 
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EEC Treaty and hence in some cases avoids the need for exemption 
under Article 85 (3). 2 9 2 
The second interpretation involves a kind of "rule of reason".293 The 
concept of "rule of reason" originates from US anti-trust law, where 
i t is applied in interpreting section 1 of the Antitrust Act of 1890. 
Under this provision "[..] every contract (...1 in restraint of trade 
or commerce among several States [...]" is illegal. Since sec. 1 
Sherman Act does not contain any definition of "restraints of trade", 
i t was up to the courts to decide whether a measure is, or is not 
caught by this rule. 
In US v American Tobacco*9*, the US Supreme Court held that not all 
restraints are illegal but only those that are unreasonable in that 
they are " I . . . ] operated to the prejudice of the public interest by 
unduly restricting competition [...]". This "rule of reason" was very 
succintly defined in Continental T.V. INC v GTE Sylvania INC29*. The 
Court held: "Under this rule the factfinder weighs all of the 
circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice 
should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on com-
petition." 
However, the American "rule of reason"-concept is different from the 
European one.296 The main difference derives from the fact that Art. 85 
EEC Treaty has its para. (3). Section (1) of the Sherman Act, in 
contrast to that, contains no rule according to which certain restric-
tions to competition are not prohibited. 2 9 7 
2 9 2 Bellamy/Child, op.cit. n. 141, p. 67. 
2 9 3 Steiner, op.cit. n. 139, p. 123. 
2 9 4 221 U.S. 106, 55 L Ed at 179. 
2 9 8 433 U.S. 36, 53 L Ed 2d 568. 
2 9 6 Bellamy/Child, op.cit. n. 141, p. 
291, p. 21. 
2 9 7 In addition, there are differences 
see infra chapter 3 part F.II.3. 
66; Forrester/Norall, op.cit. n. 
in the application of that rule, 
page 100 
Clear answers to the questions concerning the interpretation of 
"restrictions of competition" in Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty have not yet 
been developed, but both approaches mentioned above can be found under 
Community Law.2 9 8 
While i t is the Commission's philosophy to interpret the term 
"restrictions of competition" in a wide way2 9 9, only permitting them 
under Art. 85 (3), i t will be demonstrated that the ECJ has elaborated 
a more flexible approach, that is to say i t has developed a "rule of 
reason". 
2. Important Decisions by the European Court of Justice 
a. An Introductory Remark 
A very important characteristic of the interpretation of Article 85 by 
the Court is that this provision is read in the context of the 
preamble, and of Article 2 and 3 of the Treaty. 3 0 0 
2 9 8 Bellamy/Child, op.cit. n. 141, p. 64. 
2 9 9 S.B. Hornsby, "Competition Policy in the 80's: More Policy Less 
Competition?" (1987) 12 EuLRev pp. 79-101 (p. 99); Forre-
ster/Norall, op.cit. n. 291, p. 23; V. Korah "Comfort Letters -
Reflections on the Perfum Cases" (1982) 7 EuLRev pp. 14-39 (p. 34) 
and J. Faull, "Joint Ventures under EEC Competition Rules" (1984) 4 
ECLR pp. 358-374 (p. 362); for details concerning the Commission's 
approach towards the ESI see infra, chapter 3 part G. VI. 
3 0 0 For a recent example see case 339/89 Alstom Atlantique SA v 
Compagnie de Construction Mecanique Sulzer SA, Judgement of 
24.1.1991, OJ No C 50, 26.2.1991; see also case 32/65 Italy v 
Council and Commission 11966] ECR 389 (p. 405); case 6/72 Europem-
ballage and Continental Can v Commission [19731 ECR 215 (pp. 244-
245 consideration 25); case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission 
[1979) ECR 461 (p. 520 consideration 38); case 26/76 Metro v 
Commission [1977] ECR 1875 ( p. 1904 consideration 20). 
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In Europemballage and Continental Can v Commission301 the Court held: 
"With a view to safeguarding the principles and attaining the objecti-
ves set out in Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty, Articles 85 to 90 have 
laid down general rules applicable to undertakings". 
In Italy v Commission302 the Court said: "Art. 85 as a whole should be 
read in the context of the provisions of the preamble to the Treaty 
which clarify i t [...]" 
This characteristic also can be found in connection with the interpre-
tation of the term "restriction of competition" in Art. 85 (1) EEC 
Treaty. 3 0 3 
b. Soclete Technique Minlere v Maschinenbau Ulm304 
The first case of significance3 0 3 concerning the interpretation of 
"restriction" was Societe Technique Miniere v Maschinenbau Ulm. 
A French firm had the exclusive right to sell in France the products 
of a German company. 
The ECJ held: "(...] i t may be doubted whether there is an interferen-
ce with competition i f the said agreement seems really necessary for 
the penetration of a new area by an undertaking. Therefore, in order 
3 0 1 Case 6/72 [1973] ECR 215 (pp. 244-245 consideration 25). 
3 0 2 Case 32/65 11966) ECR 389 (p. 405). 
3 0 3 See for example in case 26/76 Metro v Commission [19771 ECR 1875 
(p. 1904 consideration 20). 
3 0 4 Case 56/65 [1966] ECR 235. 
3 0 9 There are a lot of decicions of the ECJ that are important for 
the interpretation of "restrictions of competition", but i t would 
go beyond the scope of this work to deal with each one of them 
separately. 
Also important in this connection but not separately dealt with 
here, for example are: cases 56,58/64 Consten and Grundig v 
Commission [1966] ECR 299; case 32/65 Italy v Commssion [1966] ECR 
389; case 23/67 Brasserie de Hecht v Wilkin [1967] ECR 407; case 
42/84 Remia v Commission [1985] ECR 2545; case 65/86 Bayer and 
Hennecke v Silllhdfer [1988] ECR 5249. 
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to decide whether an agreement containing a clause "granting an 
exclusive right of sale" is to be considered as prohibited by reason 
of its object or of its effect, i t is appropriate to take into account 
in particular the nature and quantity, [...] the position and impor-
tance of the grantor and the concessionaire on the market for the 
products concerned, the isolated nature of the disputed agreement 
[ ] » 3 0 6 
Thus, the Court held that agreements which merely grant an exclusive 
right of sale "do not of their very nature" restrict competition 
within the meaning of Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 3 0 7 
In this decision the Court included aspects like the nature of the 
products covered, and the significance of the measures on the concrete 
market situation, in its assessment of whether there was a restric-
tion of competition in the sense of Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 3 0 8 
According to the Court's view, one has to look at the severity of the 
restrictive element in the clauses granting exclusive rights. 3 0 9 
c. Metro v Commission310 
In 1977, the ECJ had to decide the case Metro v Commission. 
Metro was a self service wholesaler, running a "cash and carry" 
business for retailers. SABA, a German company specializing in elec-
trical and electronical equipment, refused to supply Metro. The 
refusal had been made because SABA operated a system of selective 
distribution. It was part of that system that SABA distributers had 
agreed to sell only to "appointed" SABA wholesalers and retailers. 
There were two kinds of criteria for these appointments, which Metro 
3 0 8 Case 56/65 [1966] ECR 235 (p. 250). 
307 Ibid., p. 251. 
3 0 8 U. Everling. "Der Beitrag des Europaischen Gerichtshofs zur Weiter-
entwicklung des Wettbewerbsrechts der Gemeinschaft", in Wettbe-
werbspolitlk an der Schwelle zum europaischen Binnenmarkt, 22 FIW-
Symposium. 1989, pp. 103-121 (p. 114). 
3 0 9 D.G. Goyder, EEC-Competition Law, p. 62. 
3 1 0 Case 26/76 [19771 ECR 1875. 
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did not meet, technical conditions and commerical conditions. Selecti-
ve distribution systems like this make i t very difficult for discount 
stores to obtain supply of certain products and hence restrict price 
competition at retail level. 3 1 1 
The case before the ECJ arose because Metro challenged312 the Commis-
sion Decision313 in which SABA was granted an exemption for the selec-
tive distribution system under Art. 85 (3) EEC Treaty. 
The Court upheld the Commission's Decision. The relevant part of the 
judgement is: 
"The requirements contained in Articles 3 and 85 of the EEC Treaty 
that competition shall not be distorted implies the existence of a 
market of workable competition, that is to say the degree of competi-
tion necessary to ensure the observance of the basic requirements and 
the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty, in particular the 
creation of a single market achieving conditions similar to those of a 
domestic market.314 [...] the requirements for the maintenance of 
workable competition may be reconciled with the safeguarding of 
objectives of a different nature and that to this end certain 
restrictions on competition are permissible, provided that they are 
essential to the attainment of those objectives [ . . , ] " 3 1 8 (Emphasis 
added). 
Summing up, Metro had two important results3 1 6: 
Firstly, the Court established that agreements which serve desirable 
goals other than competition are objectively justified and do not fall 
under Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 
In deciding whether agreements are justified under Art. 85 (1) EEC 
Treaty, the Court had to balance negative effects against effects 
3 1 1 Bellamy/Child, op.cit. n. 141, p. 75; Goyder, op.cit. n. 309, p. 
211. 
3 1 2 Under Art. 173 EEC Treaty. 
3 1 3 OJ No. L 28, 3.2.1976, p. 19. 
3 1 4 Case 26/76 [1977] ECR 1875 (p. 1904 consideration 20). 
318 Ibid., p. 1905 consideration 21. 
3 1 6 See Bellamy/Child, op.cit. n. 141, p. 78 and Ulmer, op.cit. n. 289 
p. 522. 
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improving competition. Thus, the second outcome of the Metro case is 
that the ECJ introduced a balancing operation into Art. 85 (1) EEC 
Treaty. 3 1 7 
The same approach can be found in AEG v Commission310. The ECJ held: "A 
restriction of price competition must however be regarded as being 
inherent in any selective distribution sty stem [...] That restriction 
is is counterbalanced by competition as regards the quality of 
services supplied to customers [...)" 3 1 9 (Emphasis added). 
d. Nungesser v Commission320 
Another important case concerning the definition of "restrictions of 
competition" was Nungesser v Commission. The agreements in question 
were made between the French State agency for agricultural research 
(INRA) and Mr. Eisele, a German resident, who was trading under the 
name "Nungesser". Mr. Eisele obtained certain plant breeders' rights 
relating to maize seeds developed by INRA. Later INRA and Mr. Eisele 
also concluded an agreement under which Mr. Eisele received the 
exclusive right to distribute INRA seeds in Germany. 
The Commission held that those agreements for several reasons in f r i n -
ged Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty and refused to grant an exemption under 
Art. 85 (3) EEC Treaty. 3 2 1 
The ECJ disagreed and did not regard the exclusive rights granted to 
Nungesser as per se restricting competition within the meaning of 
Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. An important distinction was made between so-
called "open" and "protected" exclusive licences. The first category 
concerns licences whereby the "(...] owner merely undertakes not to 
grant other licences in respect of the same territory and not to 
3 1 7 Bellamy/Child, op.cit. n. 141, p. 78; see also Goyder, op.cit. n. 
3o9, p. 215. 
3 1 8 Case 107/82 [1983] ECR 3151. 
3 1 9 Ibid pp. 3196-3197 consideration 42. 
3 2 0 Case 258/78 [1982] ECR 2015. 
3 2 1 Commission Decision of 21.9.1978, OJ No L 286, 12.10.1978, p.23. 
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compete himself with the licensee on that territory." 3 2 2 The second 
case involves a license with absolute territorial protection, preven-
ting all competition from parallel importers or licensees from other 
territories. 3 2 3 
Absolute territorial protection always infringes Art. 85 (1) EEC 
Treaty. 
However, in the case of the open licences granted by INRA, the Court 
accepted that they were necessary to encourage agricultural innova-
tions. Therefore i t held: "From that i t infers that a total prohibi-
tion of every exclusive licence, even an open one, would cause the 
interest of undertakings in licences to fal l away, which would be 
prejudicial to the dissemination of knowledge and techniques in the 
Community.324 I . . . ] Taking the specific nature of the products in 
question into consideration, the Court concludes that, in a case as 
the present, the grant of an open exclusive licences [...] is not in 
itself incompatible with Art. 85 (1) of the Treaty."3 2 3 
Thus, in Nungesser the ECJ again took additional circumstances such as 
the specific nature of the products in question, the novelty and 
importance of the relevant technology, or the investment risk assumed 
by the licensee into account in answering the question whether an 
agreement restricts competition in the sense of Art. 85 (1) EEC 
Treaty. 3 2 6 
3 2 2 Case 258/78 [1982] ECR 2015 (p. 2068 consideration 53). 
323 Ibid., p. 2068 consideration 53. 
324 Ibid., p. 2069 consideration 55. 
328 Ibid., p. 2069 consideration 58. 
3 2 6 See the comment on Nungesser by U. Everling "Der Binnenmarkt nach 
der Rechtsprechung des Gerlchtshofs", op.cit. n. 123, pp. 147-148; 
idem, "Zur neueren EuGH Rechtsprechung zum Wettbewerbsrecht" 
(1982) 17 EuR pp 301-314 (p. 310). 
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e. Pronuptia de Paris v Schillgalis3 2 7 
Finally, in Pronuptia de Paris v Schillgalis the ECJ had to decide 
whether the franchise contract between Pronuptia de Paris and Mrs 
Schillgalis, the franchisee of the French firm in Hamburg, contained 
clauses that infringed Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty, 
Under three franchise agreements Pronuptia had granted the franchisee 
the exclusive right to use the trademark "Pronuptia de Paris" in the 
Hamburg, Oldenburg and Hannover area, and was obliged not to open a 
shop itself in that area. 
The ECJ, after holding that franchise systems do not in themelves 
restrict competition, examined what conditions are necessary for a 
successful functioning of such a system. 
The outcome of that examination was: 
"(1) The compatibility of franchise agreements for the distribution of 
goods with Article 85 (1) depends on the provisions contained 
therein and on their economic context. 
(2) Provisions which are strictly necessary in order to ensure that 
know-how and assistance provided by the franchisor do not benefit 
competitors do not constitute restrictions of competition for the 
purposes of Art. 85 (1). 
(3) Provisions which establish the control strictly necessary for 
maintaining identity and reputation of the network identified by 
the common name and symbol do not constitute restrictions of 
competition for the purposes of Article 85 (1). \ . . . ] " a 2 B 
The Court's approach in Pronuptia can be analysed as follows. 
First, i t considers whether the agreement in question is conflicting 
generally with the aim of the Treaty to abolish distortion of 
competition. 
If this is not the case, all restraints on competition necessary to 
make the underlying agreement work support a legitimate objective and 
3 2 7 Case 161/84 (19861 ECR 353. 
328 Ibid., pp. 384-385 consideration 27. 
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thus do not infringe Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 3 2 9 
3. Critical Analysis of the Case-Law 
From the foregoing decisions of the Court, a number of rules can be 
infered. 
Firstly, the ECR is balancing negative effects on competition against 
positive effects. It accepts that there are restraints which are 
justified under Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 
In order to come to a conclusion, the ECJ takes a careful look at the 
nature and peculiarities of the product and market in question. Thus, 
the Court makes a market analysis before holding that a restraint is 
caught by Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. The result of this approach is that 
the ECJ comes to a pragmatic solution that can be different for each 
individual case.330 
There are various types of restraints on competition that, according 
to the ECJ, are justified under Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 
In most cases, the justifying circumstances are themselves infered 
from the idea of competition.331 The Court looks beyond the immediate 
restricting effects of a measure, and asks i f they are counterbalanced 
by the promotion of competition on a different (higher) level. 
But over and above that, the Court also seems prepared to take into 
account the accomplishment of other Treaty objectives which are not 
directly connected with competition. 
In Europemballage and Continental Can v Commission i t expressly 
referred to "[...] the restraints on competition which the Treaty 
allows under certain conditions because of the need to harmonize the 
various objectives of the Treaty [ . . . ] " 3 3 2 . 
In Nungesser v Commission, the Court took into account the fact that 
the agreement in question does facilitate "[...] the dissemination of 
3 2 9 Bellamy/Child, op.cit. n. 141, p. 85. 
3 3 0 Everling, "Zur neueren EuGH-Rechtsprechung", op.cit. n. 326, p. 311. 
3 3 1 For a detailed list see Bellamy/Child, op.cit. n. 141, pp. 86-105. 
3 3 2 Case 6/72 [1973] ECR 215 (p. 244 consideration 24). 
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knowledge and techniques in the Community".333 
From that i t follows that according to the ECJ, certain "restrictive" 
agreements may not fal l within Art. 85(1) EEC Treaty i f they are 
consistent with, and intended to facilitate, the achievement of Treaty 
objectives.334 
This attitude of the ECJ is perfectly reasonable and appropriate. 
Although competition is one of the most important means to achieve the 
ultimate objective of a single market, i t must not be misconceived as 
an end in itself. The Court therefore is right in not applying the 
competition rules indiscriminately and inflexibly, but to evaluate the 
repercusions of other Treaty objectives in each individual case. 
However, the Court has to perform a tightrope walk because the 
paramount significance of competition for the Community means that 
restraints on competition can only be tolerated i f they serve equally 
important purposes.330 Not just any interest can be taken into account, 
but only those that are necessary to ensure objectives compatible with 
Community values. 
Since the ECJ takes additional circumstances in Art. 85 (1) EEC 
Treaty into account instead of considering them exclusively under Art. 
85 (3) EEC Treaty, It favours the "rule of reason" approach, although 
i t has never acknowledged the rule as such.3 3 6 
The "European" rule of reason, however, is narrower than its American 
progenitor337. The American courts can take all kinds of aspects into 
account in order to decide whether the restraint on competition is 
reasonable, while the ECJ only takes the aims of the Treaty, and in 
3 3 3 Case 258/78 [1982] ECR 2015 (p. 2069 consideration 55). 
3 3 4 For example an effective mechanism for the settlement of accident 
claims, see case 90/76 Van Ameyde v UCI [1977] ECR 1091. Bella-
my/Child, op.cit. n. 141, p. 102. 
3 3 0 H. SchrSter, in H. von der Groeben et.al. (eds.), op.cit. n. 199, 
"Vorbemerkung zu den Artikeln 85 bis 94", no. 11. 
3 3 6 Steiner, op.cit. n. 139, pp. 124.125; Ulmer, op.cit. n. 289, p 522. 
3 3 7 Steiner, op.cit. n. 139, p. 123; see also Schlechter, op.cit. n. 
291, p. 14. 
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particular those laid down in Articles 2 and 3, into consideration.338 
Thus, only restraints to competition which do not threaten the 
creation of a single market, but promote i t , can be hold valid under 
Art. 86 (1) EEC Treaty. 
Critics of the rule of reason approach in Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty 
accuse the ECJ of blurring the respective areas of application of 
paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article 85. If agreements that contain 
restraints on competition are not caught by Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty in 
the first place, the scope of application of Art. 85 (3) diminishes 
and i t becomes difficult to draw the dividing line between what is 
"justified" under Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty, and what is not. Although 
this agrument does not lack a certain justification, there is a strong 
case for the application of a rule of reason in Art. 85 (1) EEC 
Treaty. 3 3 9 
Firstly, the exemptions which the Commission may grant under Art. 85 
(3) EEC Treaty, are subject to a number of very strict conditions. 
Secondly, the need to notify agreements in order to obtain an 
exemption, results in the Commission being overburdened by the volume 
of notifications which have been submitted to i t , while its resources 
in the field of enforcement are limited. Thus, the Commission turned 
out to be incapable of issuing exemption decisions in quantity and 
33B Everling, "Der Beitrag des Europaischen Gerichtshofs", op.cit. n. 
308, p. 115. 
339 p o r literature on this discussion see: R. Joliet, The Rule of Rea-
son in Anitrust Law: American, German and Common Market Laws in 
Comparative Perspective, passim; Schlechter, op.cit. n. 291, pas-
sim; Korah, "Comfort Letters", op.cit. n. 299, passim; Kon, op.cit. 
n. 152, passim; Steindorff, "Art. 85, Para.3", op.cit. n. 152; 
idem, "Article 85 and the Rule of Reason" (1984) 21 CMLRev pp. 639-
646; Faull, op.cit. n. 299, passim; Forrester, Norall, op.cit. n. 
291, passim; Ulmer, op.cit. n. 289, passim; Steiner, op.cit. n. 
139, pp. 124-125. 
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rapidly. 3 4 0 The emerging long delays cause a considerable amount of 
uncertainty. Because of the delays many lawyers and businessmen even 
take the risk of not notifying agreements at all. 
The created uncertainty becomes even bigger because the national 
courts are not entitled to apply Art. 85 (3) EEC Treaty directly and 
thus to issue exemptions themselves. Art. 85 (3) and Art. 9 of Regula-
tion No. 17 reserve for the Commission exclusively the power to grant 
exemptions from Article 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 3 4 1 
The ECJ cannot help either in this situation because i t has no power 
to declare an agreement exempt under Art. 85 (3) EEC Treaty in 
response to a reference under Art. 177 EEC Treaty. 
It follows that a rigid handling of Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty results in 
a dissatisfactory situation. 
The alternative to this dilemma is to replace the automatic applica-
tion of Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty by an economic analysis as the Court 
does. Such an analysis is much more flexible and thus leads to a more 
realistic view of the economic relevance of the agreement in question. 
Greater flexibilty in the operation of Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty 
therefore makes the administration of EEC competition rules more 
efficient. 
The ECJ therefore is right in deploying a rule of reason analysis in 
Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. However, there are st i l l narrow limits to this 
approach following from the structure of Art. 85 EEC Treaty as a 
whole. The operation of the rule of reason must not lead to Art. 85 
(3) becomming superfluous altogether. In practice this danger does not 
materialize though, because the Court has, up to now, adopted a very 
cautious and reasonable approach to the "rule of reason" in Art. 85 
(1) EEC Treaty. 3 4 2 
340 Faun, op.cit. n. 299, p. 362; it has to be acknowledged, though, 
that the introduction of block exemptions has, as far as waiting 
periods are concerned, led to an improvement for those agreements 
covered by the block exemptions. 
3 4 1 Steindorff, "Article 85, Para. 3", op.cit. n. 152. 
3 4 2 Everling, "Der Binnenmarkt nach der Rechtsprechung der Gerichts-
hofs", op.cit. n. 123, p. 149. 
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4. Summary of Part II 
The answer to the initial questions is: 
Art. 85 (1) has to be understood as not prohibiting every restraint to 
competition but only those that jeopardize the achievement of Treaty 
objectives. 
This at the same time answers the subsequent question, as to where to 
draw the line between permitted and not permitted restrictions. 
Only those restraints to competition do not infringe Art. 85 (1) EEC 
Treaty that are necessary to secure objectives compatible with Treaty 
values. 
III. Inherent Limitations in Art. 86 EEC Treaty 
The question arises whether Art. 86 EEC Treaty also provides for 
sufficient scope of interpretation to take additional circumstances 
into account. 
A general characteristic of the interpretation of Article 86 Treaty 
is, that the Court reads this provision (just like Art. 85 EEC Treaty) 
in the context of the preamble and of Article 2 and 3 of the Treaty. 3 4 3 
Particular scope for the observance of the Treaty objectives can be 
found in the element "abuse". 
Art. 86 EEC Treaty does not define "abuse" but i t gives a list of 
examples of types of abuses in paragraph (2). This list of abuses is 
3 4 3 For example case 32/65 Italy v Commission (1966] ECR 389 (p. 405); 
case 6/72 Europemballage and Continental Can v Commission [1973] 
ECR 215 (p. 244 consideration 25); case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v 
Commission [1979] ECR 461 (p. 520 consideration 38); case 26/76 
Metro v Commission [1977] ECR 1875 (p. 1904 consideration 20). 
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not exhaustive.344 An abuse that is not covered by one of these 
examples may sti l l fall under the prohibition of Art. 86 EEC Treaty. 
The concept of "abuse" in Art. 86 EEC Treaty is an objective concept 
that covers practices which relate "[...] to the behaviour of an 
undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the 
structure of the market where (...) the degree of competition is 
weakened and which [...] has the effect of hindering the maintenance 
of the degree of competition sti l l existing in the market I . . . ] " 3 4 3 . 
The market behaviour of a dominant firm only can amount to an "abuse" 
i f there is no objective justification for i t . In Sirena Sri v EDA 
SrP46 the Court held that the price level of a product may be abusive 
"[...] i f unjustified by any objective criteria [...1". For the 
existence of an "abuse" i t is thus decisive whether the exploitation 
of a dominant position is improper.347 
In order to establish whether an otherwise prohibited behaviour is 
objectively justified, the ECJ weighs up all the interests involved. 3 4 8 
In one instance, the Court explicitly set forth this approach: "For 
this appraisal account must be taken of all relevant interests 
[ ]»349 
In weighing up the relevant interests, the Court pays particular 
attention to the public interest.330 In Italy v Commission301 i t held: 
3 4 4 Case 6/72 Europemballage and Continental Can v Commission [1973] 
ECR 215 (p. 245 consideration 26). 
3 4 8 Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 461 (p. 541 
consideration 91). 
3 4 6 Case 40/70 [1971] ECR 69 (p. 84 consideration 17). 
3 4 7 Vaughan, op.cit. n. 139, para. 19.78. 
3 4 8 See for example case 7/82 Gesellschaft zur Verwertung von Lei-
stungsrechten v Commission [1983] ECR 483 (pp. 506 et seq). 
3 4 9 Case 127/73 BRT v Sabam [1974] 313 (p. 316 consideration 8); see 
also case 51/89 Tetra Pak Rausing SA v Commission 1991 CMLR 5, p. 
334 (p. 384). 
3 8 0 Stewing, op.cit. n. 50, p. 65. 
3 8 1 Case 41/83 [1985] ECR 873 (p. 887 consideration 26). 
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"(...) the employment of new technologies [...] constitutes progress 
in conformity with the public interest and cannot be regarded per se 
as an abuse." 
It follows that for the purpose of interpreting "abuse" in Art. 86 EEC 
Treaty, the circumstances surrounding the acquisation, and in particu-
lar the effects on the structure of competition in the relevant 
market, must be taken into account. 
The element "abuse" hence provides scope of interpretation in order to 
take aspects such as the public interest, into account.382 
Thus, Art. 86 like Art. 85 EEC Treaty contains inherent limitations. 
IV. The Court's Concept of Competition 
The question arises whether the case-law analysed above can be 
understood as corresponding to a particular economic concept of 
competition. 
Only seldom does the Court use expressions that could give information 
about the underlying concept of competition. It sometimes speaks of 
"effective" 3 3 3 or "imperfect"334 competition. The most instructive case 
in this connection probably was Metro v CommssiorPm. Here the ECJ 
employed the term "workable competition" and defined i t as "[...] the 
degree of competition necessary to ensure the observance of the basic 
requirements and the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty, in 
particular the creation of a single market achieving conditions 
similar to those of a domestic market." 
3 3 2 Everling, "Der Binnenmarkt nach der Rechtsprechung des Gerlchts-
hof", op.cit. n. 123, pp. 150-151; Arndt, op.cit. n. 32, p. 18; 
Speich, op.cit. n. 160, p. 126. 
3 3 3 Case 6/72 Europemballage and Continental Can v Commission [1973] 
ECR 215 (p. 245 consideration 26). 
3 3 4 Case 13/60 Geitling v High Authority [19621 ECR 83. 
3 3 8 Case 26/76 [1977] ECR 1875 (p. 1904 consideration 20). 
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The phrase "workable competition" is sometimes used in contradiction 
to the economist's model of perfect competition. The latter is an 
idealised concept based on a number of assumptions306. It assumes that 
there are absolutely homogeneous products on a large market of buyers 
and sellers; that consumers have perfect information, and no personal, 
factual or time preferences; that consumers always act to maximize 
util i ty and that there are no barriers of entry. 3 8 7 
Under these conditions of perfect competition i t is impossible to f ix 
the market price unilaterally. This is because there are so many 
producers on the market and each firm's share of the market is so 
small that no one individually has the power to affect the price by 
altering his output. This, in highly simplified form, is the way 
"perfect (or atomistic) competition" functions. 
Because in reality markets meeting those conditions hardly exist 3 3 8, 
the concept of "workable competition" was developed. 
It describes a market situation of imperfect competition with enough 
buyers and sellers acting independently of each other and without 
significant barriers of entry. Such a market will produce an outcome 
which approaches the optimum sufficiently closely and hence yields 
optimum results. 3 0 9 
3 0 6 For the development of these assumptions see: W.St. Jevons, Die 
Theorle vom nattlrllchen Monopol; L. Walras, Elements of Pure 
Economics or the Theory of Social Wealth. 
3 0 7 See A. Vath, Die Wettbewerbskonzeptlon des Europaischen Gericht-
shofs, p. 13; Steiner, op.cit. n. 139, p. 93; M. Hall, "EEC: 
Competition or Policy? An Economist's Enquiry" (1980) 1 ECLR pp. 
287-296 (p. 290). 
3 3 8 R. Wish, "The impact of EEC Competition Law in the United Kingdom", 
in M.P. Furmston et al., (eds.) The Effect on the English Domestic 
Law of the Membership of the European Communities and of the Rati-
fication of the European Convention of Human Rights, pp. 108-144 
(p. 110); D.G. Goyder, op.cit, n. 309, pp. 11-12. 
3 3 9 J.P. Cunningham, J. Tinnion, The Competition Act 1980, p. 13; F.M. 
Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, pp. 
41-44. 
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Since the ECJ uses expressions like workable, effective or imperfect 
competition, i t obviously assumes that in reality there is practically 
no market that meets the requirements of perfect competition but that 
in most cases i t is realistic to strive for "workable competition".360 
This a fortiori is true i f one has to bring competition and the other 
objectives of the EEC Treaty into accord.361 
In Geitling v High Authority362 the Court therfore held that seeing the 
markets in question "[...] as perfectly competitive atomistic markets 
would be to ignore realities." 
It follows that the ECJ, when using the term "workable competition", 
seeks to achieve a market structure which is efficient, responsive to 
customer demand, has no significant barriers to entry and in which 
the various objects of the Treaty are harmonized in the best possible 
w a y 383 T M S is the sense in which the term "workable competition" will 
be used in this thesis. 
V. Conclusion of Part F. 
In the foregoing parts i t has been established that both Art. 85 (1) 
and Art. 86 EEC Treaty allow considerable scope for interpretation. 
Whereas for Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty this scope can be found in the 
expression "restriction of competition", Art. 86 EEC Treaty provides 
i t in the term "abuse". In utilizing these scopes for interpretation 
one has to take other Treaty objectives into account and find a 
reasonable balance between the different, sometimes conflicting, 
goals. 
3 6 0 Koch in Grabitz op cit n 198 vor Art. 85 no 4. 
3 6 1 K. Markert, "Wettbewerb und Wettbewerbspolitik in der EWG" (1970) 5 
EuR pp. 348-366 (p. 349 and pp. 352-353). 
3 6 2 Case 13/60 [19621 ECR 83 at p. 108. 
3 6 3 Like here Koch in Grabitz, op.cit. n. 199, before Art. 85 no. 4; 
critical about the use of the term "workable competition" Bella-
my/Child, op.cit. n. 141, p. 77 note 3. 
page 116 
The reason for this is that competition, in the sense of workable 
competition, is no end in itself but rather a means to an end. This 
end is the realization of the objectives formulated in Article 2 of 
the Treaty. Thus, competition is not to be viewed in absolute terms 
but is subject to certain limits justified by the objectives of public 
interest. The appearance of the reasonable balance sought after, de-
pends on the concrete circumstances of each individual case. 
Summing up, one can say that not every restraint to competition 
establishes a "restriction of competition" in the meaning of Art. 85 
(1) EEC Treaty or an "abuse" in the meaning of Art. 86 EEC Treaty. 
Some agreements and conducts are "justified" by the inherent limita-
tions of these rules which have to be deduced from the Treaty 
objectives. As far as such a "justification" can be found the measures 
in question are not prohibited by Articles 85 (1) or 86 EEC Treaty. 3 6 4 
3 6 4 Like here Schwark, op.cit. n. 160, p. 214; Kuhnt, "Ubertragung von 
Strom", op.cit. n.118, pp. 418-419; Hermann, "Ordnungsgrundlagen", 
op.cit. n. 31; Everling, "Der Binnenmarkt nach der Rechtsprechung 
des Gerlchtshofs", op.cit. n. 123, pp. 147-151. 
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G. Utilizing the Concept of Competition for the ESI 
I. Introduction 
In the preceeding section is was established that not every restraint 
on competition is caught by Art. 85 (1) or Art. 86 EEC Treaty, but 
that in general some restrictive practices are "justfied" because they 
facilitate the achievement of higher Treaty objectives. 
In this pari, i t has to be examined which particular aspects out of 
the many objectives of the Treaty contained in Articles 2 and 3 are 
relevant for the electricity market, (part II.) 
It then will be examined to what extent anticompetitive measures on 
the electricity market are justified under the relevant Treaty objec-
tives, (parts III .-IV.) 
II. Treaty Objectives Relevant for the Electricity Market 
Up to today, the ECJ did not have to decide any case concerning the 
application of Articles 85 and 86 to the ESI. Thus, the question of 
which Treaty objectives are important enough for the ESI to justify 
the restriction of the concept of competition (which according to Art. 
3 f EEC Treaty is also an important objective of the Community) has 
not been finally decided yet. 
It is, however, possible to deduce information as to which aspects 
are of particular importance for the development of the electricity 
industry within the common market from the provisions and proposals 
that have been issued in connection with the completion of an internal 
energy market.360 
Examining those proposals, resolutions and decisions, i t becomes 
obvious that there are four points that constantly receive particular 
attention. These aspects are: security of supply, price of supply, 
363 Supra, chapter 2 part A.I. 
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environmental protection and use of certain primary energies.366 
Two sentences from the preamble of the proposed Energy Charter may 
serve as example for the importance of these points: "Convinced that 
all countries of Europe share a common interest in the problems of 
energy supply, safety of Industrial plants, particularly nuclear 
plants, and environmental protection; concerned to do more to attain 
the objectives of security of supply, optimum management of resources 
and efficient use of resources."367 Similar sentences, that also empha-
sise the significance of those aspects, can be found in most of the 
other documents concerning the energy market as well. In the Decision 
concerning the Dutch ESI, the Commission paid foremost attention to 
the security of supply aspect.368 
The question arises whether security of supply at reasonable prices, 
environmental protection and the use of certain primary energies are 
objectives compatible with Treaty values and hence can justify a 
restriction of the principle of undistorted competition. 
The general priniciples of the European Community are formulated in 
Articel 2 of the Treaty. 
According to this provision, i t is the task of the Community to promo-
te "a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and 
balanced expansion, an increase in stability and accelerated raising 
in the standard of living". The key goal of the European Community 
thus is a secured and high quality of life for all European citizen. 
For the achievement of that goal i t is essential to have a secure and 
reliable power supply. In case of power shortage the entire infra-
structure of a modern state breaks down and the society as a whole is 
paralysed. 
3 6 6 About the importance of these aspects see also P. Montagnon op.cit. 
n. 127, pp. 58-59; Hermann, "Ordnungsgrundlagen", op.cit. n. 31, p. 
111. 
3 6 7 COM (91) 36 final, 14. February 1991, p. 8. 
3 6 8 See for example OJ No. 28, 2.2.1991, p. 32 (44) concerning the 
application of Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty. 
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The security of supply depends, to a great extent, on the kind of 
primary energy sources that are deployed. In connection with the 
electricity market, this aspect mainly concerns the dependence on 
imported primary energies, in particular, on crude oil and natural 
gas.369 Since import partners are sometimes unreliable and the available 
quantities of natural gas and oil are limited anyway, security of 
supply is higher the less the generation of electricity relies on oil 
or gas imports. 
Of equal importance for a high quality of life within the Community, 
is the price of power supply. The mere availability of electricity is 
no argument as long as i t is not affordable by everyone. Thus, only a 
supply at an acceptable price is a supply supporting the goals of the 
Treaty. 
Finally, the protection of the environment is also important for the 
promotion and realization of the goals named in Art. 2 EEC Treaty. The 
Council of Ministers has emphasized this In several declarations. 
"Whereas in particular, in accordance with Article 2 of the Treaty 
[...] part of the latter's task is to promote thoughout the Community 
a harmonious development of economic activities and a continuous and 
balanced expansion, which cannot now be imagined in the absense [...] 
of an improvement of the quality of life and the protection of the 
3 6 9 In this connection see Council Directive of 14. April 1975 concer-
ning the restriction of the use of petroleum products in power 
stations (OJ No L 178, 9.7.1975 p. 26) and Council Directive of 13 
February 1975 on the restriction of the use of natural gas in power 
stations (OJ L No 178, 9.7.1975, p. 24). The latter has been 
revoked by a recent Council Directive of 18. March 1991 (OJ No L 
75, 21.3.1991, p. 52) because natural gas reserves now are conside-
red to be of sufficient level with regard to the security of 
supplies of this source of energy. 
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environment;!...]".370 
It follows that there are, apart from the Introduction of more 
competition, four Important goals within the electricity market that 
need to be pursued. All of them form part of the general objectives 
the Community wants to promote. 
Thus, in applying Articles 85 and 86 EEC Treaty to the ESI, one has to 
find a balance between the concept of competition on the one hand and 
the security of supply, a reasonable price of supply, the protection 
of the environment and the promotion of the use of certain primary 
energies, on the other hand.3 7 1 
It now has to be examined which restrictions of competition on the 
electricity market can find justification under the aspects security 
of supply, price of supply and protection of the environment.372 
3 7 0 Resolution of the Council of the European Communities and of the 
Representatives of the Governments of the Member States meeting 
within the Council of 17, May 1977 on the Continuation and 
Implementation of a European Community Policy and Action Programm 
on the Environment, OJ No C 139, 23.6.1977, p. 1; see similar 
resolutions and statements in OJ No C 112, 20.12. 1973, p. 1 and OJ 
C No 46, 17.2.1983, p. 1. 
3 7 1 Montagnon. op.cit. n. 127, pp. 60-61; concerning the environmental 
protection the neccesity to balance the needs of the environment 
against other Treaty objectives such as competition does not only 
derive from Art. 2 EEC Treaty but Is also expressly laid down in 
Art. 130 r (2), according to which "Environmental protection 
requirements shall be a component of the Community's other poli-
cies". 
3 7 2 The question whether restrictions to competition can find j u s t i f i -
cation under the aspect "promotion of the use of certain primary 
energies" is not relevant for the purpose of this thesis since 
regulations that promote certain energy sourcesdo not affect the 
possibility to enter into competition for the suply of electricity 
customers in the first place. 
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III. The Security of Supply Aspect 
The most important goal within the electricity market certainly is the 
security of supply. The people in the EEC would not gain any advantage 
from competition in the ESI i f the price for that was unreliability 
or shortage of electricity supply. 
Before examining which restrictions to the concept of competition are 
therefore justified under the security of supply aspect, two prelimin-
ary remarks are necessary. 
1. The Complex Structure of Security of Supply 
Security of electricity supply is a state in which the electricity 
demand of the entire population can be satisfied at any given time. 3 7 3 
Whether or not this state is achieved depends on a multitude of 
different factors. 
In the first place, a number of technical requirements have to be f u l -
filled, such as the permanent maintenance of a certain mains voltage.3 7 4 
Apart from those technical requirements, a secure supply with electri-
city also depends on certain economic conditions. Power generation and 
distribution are activities demanding very large investments with long 
pay-back periods. Thus, foreseeability of developments and a consider-
able financial strength of the electricity utilities are necessary.373 
Since the safety of electricity supply depends on the interaction of a 
vast number of determinants i t is almost impossible to establish a 
"turning-point" after which the security of supply is no longer 
guaranteed. Thus a deterioration in the safety of supply is, as a 
3 7 3 J. Grawe, "Die stromwirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit im vereinigten 
Deutschland" (1990) 7 Stromthemen, pp. 1-12 (pp. 2-3). 
374 Supra, chapter 2 part C.III.2. 
3 7 3 Foreseeability was one of the aspects the Commission took into 
account when i t scutinized the compatibility of certain agreements 
in the Dutch ESI with the European rules on competition; OJ C No 
28, 2.2.1991, p. 32 (42). 
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rule, only gradually ascertainable.376 
2. The Neccesity to define Security of Supply on a European Basis 
The second preliminary remark concerns the question whether i t is true 
that the dependence on electricity imports from other Member States 
always endangers the security of supply in the dependent Member State. 
This i t what the representatives of the electricity industry sometimes 
claim. 3 7 7 It is assumed that in times of energy crises the foreign 
power supplier would favour his own nationals. Since crossboarder 
supply therefore allegedly cannot be relied upon, the security of 
supply is threatened i f customers enter into contracts with electricty 
utilities in other Member States. 
The influence of energy imports on the security of supply has once 
before played an important role in a case before the ECJ. 
In Campus Oil Limited v Minister for Industry and Energy370 the Court 
had to decide whether Irish rules obliging importers of petroleum 
products to purchase a certain proportion of their requirements from a 
State-owned company, which operated a refinery in Ireland, were 
compatible with the EEC Treaty. The Irish Government had issued these 
rules in order to keep the refinery going which was the only one in 
Ireland. If that refinery had closed, all suppliers of refined 
petroleum products on the Irish market would have been obliged to 
obtain their supplies from abroad, with approximately 80 % of these 
supplies coming from the United Kingdom. 
Against this background, the ECJ considered the rules in question as 
being necessary for the maintenance of public security within the 
meaning of Art. 36 EEC Treaty because they had the purpose to 
guarantee "(...1 a minimum supply of petroleum products to the State 
3 7 6 Heitzer, op.cit. n. 47, p. 108. 
3 7 7 For arguments like these see Birkenmaier, op.cit. n. 202, pp. 154-
155; Montagnon, op.cit. n. 127, p. 61. 
3 7 8 Case 72/83 [1984] ECR 2727. 
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concerned in the event of a supply crisis." 3 7 9 The Court, however, also 
stated that the "[...] quantities of petroleum covered by such a 
system must not exceed the minimum supply requirements without which 
the public security of the State concerned would be affected or the 
level of production necessary to keep the refinery's production 
capacity available in the event of a crisis [.,.)" 3 B 0. Thus, according 
to the ECJ the public security is only endangered if a state totally 
relies on the import of petroleum products without having the capacity 
to refine al ieast a minimum supply in case of crises. 
From this decision i t can be infered as a argumentum a contrario that 
the ECJ does not consider the safety of supply, and thus the public 
security, endangered if a state partly relies on the import of energy 
from other Member States.381 
This point of view can be approved. The European Community is striving 
towards the completion of a single market with conditions similar to 
those of a domestic market, and the Member States grow closer together 
than ever before. Considering the present state of integration, one 
can no longer define security of supply on a national level, assuming 
that the dependence on imports from other European Countries puts the 
security at risk. 3 8 2 Just the opposite is true. Real security of 
supply, even in cases of severe crisis, can only be achieved i f all 
Member States work very close together and help each other out. 
Whether or not the supply with electricity is secure can not be 
ascertained for an individual Member State, but has to be established 
for the European Community as a whole. 
379 Ibid., p. 2754. 
380 Ibid., p. 2757. 
3 8 1 Everling, "Der Binnenmarkt nach der Rechtsprechung des Gerichts-
hofs" op.cit. n. 123, p. 149. 
3 8 2 Arndt, op. cit. n. 32 , p. 18; Birkenmaler, op.cit. n. 202, p. 155; 
Everling, "Der Binnenmarkt nach der Rechtsprechung des Gerichts-
hofs", op.cit. n. 123, p. 149; GrQner, op.cit. n. 144, p. 75. 
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Both preliminary points must be kept in mind when we now proceed to 
examine which restrictions to competition are justified under the 
security of supply aspect. 
3. Restraints on Competition "justified" under the Security of Supply 
Aspect 
Restraints Lo competition on the electricity market that are justified 
under the security-aspect can be categorized in (a) those that are 
necessary because of the technical peculiarities of the ESI and (b) 
those that are caused by economical circumstances. 
a. Technical Requirements 
The ESI is characterized by a number of technical peculiarities.3 8 3 The 
most important are; the dependence on a grid, the very poor storage 
capability of electricity and the resulting simultaneity of production 
and consumption, the need to keep up a certain mains frequency at any 
given time, and the necessity always to have reserve capacities at 
one's disposal. 
These peculiarities make i t impossible to grant every competitor free 
access to the grid without introducing certain regulations. It is, 
for example, necessary to control the amount of electricity that is 
fed into the grid in order to keep the mains frequency in balance. It 
is also necessary to Issue rules obliging the electricity utilities to 
keep reserve capacities in store. 
From these examples i t becomes obvious that there are a number of 
technical requirements that make i t inevitable to control market 
access, as well as the behaviour of competitors on the market.384 The 
383 Supra, chapter 2 part C. III.2. 
3 8 4 Within this thesis i t is not possible to mention even roughly all 
the technical conditions a secure electricity supply demands, 
especially because a detailed enumeration requires specialized 
knowledge about complicated technical processes. 
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necessary regulations can cause restraints to competition, which do 
not, however, contradict Articles 85 (1) or 86 E E C Treaty, since they 
are justified under the security of supply aspect. 
b. Economical Requirements 
Apart from the technical requirements, there are economical peculiari-
ties within the ESI that justify restrictions of competition because 
they safeguard a secure supply. 
There are substantial differences in the national frameworks for the 
electricity industries in Europe.388 They concern the use of primary 
energies, environmental protection standards, fiscal treatment, con-
sent and appellate procedures for the construction of new plants and 
state aids etc. These differences result in considerable variations in 
the electricity production costs. Therefore, the prices charged for 
electricity in the respective Member States differ substantially. Thus 
the starting conditions for a competitive market are much better for 
the electricity utilities of some Member States than for others. In 
particular the French company EDF is, due to the French energy 
policy 3 8 6, able to produce power at almost unbeatable prices. 
If one assumed that all anticompetitive agreements and practices which 
hinder the import of electricity, infringe Articles 85 (1) or 86 EEC 
Treaty and are therefore void, a considerable stress of competition 
from France would start. EdF has surplus power at its disposal which 
i t would be pleased to sell to big industrial end users within the 
EEC. The German ESI especially fears the French competitor. Due to the 
high electricity production prices the German generators find themsel-
ves in a disadvantegous position which would not allow them to compete 
with offers that EdF threatens to make. 
Thus, i t is to be expected that German electricity ultilities as well 
383 Supra, chapter 2 part D.V. 
386 Supra, chapter 2 part D.V. 
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as those from other Member States would lose a number of very 
attractive industrial customers to EdF. In other words a lot of 
"cherries" would be "picked". France would probably become a dominant 
supplier to the rest of Europe because its cheap power would squeeze 
out other suppliers.387 This in turn would lead to significant finan-
cial difficulties for the utilities losing the attractive customers. 
Some may even go bankrupt. Those difficulties could endanger a 
forward-looking Improvement of generation and transmission fac i l i -
ties. Disadvantegous developments like these could in the long term, 
endanger the supply security. 
It follows that, due do the different frameworks for the electricity 
Industry in the EEC, the abolition of supply monopolies could cause 
significant economical difficulties for the electricity utilities of 
some Member States and hence on the long term could endanger the 
security of supply.3 8 8 
This danger though, is not caused by the fact that other Member States 
would depend on electricity imports from France, since the dependence 
on energy imports as such does not threaten the supply safety. Rather, 
the security of supply rather is endangered because the variety, as 
well as the financial strength, of the electricity utilities could 
suffer. 
Those difficulties would not arise i f the national energy policies 
were better harmonized and the starting conditions for the competitors 
were more approximated. In this case each electricity ut i l i ty losing 
an attractive industrial end user would have a realistic chance to 
find itself in return, a profitable customer ouside its original 
territory. Thus, all utilities, and not only those being privileged by 
the energy policy of their State, could "pick cherries".389 
3 8 7 Montagnon, op.cit. n. 127, p. 61. 
3 8 8 Engels, op.cit. n. 106, p. 67. 
3 8 9 About the necessity to harmonize the starting conditions see in 
place of many Kuhnt, "Atomstrom", op.cit. n. 55, p. 764. 
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Whether or not those negative developments actually will take place 
depends on a number of different economical factors. Supporters of 
more competition in the ESI for example, predict no negative but 
positive effects such as a reduction of the need for costly surplus 
generating capacity, as well as overall cost saving that could be 
passed on to customers,390 
Prognoses about the effects of competition, though, are in principle 
as unreliable as weather forecasts.391 Thus, a generally applicable as-
sessment of the effects of competition to the conditions on the 
electricity market is hardly possible.392 It will rather be necessary 
to scutinize the consequences for the market and for the security of 
3 9 0 Montagnon, op.cit. n. 127, p. 61. 
3 9 1 Hermann, "Ordnungsgrundlagen" op.cit. n. 31, p. I l l ; see also the 
differences of view over the advantages of competition in the 
recent Commitee reports, supra n. 134. 
3 9 2 Heitzer, op.cit. n. 47, p. 108; R. Bierhoff, "Stromversorgung in 
der Bundesrepubllk Deutschland" (1990) 40 ET pp. 758-761 (p. 760); 
J. Grawe, "Rechtliche Moglichkeiten und Grenzen eines europaischen 
Strommarktes" in U. Httffer et.al. (eds.) Berg- und Energierecht vor 
den Fragen der Gegenwart, Festschrift fur Fritz Fabricius. pp. 219-
234 (p. 225); Nlederleithinger, op.cit. n. 173, p. 68; Speich, 
op.cit. n. 160, p. 126; W. Tegethoff, "Fortbestand geschlossener 
Versorgungsgebiete in EG-Energiemarkt? in W. Harms (ed.) Konturen 
eines EG-Energiemarktes, pp. 89-94, (p. 91); S. Klaue, "Sonderab-
nehmer", op.cit. n. 258, p. 154; Harms, op.cit. n. 128, p. 86. 
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supply in each individual case.393 
In cases, however, in which the security of supply is endangered, 
restraints of competition that avoid these results are "justified" and 
thus are not caught by Articles 85 (1) or 86 EEC Treaty. 
IV. The Price of Supply Aspect 
The question that arises next is whether restraints to competition on 
the electricity market could be justified under the price of supply 
aspect. 
Some authors3 9 4 claim that the breaking up of supply monopolies and the 
introduction of competition to the electricity market would lead to 
price increases for domestic customers. If the local suppliers lose 
attractive industrial end users, i t is up to the remaining customers 
to meet the fix costs as well as the expenses that arise from the fact 
3 9 3 It also will be necessary to find solutions for the problems that 
have been described above under the expressions "prodigal son" and 
"services performed by grid owners". 
It is for example essential that the grid owner receives an 
adequate transmission charge for the use of his system. 
The "prodigal son"-problem seems to have been solved in England in 
a very reasonable way. According to the Electricity Act (Sec. 17) a 
public electricity supplier is not obliged to supply premises i f 
circumstances exist by reason of which his doing so would endanger 
the security of supply. Thus a public electricity supplier is not 
under the duty to supply a "prodigal son" i f this, due to a lack of 
capacity, endangered the regular supply of his other customers. The 
risk of finding a supplier hence partly lies with the customer that 
chooses a non-local supplier. 
394 Supra, chapter 3 part D. 
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that the facilities run less to capacity than usual. 3 9 8 
Due to the significance of a power supply at reasonable prices for a 
harmonious development of the economy, unequitable increases in elec-
tricity prices contradict the goals set up in Art. 2 EEC Treaty. 
Restraints to competition which are necessary to avoid undue price 
rises in the electricity supply of domestic customers, thus find a 
compensatory justification. 
It has to be observed, though, that this does not apply to any price 
increase but only to those that are somewhat out of proportion. 
Marginal price rises do not threaten the achievement of Treaty 
objectives. 
It is not easy to draw a line between those increases that have to be 
considered as undue and those that are st i l l justifiable, but i t seems 
reasonable to deploy the general rate of price increase in the Member 
States as a guideline. 
It is hard to imagine, anyway that the introduction of competition to 
the electricity market will, on the long run, cause an increase in 
electricity prices. It rather is quite within the bound of probability 
that the breaking up of supply monopolies and an increase in cross 
border trade will result in considerable lower electricity prices for 
all customers. An advanced integration of the national grids for 
example, is bound to lead to remarkable economic benefits. Competition 
between new private generators and existing power plants also will 
have positive effects on the price regime. In addition, not only large 
end users, but also local distributors would profit from the possibi-
l i ty to shop around for a generator. Thus, local distributors would 
also have the chance to purchase cheap power and could pass these 
3 9 8 Similar fears exist in England. Therefore the Government has 
introduced regulations that link the increase of electricity prices 
for household customers to the rate of inflation for the next two 
years. This way undue price rises are to be avoided. Sas, op.cit. 
n. 39, p. 494. 
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benefits on to their customers.396 
It is, however, necessary to allow competitive market forces some time 
to blossom to fu l l . Since several years are needed to build new power 
plants the emergence of sufficient competing capacity to have serious 
impact on prices may take quite a time. 3 9 7 
V. The Protection of the Environment Aspect 
At this point i t has to be examined which restrictions to the concept 
of competition are "justified" under the aspect of the protection of 
the environment. 
Apart from allowing third party access to the existing networks, 
competition on the electricity market can also be promoted by permit-
ting the supply of industrial and commercial end users via private 
grids. 3 9 8 
Rules that control the construction of those private grids therefore 
can cause restraints to competition on the electricity market. 
This applies, for example, to contracts, agreed, between the local 
3 9 6 Engels, op.cit. n. 106, p. 63. 
3 9 7 This is why the present protests of firms in England about a rise 
in power prices must not be taken too serious yet; for the protests 
see: "Firms protest at 40% rises in power prices", Times 
17.6.1991; see also: "Wakeham praises the benefits of competition", 
Financial Times 18.6.1991 and "Power prices fal l by up to 15 % for 
big customers", Financial Times 15.5.1991; according to the two 
later articles i t is not true that Industrial end users face price 
rises. They, on the contrary, have been able to secure lower 
electricity prices. 
3 9 8 Seidel, op.cit. n. 106, p. 136; since the construction of a grid 
causes extremely high expenses, private networks in most cases, 
will be uneconomical. Nevertheless, situations are conceivable in 
which a customer wishes to be supplied by a non local utility, via 
his own grid. This could be the case in areas close to the borders. 
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supplier and the holder of the right of way that make i t impossible 
for non local utilities to build a new grid for the supply of indivi -
dual customers.399 
The question arises, whether such a restraint to competition can find 
justification under the aspect of the protection of the environment. 
Overhead cables for the transmission of electricity can disturb the 
environment considerably.400 This may manifest itself in inroads on the 
physical substance of the terrain, like the clearing of trees or the 
draining of swamps which may destroy the natural environment of the 
wild life. But even where such drastic measures are not necessitated, 
additional pylons and cables will cause further visual distraction 
from the landscape. In addition, the result of recent scientific 
research suggests that high voltage cables emit electro-magnetic 
fields which damage human health. 4 0 1 
The European Council also attaches importance to the construction of 
networks for the environment. This can be infered from the fact that 
overhead electricity transmission lines are projects that, according 
to Art. 4 (2) of Council Directive 85/337402, shall be made subject to 
an assessment of the effects on the environment caused by those 
projects. 
Whether or not the disturbance caused by the construction of a new 
grid is significant enough to make i t necessary to refrain from the 
project, depends on the concrete circumstances of each individual 
case. Aspects like the length of the planned grid or whether the 
3 9 9 An example for such measures are the German Demarcations Con-
tracts, supra, chapter 2 part CIV.2. and infra, chapter 4 part 
C.I. 
4 0 0 H.J. Budde, "Elektrizitatsversorgungsunternehmen" in H. Rtihle (ed.) 
Energiepolltik und Marktwlrtschaft. pp. 155-167 (p. 161). 
4 0 1 "Confusion from crossed wires", Financial Times 30.1.1991. 
402 Council Directive of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of the effects 
of certain public and private projects on the environment, OJ L No 
175, 5.7.1985, p. 40; see in particular Annex II No 3 (b). 
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marked-out route would touch a nature reserve are important. 
It is thinkable, however, that restraints of competition caused by the 
prohibition to build grids for the supply of individual customers are 
"justified" under the aspect of the protection of the environment. 
In face of the growing importance of environmental protection, which 
has found expression in Art. 130 r (2) EEC Treaty 4 0 3, i t can even be 
assumed that, as a rule, competition draws the shorter straw. This 
solution seems all the more adequate considering that competition can 
also be promoted by granting third parties access to the existing 
grids and thus does not depend on the construction of new grids. 
VI. Analysis of the Commission's Approach to Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty 
in Connection with the ESI 
It has been established that anticompetitive agreements and conducts 
on the electricity market which are justified under the security of 
supply aspect, the price of supply aspect or the protection of the 
environment aspect do not infringe Art. 85 (1) respectively Art. 86 
EEC Treaty. 
The question arises whether this point of view coincides with the 
Commissions approach to Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 4 0 4 
During the present Intergovernmental Conferences, the Commission has 
proposed that the revised Treaty should specifically consider an 
internal energy market and mention the security of supply. The text of 
one of the proposed Articles is: "The provisions in article 85 para. 1 
may be declared inapplicable to any agreement in the energy sector 
which contributes to ensuring security of supply in the Community, to 
the extent that the restrictions i t contains and which are indispen-
4 0 3 According to this provision environmental protection shall be 
component of the Community's other policies. 
4 0 4 Anticompetitive conducts on the electricity market that could 
contradict Art. 86 EEC Treaty have not been subject to a Commission 
Decision yet. 
page 133 
sable for achieving this objective do not give the enterprises 
concerned the possibility of eliminating competition for a large part 
of the products in question".400 
The Commission thus proposes to add a provision, similar to Art. 85 
(3) EEC Treaty, to the Treaty that provides for the possibility of 
exempting agreements necessary to ensure the security of supply from 
the application of Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 
The fact that the Commission considers such an amendment of the Treaty 
neccessary, suggests that it does not share the view put forward in 
this thesis, according to which restraints to competition that are 
"justified" under the security of supply aspect do not infringe Art, 
85 (1) EEC Treaty in the first place. 
The conflicting view of the Commission also can be infered from the 
recent Decision concerning the Dutch ESI. In examining, whether the 
agreements in question infringe Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty the Commission 
did not expressly pay attention to the question of whether those 
agreements are necessary to ensure the security of supply. 
The drawback of this approach, which takes no rule of reason into 
consideration, is that i t denies Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty the necessary 
flexibility to accomodate such important goals as security of supply 
or protection of the environment, without prior intervention of the 
Commission. This lack of flexibility is probably the reason why the 
Commission is not absolutely consequent in its approach. It rather 
takes, in deciding whether certain agreements contradict Art. 85 (1) 
EEC Treaty, aspects like the necessary forseeability of developments 
into account, which in turn are relevant for the security of supply.4 0 6 
405 Europe-Documents, No 5440, 27.2.1991, p. 9. 
4 0 6 This is all, that can be said about the Commission's approach at 
this stage. More information probably can be infered from its 
Decision concerning the English and Scottish ESI because in the 
notices pursuant to Art. 19 (3) of Regulation 17 i t paid more 
attention to aspects like the "proper operation of the market" than 
i t did in the Dutch Decision. 
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H. Summary and Conclusion of Chapter 3 
In the preceding chapter, i t has been established that agreements and 
behaviours which serve to uphold the existing supply monopolies or 
have a similar effects on competition on the electricity market, are 
subject to the application of Articles 85 (1) and 86 EEC Treaty. 
The existing restraints to competition though, do not infringe those 
provisions, which have to be interpreted on the basis of a concept of 
workable competition, i f they are "justified" under higher Treaty 
objectives such as the security of supply or the protection of the 
environment. Whether or not a justification can be found depends on 
the concret circumstances of each individual case. 
In the following chapter i t will be examined whether the agreements 
and behaviours that can be found in the English and German ESI amount 
to restraints of competition and whether they are justified under the 
security of supply, the price of supply or the protection of the envi-
ronment aspect. 
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Chapter 4 Examination of the Electricity Supply Industry in 
England and Germany 
A. Introduction 
In the preceding chapter i t has been established that the electricity 
industry is covered by the Treaty provisions on competition and 
concrete rules for the application or Articles 85 and 86 EEC Treaty 
have been elaborated. 
In this chapter i t has to be examined what kind of anticompetitive 
agreements and behaviours are to be found in the ESI of England and 
Germany. 
It also will be necessary to discuss whether those agreements and 
behaviours do in fact infringe Articles 85 (1) or 86 EEC Treaty or 
whether It is possible to find a justification under higher Treaty 
objectives relevant for the electricity market. 
B. The Electricity Supply Industry In England and Wales 
I. Existing Agreements 
1. Introduction 
In connection with the privatisation of the ESI in England and Wales, 
several commercial agreements between various parties of the industry 
have been concluded.407 
In order to give a general picture, the existing agreements can be 
divided into four categories. One important contract concerns the 
selling and purchasing of electricity on the wholesale market (Pooling 
407 The same applies for the privatised Scottish ESI, but i t would go 
beyond the scope of this thesis to deal with those agreements as 
well. As a matter of fact the overall result as far as the European 
rules on competition are concerned does not differ considerably 
from the outcome for the English and Welsh ESI. 
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and Settlement Agreement). Other contracts deal with financial details 
of the wholesale trade with electricity (Option Contracts). In addi-
tion, there are agreements that relate to the purchase of electricity 
from non-fossil energy sources by the Regional Electricity Companies408 
(Nuclear and Renewables Contracts). Finally, a fourth category of 
commercial agreements concerns details of the use of the existing 
grids and networks (Grid and Distribution Codes and Connection and Use 
of System Agreements). 
All of those commercial arrangements have been notified to the 
Commission of the European Community in accordance with Regulation 
17/62 in February 1990. 
Pursuant to Art. 19 (3) of this Regulation, the Commission thereupon 
has published a notice 4 0 9 stating that i t "intends to adopt a favourable 
position" in respect to all contracts. A final Decision has not yet 
been reached.410 
A notice under Art. 19 (3) of Regulation 17/62 is required in 
connection with the issue of a negative clearance411, stating that on 
the basis of the facts in its possession, the Commission sees no 
reason for actions under Art. 85 (1) or Art. 86 EEC Treaty. It also is 
an essential element of the procedure concerning the issue of an 
exemption under Art. 85 (3) EEC Treaty 4 1 2. 
The notice issued in connection with the English and Welsh ESI does 
not reveal any definite information as to which of those two procedur-
es is relevant here. 
In practice companies, as a rule, apply for a negative clearance and 
notify for an exemption under Art. 85 (3) EEC Treaty at the same time, 
4 0 8 Refered to as RECs. 
4 0 9 OJ C No. 191, 31.7.1990, p. 9. 
4 1 0 The same applies in respect of the agreements entered in by parties 
of the Scottish ESI. See notice pursuant to Art. 19 (3) of 
Regulation 17/62 in OJ C No 245, 29.9.1990, p. 9. 
4 1 1 Art. 2 of Regulation 17/62. 
4 1 2 Art. 4 of Regulation 17/62. 
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since the same form, Form A/B, is used for both procedures.413 This 
leads to the assumption that the companies involved in this case also 
have made a joined application. 
It nevertheless is possible to deduce some hints as to the Commis-
sion's point of view from the notice pursuant to Art. 19 (3) of 
Regulation 17/62. In cases in which the Commission plans to grant an 
exemption under Art. 85 (3) EEC Treaty, i t has developed the habit of 
announcing that outrightly, in the notice under Art. 19 (3). 4 1 4 Since i t 
did no such thing in the notice concerning the English and Welsh ESI 
but stuck to the more traditional terminology, "(..] intends to adopt 
a favourable position", i t can be assumed that the Commission plans to 
issue a negative clearance and hence does not see any infringement of 
Articles 85 (1) or 86 EEC Treaty caused by the arrangements in 
question. 
2. Pooling and Settlement Agreement413 
In the newly privatised ESI of England and Wales, customers buy 
electricity from supliers who in turn purchase i t from generators 
through a wholesale electricity market called "pool". 
Customers with a monthly demand exceeding 1 MW, thereby can choose 
their suppliers and the suppliers are free to shop around for a 
generator from which they want to purchase electricity. Concerning all 
other customers, the 12 RECs, as special suppliers, are under an 
obligation to offer supply at published tariff prices. 
The entire physical trade with electricity between generators and 
suppliers, as well as part of the trade between generators and large 
end users, occurs through the pool for electricity. It is compulsory 
4 1 3 Kerse, op.cit. n. 215, p. 39. 
4 1 4 Kerse, op.cit. n. 215, p. 42 note 16; for a recent example see OJ C 
No 17, 29.6.1990, p. 7 concerning the German "Jahrhundertvertrag". 
4 1 8 For details concerning all agreements see Capel, op.cit. n. 63, 
passim: see also H.P. Hermann, "Prlvatlsierung der brltischen 
Elektrizitatswirtschaft", (1988) 38 ET pp. 886-892; Sas, op.cit. n. 
39, passim and OJ No L 191, 31.7.1990, p.9. 
page 138 
for all licensed suppliers of electricity (for example RECs and second 
tier suppliers416), and for licensed generators, to be member of the 
pool and hence party of the Pooling and Settlement Agreement. This 
condition is part of the terms of all licences to these persons issued 
by the Secretary of State or the Director General of Electricity 
Supply. In addition, membership is open to all parties interested in 
the generation of electricity such as large end users. 
According to the terms of the Pooling and Settlement Agreement the 
pool is dealt with by the National Grid Company (NGC). By no later 
that 10.00 a.m. each day, all generators inform NGC of the availabili-
ty of their plants for each half hour of the next day and of the price 
at which they are willing to sell their power (= offer price). NGC 
then ranks the generating units in order of increasing offer prices. 
To meet demand at the lowest possible costs, i t dispatches and 
schedules the lowest price plant first. This system is called Merit 
Order.417 
At about 4.00 p.m. NGC publishes a schedule that indicates to the 
generation units at what times at to what extent their output will be 
required the following day. The calculations on which the schedule is 
based take into account amongst other things, the requirements of 
system stability. It is for example necessary to have plants available 
on reserve in case of failure of one unit. 
3. Option Contracts 
Since the pool price is calculated on a half hourly basis, depending 
on the costs of supply, and the balance of demand and supply, i t is 
likely to be quite volatile. 
The unpredictability of the pool price is unwelcome for customers and 
even technically unworkable since the meters in most premises cannot 
cope with changing prices. In addition, generators as well as sup-
pliers do not wish to be exposed to the financial risks that are 
4 1 6 A person or a company other than a REC providing supply with 
electricity is called "second tier supplier". 
4 1 7 Cotterell, op.cit. n. 163, p. 59. 
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connected with a volatile price. 
Therefore generators and suppliers, as well as generators and other 
third parties like big end users, have entered into contracts that aim 
at minimizing this risk. The Option Contracts provide for one party or 
the other to have the right to claim payments according to the 
difference between the pool price and a price fixed in the private 
agreement.418 
During the restructuring phase of the English and Welsh ESI, initial 
option Contracts were Jointly negotiated between National Power, Power 
Gen and Nuclear Electric on the one side, and the 12 RECs on the other 
side. These contracts will expire in not later than three years time. 
4. Nuclear and Renewable Contracts 
Under sec. 32 Electricity Act, the RECs have to produce evidence to 
the Director General of Electricity Supply showing that they have made 
arrangements according to which an aggregate amount of generating 
capacity from non-fossil fuel generating systems will be available to 
them. This so-called non-fossil-fuel-obligation concerns both nuclear 
and renewables generation. 
In pursuance to details of this obligation, elaborated in orders made 
by the Secretary of State, the RECs are obliged to contract for an 
average of 8 GW of capacity from nuclear power plants over the period 
from 1990-1998.419 They also have to enter into contracts for the 
purchase of increasing amounts of electricity from renewable energy 
sources (the final obligation is expected to amount to 800 MW for 
1998)420. 
4 1 8 The content of such an Option Contract could for example be: "The 
generator X agrees to pay the REC Y the difference between the pool 
price and a fixed price of 2.0p/kWh whenever the former is higher. 
In return the REC pays the generator a fixed sum each year"; see 
Capel, op.cit. n. 63, p. 20. 
4 1 9 OJ No L 191, 31.7.1990, p. 9 (p. 12). 
420 Ibid., p. 13. 
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The necessary contracts (Nuclear and Renewable Contracts) have been 
entered into by generators like Nuclear Electric 4 2 1 on the one side, 
and the Non-Fossil Purchasing Agency on the other. This agency is 
jointly owned by the 12 RECs and buys electricity on their behalf. 
The essential feature of the Nuclear and Renewable Contracts is that 
the specified amount of electricity must be made available for the 
RECs by the generators. 
5. Grid a n d Distribution Codes. Connection and Use of System 
Agreements 
Pursuant to its transmission licence, NGC is obliged to draw up and 
implement a Grid Code. 
NGC has the duty to offer use of the grid to every third party on the 
basis of a "common carriage" system. The Grid Code lays down technical 
standards and requirements for that kind of use of system. It 
determines conditions for the connection with the high voltage grid. 
The Grid Code also specifies certain ancillary services, necessary to 
maintain system stability, that have to be carried out by the 
generators and are purchased from them by NGC. 
While the Grid Code itself is no private agreement, but is set up by 
NGC and approved by the Director General of Electricity Supply, there 
are Connection and Use of System Agreements that require compliance 
with the Grid Code. These Connection and Use of System Agreements are 
entered into by NGC and all parties that wish to use the grid, such as 
the RECs, generators and direct connected customers. All parties agree 
with each other to comply with the provisions of the Grid Code. 
The licences for the RECs contain the obligation to set up a 
Distribution Code. Similar to the Gird Code, the Distribution Codes 
lay down technical requirements that have to be met by all users of 
the system, in order to keep up an efficient and secure distribution 
A relatively small amount of electricity generated from atomic 
energy will be provided by other companies such as British Nuclear 
Fuels. 
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system. They, for example, deal with details as to the connection to 
the lines. The RECs are obliged to offer use of their systems to every 
third party on a non-discriminatory basis. For that purpose, Connec-
tion and Use of System Agreements that require compliance with the 
respective Distribution Code are necessary . This way each party 
agrees to observe the standards and requirements contained in the 
Distribution Code for the transport of electricity to customers. 
II. Infringement of Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty? 
The question that now arises is whether the arrangements on the 
English and Welsh electricity market infringe Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 
In order to produce an answer, i t will be necessary to examine whether 
the arrangements are agreements between undertakings that have, at 
their object of effect, the restriction of competition within the 
common market. 
1. Option Contracts 
a. Undertakings 
The first question that has to be examined is whether the parties of 
the Option Contracts are undertakings in the meaning of Art. 85 (1) 
EEC Treaty. 
An undertaking in the meaning of Art. 85 EEC Treaty is, according to a 
commonly used wide definition, "almost any legal or natural person 
carrying on activities of an economic or commercial nature"422, inclu-
ding state-owned corporations423. 
The Option Contracts have been entered Into by suppliers such as the 
RECs, by large end users and by generators. Suppliers and generators 
422 Supra, chapter 3 part E.IV.3. 
4 2 3 In case 155/73 Sacchi (1974] ECR 409 (pp. 428-432) the ECJ regarded 
a state television company as undertaking in the meaning of 
Articles 85-90 EEC Treaty. 
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are private or state-owned424 companies engaged in the trade with 
electricity and hence undertakings in the meaning of Art. 85 (1) EEC 
Treaty. It can be assumed that large end users with a demand of more 
than 1 MW per month, are also private or public legal bodies carrying 
out commercial activities of some sort, and therefore also qualify as 
undertakings in the meaning of Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. The Option 
Contracts thus have been concluded between undertakings. 
b. ARreements 
It now has to be examined whether the Option Contracts are agreements 
in the meaning of Art. 85 EEC Treaty. 
The EEC Treaty does not define "agreement", neither has the ECJ 
produced a comprehensive definition. The prevalent view 4 2 3, however, 
gives "agreement" a broad definition. According to the European 
Commission "it is sufficient that one of the parties voluntarily 
undertakes to limit its freedom of action with regard to the other"426. 
The parties of the Option Contracts have agreed to change the volatile 
pool price into a fixed price, as far as the trade among them is 
concerned. They thus have limited their freedom to negotiate and 
charge electricity prices. The Option Contracts therefore are agree-
ments between undertakings within the meaning of Art. 85 (1) EEC 
Treaty. 
4 2 4 Nuclear Electric is st i l l a public undertaking and so where 
National Power, Power Gen and the 12 RECs prior to their p r i -
vatisation. 
4 2 9 See the descriptions of what is covered by that term in: Korah, 
"Competition Law", op.cit. n. 139, p. 200; Vaughan, op.cit. n. 
139, para. 19.32; Bellamy/Child, op.cit. n. 141, p. 49. 
4 2 6 See Commission Decision of 29.11.1974, Franco-Japanese Ballbearing 
Agreements, OJ L No 343, 21.12.1974, p. 19 (24). 
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c. Restriction of Competition within the Common Market 
The next question is whether the Option Contracts amount to a "re-
striction of competition" within the meaning of Art. 85 (1) EEC 
Treaty. 
aa. Restraints to Competition caused by the Option Contracts 
The Option Contracts could constitute a restraint to competition on 
the electricity market, insofar as generators use them to tie sup-
pliers and large end users to them. As long as those buyers of 
electricty are bound to one generator through an Option Contract, 
other generators cannot enter into competition for them. These con-
tracts thus have repercussions on the possibility to compete for the 
supply of the local distribution boards and large end users. They 
hence distort competition on the electricity market. 
bb. Effect on Trade between Member States 
To be covered by Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty, the Option Contracts have to 
"affect trade between Member States". The ECJ tends to construe that 
element in a very broad sense.427 
As a matter of fact, foreign utilities are excluded from the supply of 
customers which are tied to a certain generator, as well as British 
ones. The restraint to competition that proceeds from the Option 
Contracts thus not only impaires British generators, but also those 
from other Member States. This restraint has therefore effect on the 
trade between Member States. 
4 2 7 For details see infra, chapter 4 part C.II.l.b.bb. 
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cc. Compensatory Justification for the Restraints caused by 
the Option Contracts 
The next question is whether the established restraints to competition 
caused by the Option Contracts are "justified" under Treaty values 
relevant for the ESI or whether they constitute restrictions to 
competition that infringe Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 
The companies have entered into the Option Contracts to even out the 
variations of the pool price for electricity that due to the mechanism 
of the pool is quite volatile. This way they protect themselves 
against financial risks connected with an unpredictable price, and 
improve the forseeability of developments. The companies involved 
hence put their future planning on a more secure foundation. This in 
turn helps them to avoid financial crises and supports their economi-
cal wellbeing, a factor that is important for the security of 
supply.4 2 8 
Fixed prices also ensure that end customers will not have to face 
undue increases in the electricity price. 4 2 9 
The restraints to competition caused by the Option Contracts , are for 
those reasons, justified for the sake of a secure and efficient 
supply. Therefore they do not constitute "restrictions to competition" 
within the meaning of Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 
Against the qualification of the Option Contracts as restrictions to 
competition, in addition, speaks the fact that none of the initial 
contracts has a duration of longer than three years. The tying of 
suppliers to certain generators is thus limited to a relatively short 
period of time anyway. 
The Option Contracts entered into by numerous companies within the 
English and Welsh ESI thus do not infringe Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 
4 2 8 Supra, chapter 3 part G.III.3. 
4 2 9 See Commission in OJ C No 191. 31.7.1990, p. 9 (at p. 11). 
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The Comission is likely to share this view. 4 3 0 
2. Nuclear and Renewables Contracts 
The 12 RECs have entered into various contracts with plants generating 
electricity from nuclear or renewable energy sources, according to 
which, these plants have to provide certain amounts of electricity for 
the RECs. The question arises whether those arrangements are agree-
ments between undertakings that restrict competition in the meaning of 
Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 
a. Undertakings 
The Nuclear and Renewables Contracts have been concluded between the 
12 RECs and generator companies, all of which are undertakings in the 
meaning of Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 
b. Agreements 
aa. Involvement of Public Authorities 
The Nuclear and Renewables Contracts were entered into in compliance 
with the non-fossil fuel obligation contained in sec. 32 Electricity 
Act and orders by the Secretary of State issued on the basis of that 
provision. Therefore, i t was not up to the parties of those contracts 
to decide whether they wanted to conclude them or not. The RECs were 
obliged to do so by measures of public authority. These public 
measures also set up conditions concerning some aspects of the content 
of the arrangements, such as the amount of electricity that has to be 
covered. 
4 3 0 See notice pursuant to Art. 19 (3) of Regulation 17/62, OJ L No. 
191, 31.7.1990, p. 9 (at p. 12); the Commission "intends to adopt a 
favourable position" in respect of the Option Contracts; for the 
interpretation of this formulation see supra, chapter 4 part B.I.I . 
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It therefore is questionable whether those arrangements fal l under 
Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty, since measures of national legislation do not 
constitute "agreements" within the meaning of this provision. 4 3 1 
The problem that needs discussion here is thus, whether the Nuclear 
and Renewables Contracts due to the involvement of public authorities 
have to be regarded as legislative measures, or whether they neverthe-
less are private "agreements" covered by Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 
bb. Secisiuus concerning the Involvement of Public Authorities 
The ECJ as well as the Commission have been dealing with cases in 
which i t has been at issue whether the arrangements in question were 
legislative measures or private "agreements" within the meaning of 
Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 
Both institutions have decided those cases on the basis of the 
respective circumstances, without developing generally applicable c r i -
terias for the distinction between public measures and "agreements". 
But i t nevertheless is possible to derive some rules from the 
decisions promulgated so far. The European Commission432, as well as 
the ECJ433, do in any case, regard an arrangement as "agreement" in the 
meaning of the European Competition Rules, i f its parties have been 
free to refrain from entering into i t . This is true even in respect to 
4 3 1 Bellamy/Child, op.cit. n. 141, p. 50; R. Bieber in Beutler et al., 
op.clt. n. 87, p. 337; see also case 267/88 Van Eycke v ASPA [1988] 
ECR 4769 (at p. 4791). 
4 3 2 Commision Decision of 29.11.1974 relating to proceedings under 
Article 85 of the Treaty (IV 27.905 - Franco-Japanese Ballbearing 
Agreements), OJ No L 343, 21.12. 1974, p. 19 (p. 24) and Commission 
Decision of 19.12.1984 relating to Article 85 of the Treaty (IV 
126.870 - Aluminium Imports from Eastern Europe), OJ No L 92, 
30.3.1985, p. 1 (p. 37). 
4 3 3 Cases 240-242, 261, 262, 268, 269/82 Stlchting Sigarettenindustrie 
and Others v Commission (1985] ECR 3831 (p. 3871) and case 41/83 
Italy v Commission (1985] ECR 873 (p. 885), the latter relating to 
a behaviour under Art. 86 EEC Treaty. 
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an industry agreement that later expressly has been ratified by French 
law. 4 3 4 
From these rulings, i t can be deduced that i t is doubtful whether 
contracts such as the Nuclear and Renewables Contracts qualify as 
"agreements" under Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty when the undertakings were 
obliged by public authorities to enter into them, 
cc. The Commission's Point of View 
The undertakings involved as well as the European Commission neverthe-
less do regard the contracts in question as "agreements". 
They have formally been notified to the Commission, which has thereu-
pon opened a procedure that will either lead to a negative clearance, 
or an exemption under Art. 85 (3) EEC Treaty. In the notice pursuant 
to Art. 19 (3) of Regulation 17/62, no indication can be found that 
the reason why the Commission intents to take a favourable position 
lays in the arrangements not qualifying as "agreements", within the 
meaning of Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 
dd. Commentary 
The position that the Nuclear and Renewables Contracts are indeed 
"agreements" in the definition of Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty, inspite of 
the state involvement, is perfectly justifiable. This may be illustra-
ted by the following considerations. 
The whole body of EC competition law is based on two pillars: Articles 
30 et seq. EEC Treaty are concerned with state measures and Articles 
85 et seq. EEC Treaty look at the effects of the activities of private 
parties. The two groups of rules complement each other and serve the 
same purpose. As a whole, they are meant to cover every conceivable 
4 3 4 See Commission Decision of 15.12.1982 relating to a proceeding 
under Article 85 of the Treaty (IV 29.883 - AROW/ Bureau national 
interprofessionnel du cognac), OJ No L 379, 31.12.1982, p. 1 and 
the corresponding case 123/83 Bureau national interprofessionnel du 
cognac v Guy Clair [1985] ECR 391. 
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aspect of interference with free and undistorted competition.439 Thus, 
i t must be possible to classify any measure which has effects on 
competition either as a state measure (with the consequence that Art. 
30 et seq will be applied), or as a private measure (in which case i t 
falls under Art. 85 et seq.). Nothing must be allowed to effectively 
escape the scrutiny of both sets of rules. 4 3 6 
Classification does not pose any problems as long as a measure or 
behaviour can be traced back exclusively to an act of public authority 
or to the arrangements of private parties. 
The Nuclear and Renewables Contracts are difficult to f i t into the 
scheme as they contain elements of both: they have been concluded in 
the form of a private contract between companies, but on the other 
hand, they were required in order to satisfy the obligations imposed 
by sec. 32 of the Electricity Act 1989. 
Should they then be treated as state measures, or as agreements in the 
meaning of Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty? 
For two reasons, the latter option is preferable. 
First, even though the Electricity Act demands that the contracts be 
concluded, not every single provision or detail of the Nuclear and 
Renewables Contracts has been determined in advance. A lot of i t is 
also the result of free negotiations between the partners.4 3 7 
Second, i t does not seem a good idea to blur the distinction between 
the Electricity Act itself, and the agreements which have been conclu-
ded in compliance with this Act. The first one is clearly a state 
measure. If sec 32 Electricity Act was found to be in breach of Art. 
30 EEC Treaty, i t would be prohibited and hence inapplicable. But why 
438 Supra, chapter 2 part IV.5. 
4 3 6 This can for example be deduced from the judgement in case 229/83 
Leclerc v Sari "Au B16 vert' ECR [1985] 17 (pp. 30 et seq.). Here 
the Court first examined the applicability of Art. 85 EEC Treaty to 
the measures in question and then, after having denied i t , applied 
Art. 30 EEC Treaty; see also Steiner, op.cit. n. 139, p. 105. 
4 3 7 In this connection Stewing, op.cit. n. 50, p. 23 according to whom 
Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty applies as long as the undertakings involved 
have some scope left to make their own decisions. 
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should this effect of Art. 30 EEC Treaty extend to the private agree-
ments? Sec. 32 of the Act is no condition of law for the validity of 
these agreements. They will continue to exist with or without sec. 32. 
The agreements might have been induced by the Act, but they do not 
depend on its continued existence. In fact, as they are, they might as 
well have been concluded voluntarily in the first place, and hence 
should be treated the same way. Therefore, the Nuclear and Renewables 
Contracts could only be prohibited i f they themselves were in conflict 
with EC competition law, and the decisive norm must be Art. 85 (1) EEC 
Treaty. 
It could be objected that this is unfair to the private parties 
concerned and places them in an awkward position: they are threatened 
with a fine i f they fai l to conclude an agreement conforming to 
sec. 3 2 4 3 8 , and they are in danger of being fined by the Commission i f 
the agreement infringes Art. 85 (1) of the EEC Treaty. 4 3 9 But this 
argument does not hold water. 
Two constellations are thinkable: 
The first situation is that the Nuclear and Renewables Contracts do 
not infringe Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. In this case the undertakings can 
be forced by national law to enter into them. 
In the opposite case the Electricity Act demanded an action which 
would be prohibited under Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. It then itself would 
be in breach of the contract, namely of Art. 5 (2) EEC Treaty 4 4 0 and of 
4 3 8 Sec. 32 subsec. 3 Electricity Act. 
4 3 9 Art. 15 (2) VO 17/62. 
4 4 0 The general duty of the Member States under Art. 5 EEC Treaty to 
abstain from enacting national laws that could endanger the effec-
tiveness of Articles 85 - 90 EEC Treaty was fist established in 
case 13/77 INNO v ATAB [19771 ECR 2115 (pp. 2144-2145); see also 
case 267/86 Van Eycke v ASPA ECR [1988] 4769 (p. 4791 consideration 
16) and case 311/85 Vereniging van Vlaamse Reisebureaus v Sociale 
Dienst Van de Plaatselijke en Gewestelijke Overheidsdiensten [1987] 
ECR 3801 (p. 3826 consideration 10). 
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Art. 30 EEC Treaty 4 4 1 and due to the direct effect of the latter 
provision would be void. The undertakings involved were no longer 
obliged to conclude the Nuclear and Renewables Contracts. The private 
parties hence would not have to obey the national law if this 
inescapably put them into conflict with EC law. Thus attention must be 
paid above all to the requirements of EC competition law. 
ee. Summary of Part b. 
Despite the fact that sec. 32 Electricity Act Imposes the obligation 
to conclude them, the Nuclear and Renewables Contracts are private 
arrangements between the undertakings involved. Thus, i t is more 
appropriate to classify them as "agreements" in the meaning of Art. 85 
(1) EEC Treaty than as state measures covered by Articles 30-36 EEC 
Treaty. 4 4 2 
4 4 1 If the Nuclear and Renewables Contracts in fact do infringe Art. 85 
(1) i t must be concluded that the Electricity Act obliging the 
companies to enter into those contracts constitues a measure having 
equivalent effect as a quantitative restriction under Art. 30 EEC 
Treaty. The same correlation did the ECJ see in the INNO case 
([1977] ECR 2115). It held: "In any case, a national measure which 
has the effect of facilitating the abuse of a dominant position 
will generally be imcompatible with Articles 30 and 34 [...]" (p. 
2145 consideration 35). 
4 4 2 With the same result Sas, op.clt. n. 39, p. 498 who also regards i t 
necessary to notify the arrangements to the Commission and thus 
treats them as agreements under Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty; see also 
Cotterell, op.cit. n. 163, p. 59. 
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c. Restriction to Competition 
The next question is whether the Nuclear and Renewables Contracts 
constitute "restrictions to competition" within the meaning of Art. 85 
(1) EEC Treaty. 
aa. Restraints to Competition caused by Nuclear and Renewables 
Contracts 
A restraint to competition could derive from the fact that for a 
certain capacity, the RECs are tied up with generators running nuclear 
or renewables power plants. As to this amount, generators cannot enter 
into competition with each other for the supply of the RECs with 
electricity. The capacity covered by the Nuclear and Renewables 
Contracts thus, for a period of eight years, is excluded from an 
otherwise competitive market in which the RECs choose their 
generators. 
bb. Effect on Trade between Member States 
This restraint affects the trade with electricity between the Member 
States because the Nuclear and Renewables Contracts exclude foreign 
generators as well as British ones from the supply of the RECs. 
cc. Compensatory Justification for the Restrainst caused by 
Nuclear and Renewables Contracts 
The restraint to competition caused by the Nuclear and Renewables 
Contracts does constitute a restriction under Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty, 
unless a justification under the aspects elaborated above443 can be 
found. 
It could be justified under the security of supply aspect. 
The Nuclear and Renewables Contracts were concluded to make sure that 
the RECs when purchasing electricity do not orientate themselves 
443 Supra, chapter 3 part G. 
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solely to commercial aspects. If the RECs were free to choose 
generators for their entire demand, plants producing at relatively 
high costs such as those generating from renewable energy sources or 
atomic energy444 would have quite bad prospects. They probably would 
very soon face severe financial difficulties. Some might even go 
bankrupt. 
Thus, the Nuclear and Renewables Contracts have been concluded to 
support the nuclear and renewables industry, and hence help to ensure 
the future existence of certain kind of generating plants. 4 4 0 This in 
turn improves the diversity of fuel sources and hence the security of 
supply.4 4 6 This is even more true because the Nuclear and Renewables 
Contracts promote fuel sources different from oil and gas the supply 
with which can be unreliable. 
Moreover, the capacity covered by the non-fossil-fuel-obligation con-
cerns only a relatively small percentage of the total electricity 
generation in England and Wales.447 
The restraint caused by the Nuclear and Renewables Contracts thus is 
justified under the security of supply aspect and does not constitue a 
restriction to competition within the meaning of Art. 85 (1) EEC 
Treaty. This outcome is likely to be shared by the Commission.448 
4 4 4 Electricity generated from atomic energy is, unlike in France, 
quite expensive in England and thus also is difficult to sell on a 
free market; see "Nuclear power's difficult rebirth", Financial 
Times, 5.3.1991. 
4 4 3 Sas, op.cit. n. 39, p. 498. 
4 4 6 Like here the Commission in its notice pursuant to Art. 19 (3) of 
Regulation 17/62, OJ C No. 191, 31.7.1990, p. 9 (at p. 13). 
4 4 7 Nuclear generated electricity accounts at present for 14.2 % of the 
total electricity generated in England and Wales; see "Nuclear 
power's difficult rebirth", Financial Times 5.3.1991. 
4 4 8 See notice pursuant to Art. 19 (3) of Regulation 17/62, OJ L NO. 
191, 31.7.1990, p. 9 (at p. 13); the Commission "intends to adopt a 
favourable position" in respect of the Nuclear and Renewables 
Contracts; for the interpretation of this formulation see supra, 
chapter 4 part B.I.I. 
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3. Pooling and Settlement Agreement 
The question that is to be discussed next, is whether the Pooling and 
Settlement Agreement is an agreement between undertakings which has as 
its object or effect the restriction of competition within the common 
market, and thus contradicts Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 
The Pooling and settlement Agreement has been entered into by genera-
tors, the RECs and large final consumers, all of which qualify as 
undertakings in the meaning of Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 
Membership in the pool is, according to their licences, compulsory for 
the RECs as well as for generators. Such companies are thus required 
to enter into the agreement by an act of public authority. But, as 
explained in respect to the Nuclear and Renewables Contracts, the 
involvement of public authorities does not alter the fact that the 
arrangements in question are nevertheless agreements of private law to 
which Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty applies.449 
The Pooling and Settlement Agreement has been set up to accommodate 
two features connected with electricity trade over a fully intercon-
nected system.430 
The first feature is that, in order to avoid a collapse of the supply, 
the amount of power generated at the plants has to match the 
customers' demand at any given time. The second characteristic is the 
impossibility to distinguish between power that has been generated at 
one plant, and that generated at another. 
Because of the necessity to meet the highest imaginable demand at any 
given time, a central co-ordination of all big electricity generators 
is required. The second feature results In the technical difficulty to 
determine which plant is supplying power to which customer. Thus the 
4 4 9 This obviously is also the Commission's point of view. See notice 
pursuant to Art. 19 (3) of Regulation 17/62, OJ C No. 191, 
31.7.1990, p. 9 (at p. 11). 
4 5 0 Capel, op.cit. n. 63, appendix 1. 
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output of the generators is effectively combined.431 
The best way to deal with those peculiarities of the trade with 
electricity, is to buy and sell i t through a single pool at a single 
price. 4 3 2 This is why the Pooling and Settlement Agreement has been 
concluded. 
The agreement is thus a vital instrument for a satisfartory operation 
of the electricity market. It has neither at its object nor its effect 
to restrict competition, but it simply meets technical necessities 
associated with the peculiarities or electricity trade. It also does 
not have negative effect on the trade between Member States since 
membership to the pool is open to foreign generators as well as to 
British. 
Summing up, the Pooling and Settlement Agreement does not constitute a 
restriction to competition and thus does not infringe Art. 85 (1) EEC 
Treaty. This conclusion is expected to be shared by the European 
Commission.453 
4. Connection and Use of System Agreements 
Finally, the Connection and Use of System Agreements could contravene 
Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 
Like the other contracts entered into in connection with the privat i-
sation of the ESI in England and Wales, the Connection and Use of 
System Agreements are agreements between undertakings within the 
meaning of Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 
451 Ibid. 
432 Ibid. 
4 3 3 See notice pursuant to Art. 19 (3) of Regulation 17/62, OJ L NO. 
191, 31.7.1990, p. 9 (at p. 11); the Commission "intends to adopt a 
favourable position" in respect of the Pooling and Settlement 
Agreement; for the interpretation of this formulation see supra, 
chapter 4 part B.I.I . 
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They cover technical and safety aspects relating to the connection and 
the operation of the high voltage grid and of all other electrical 
lines. The observance of those rules is necessary for the functioning 
of the whole system. They therefore are essential for the operation of 
the newly competitive generation and supply business in England and 
Wales. The Connection and Use of System Agreements hence do not 
constitute restriction to competition. They achieve just the opposite, 
in facilitating the continuous supply on a competitive basis. 
It therefore is possible to agree with the expected view of the 
Commission, according to which the Connection and Use of System 
Agreements do not contravene Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 4 3 4 
5. Summary to Part II 
In the foregoing parts i t has been demonstrated that the commercial 
contracts entered into in connection with the privatisation of the 
English and Welsh ESI, do constitute agreements between undertakings 
within the meaning of Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. Insofar as the 
arrangements cause restraints to competition on the electricity mark-
et, those restraints are justified under the security of supply as-
pect. None of the agreements therefore infringes Art. 85 (1) EEC 
Treaty. 
4 5 4 See notice pursuant to Art. 19 (3) of Regulation 17/62, OJ L NO. 
191, 31.7.1990, p. 9 (at p. 14); the Commission "intends to adopt a 
favourable position" in respect of the Connection and Use of System 
Agreements; for the interpretation of this formulation see supra, 
chapter 4 part B.I.I . 
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III. Exemption under Art. 85 (3) EEC Treaty? 
Since the agreements on the English and Welsh electricity market do 
not contradict Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty, the question of whether those 
contracts perhaps qualify for an exemption under Art. 85 (3) EEC 
Treaty does not arise. 
IV. Infringement of Art. 86 EEC Treaty? 
No such conducts on the electricity market in England and Wales have 
come to the present author's knowledge as would constitute an in f r i n -
gement of Art. 86 EEC Treaty. 
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C. The Electricity Supply Industry in Germany 
I . Existing Agreements and Conducts 
Two types of contracts can be found on the German electricity market: 
Demarcation Contracts and Concession Agreements. 
Demarcation Contracts have been concluded between various kinds of 
electricity utilities. The contents of those contracts vary. 4 3 8 
Some simply provide for its parties the mutual obligation to refrain 
from supplying customers within the other party's area of supply. 
Other Demarcation Contracts, which have been entered into by genera-
tors on the one side and distributors on the other side, contain the 
obligation of the distributor to purchase its entire demand or a 
specified percentage of its demand from the generator. These agree-
ments sometimes provide for the distributor the requirement not to 
generate electricity itself, and for the generator the obligation not 
to supply end users in the distributors area directly (mutual recogni-
tion of the respective tasks). 
Finally, some contracts contain provisions according to which an 
electricity uti l i ty commits itself to not offering third parties use 
of its system (electrical lines etc.) for the through transport of 
electricity to premises situated within the area of the other party to 
the contract. Those agreements concern the through transport to local 
distributors as well as to large end users. 
The Concession Contracts, which have been concluded between electrici-
ty supply companies and local government bodies, provide for the 
utilities the exclusive right to use all public premises such as roads 
and paths to lay cables.486 
In addition to these two types of contracts, one conduct can be found 
in the German ESI. All electricity utilities deny third parties access 
433 Supra, chapter 2 part CIV.2. 
436 Supra, chapter 2 part CIV.2. 
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to their systems of grids and lines. They do so in respect of through 
transport of electricity to customers within their own area of supply, 
as well as in respect of the through transport to consumers that are 
customers of other utilities. This conduct is called Durchleitungsver-
weigerung (Through-Transport-Refusal). 
The question arises whether the Demarcation or Concession Contracts or 
the Trough-Transport-Refusal infringe Articles 85 or 86 EEC Treaty. 
II. Infringement of Art. 85 (1)? 
1. Demarcation Contracts 
a. Agreements between Undertakings 
The Demarcation Contracts have been entered into by German electricity 
utilities. Some of these are private companies, others have a majority 
public sector stake. They all fall under the wide definition of 
"undertakings" in Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 4 0 7 
Since the Demarcation Contracts are contracts under private law in 
which the parties voluntarily have limited their freedom to choose a 
generator or to supply customers with electricity they also qualify as 
"agreements" within the meaning of Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 
b. Restriction of Competition within the Common Market 
aa. Restraints to Competition caused by Demarcation Contracts 
Demarcation Contracts aim at partioning the market of electricity 
customers between the utilities involved. 4 5 8 Utilities that have agreed 
not to offer supply to end users in each others areas of supply, do 
not enter into competition with each other for those customers. 
4 8 7 Arndt, op.cit. n. 32. p. 16. 
4 8 8 Lukes, "Demarkationsvertrage", op.cit. n. 219, p. 1927. 
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Neither is there competition for the supply of local distributors i f 
they have entered into exclusive purchase agreements with certain 
generators. The Demarcation Contracts thus help to establish supply 
monopolies and hence cause restraints to competition on the electrici-
ty market.439 
bb. Effect on Trade between Member States 
The next question is whether the Demarcation Contracts affect the 
trade between Member States. 
Some authors4 6 0 dispute that the Demarcation Contracts have an effect on 
intra-Community trade. They argue that these agreements, since they 
are concluded between German electricity utilities and exclusively 
concern the German market, establish domestic market sharing agree-
ments that do not affect the electricity trade between Member States. 
The Demarcation Contracts, according to this view, hence do not fal l 
under Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 
Whether or not this argumentation is to be followed depends on the 
interpretation of the term "effect on trade between Member States". 
The ECJ tends to give i t a very wide meaning.461 This can for example, 
be deduced from its ruling in Pronuptia de Paris. The Court held that 
"[...] franchise agreements for the distribution of goods which 
contain provisions sharing markets between the franchisor and the 
franchisees or between the franchisees themselves are in any event 
liable of affect trade between Member States, even i f they are entered 
into by undertakings established in the same Member State, in so far 
as they prevent franchisees from establishing themselves in another 
« 9 Arndt, op.cit. n. 32, p. 17; Lukes, "Demarkationsvertrage", op.cit. 
n. 219, p. 1827; Klaue, "Sonderabnehmer", op.cit. n. 258, p. 153; 
Harms, op.cit. n. 128, p. 83. 
4 6 0 Kuhnt, "ttbertragung von Strom", op.cit. n. 118, p. 418; Hermann, 
"Odrnungsgrundlagen", op.cit. n. 31, pp. 110 et seq. 
4 6 1 Bellamy/Child, op.cit. n. 141, p. I l l , note 58. 
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Member State."462 
In VVR v Sociale Dienst van de Plaatselijke en Gewestelijke Overheids-
diensten the ECJ even went so far as to relinquish the proof of an 
actual effect on intra-community trade. It stated: "(...] such agree-
ments may affect the trade between Member States in several aspects. 
First of all travel agents operating in one member State may sell 
travel organized by tour operators established in other Member States. 
(Italics added)"463 
This wide interpretation also applies for contracts that solely 
concern national markets i f they extend over the whole territory of a 
Member State. The Court has held that such an agreement "[...] by its 
very nature has the effect of reinforcing the compartmentalization of 
markets on a national basis [ . . . ] " 4 6 4 and thereby impedes the aims of 
the EEC Treaty. 
The position of the ECJ to give the term "effect on the trade between 
Member States" a wide interpretation is perfectly justifiable. Due to 
the advanced level of integration within the European Communities 
nearly any kind of trade is capable of having cross boarder effects. 
This results in most restrictions to competition affecting the trade 
between Member States.463 
But i t is nevertheless, still possible that restraints to competition 
on a national market do not interfer with intra-Community trade. This 
for example, is thinkable in respect of a domestic market sharing 
agreement that does not cover the entire territory of a Member State, 
but only shares regional markets. Such an agreement does not per se 
fal l under Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. Whether i t is covered by that 
4 6 2 Case 161/84 [1986] ECR 353 (p. 384 consideration 26). 
4 6 3 Case 311/85 [1987] ECR 3801 (p. 3828 consideration 18). 
4 6 4 Case 8/72 Vereeniging van Cementhandelaren v Commission [1972] 
ECR 977 (p. 991 consideration 29). 
4 6 3 S. Klaue, "Europaisches Kartellrecht und Energiewirtschaft", in H. 
LeSmann et al. (eds.), Festschrift fttr Rudolf Lukes, pp. 405-410, 
(p. 408). 
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provision rather depends on its effects on the patterns of imports and 
exports that might otherwise take place.466 
Demarcation Contracts concluded between German electricity utilities 
that oblige the parties to refrain from supplying customers within the 
area of the other party, aim at sharing regional markets. Those 
contracts do not prevent the import of electricity from other Member 
States since they only bind their own parties. Neither do they have 
any influence on conceivable exports of electricity from Germany.467 
The prevalent view 4 6 8 therefore is that Demarcation Contracts merely 
containing the obligation not to offer supply to customers situated in 
the supply area of the other party of the agreement, do not affect the 
trade between Member States and hence do not infinge Art. 85 (1) EEC 
Treaty. 
The verdict, however, must be different in cases where the Demarcation 
Contracts contain provisions according to which a util i ty has to 
purchase its entire demand or substantial parts of i t , from the other 
party. Such an agreement necessarily results in other generators being 
excluded from the supply of that util i ty. The exclusion concerns 
German competitors, as well as foreign ones. Demarcation Contracts 
containing clauses like this, therefore affect the trade between 
Member States. 
The same applies for agreements obliging their parties not to offer 
access to their systems of electrical grids and lines, to third 
parties that wish to supply customers within the supply area of the 
other parties of that agreement. Such contracts prevent competition 
for the supply of local distributors as well as large end users. Those 
customers are neither able to choose their supplier within Germany, 
4 6 6 Bellamy/Child, op.cit. n. 141, p. 178. 
4 6 7 Due to the high production costs of electricity in Germany export 
of electricity does not take place anyway. 
4 6 8 Niederleithinger, op.cit. n. 173, p. 69; Lukes, "Demarkations-
vertrage", op.cit. n. 219, p. 1927; Arndt, op.cit. n. 32, p. 17; 
Hermann, op.cit. n. 31, p. 116. 
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nor can they import electricity from other Member States by using the 
existing grids. 
Summing up, i t has been shown that some Demarcation Contracts do not 
have any effect on the trade between Member States. Those Demarcation 
Contracts however, that provide for the obligation for a uti l i ty to 
purchase its entire demand (or substantial parts of it) from the other 
party, or to not offer third parties access to its grids and lines, 
affect intra-Community trade and thus are covered by Art. 85 (1) EEC 
Treaty. 
cc. Compensatory Justification for the Restraints caused by 
Demarcation Contracts 
The final question is whether the established restraints to competi-
tion caused by the Demarcation Contracts are "justified" or whether 
they constitute restrictions to competition that infringe Art. 85 (1) 
EEC Treaty. 
Arguments in favour of the Demarcation Contracts usually refer to the 
aspects of security and price of supply, when it comes to the 
justification of these agreements. A safe supply at reasonable prices 
essentially relies, according to that view, on supply monopolies in 
which neither generators nor suppliers have to enter into competition 
with each other.4 6 9 
This view cannot be followed. Some arguments against that opinion can 
be infered from the English example. 
Firstly, the restructuring of the English and Welsh ESI proves that i t 
is technically possible to allow the through transport of electricity 
on a common carriage basis, without endangering the security of 
supply. It thus can no longer be argued that any through transport of 
electricity, due to technical reasons, endangers the security of 
supply. This does not mean, though, that through transport is always 
For details of that argumentation see supra, chapter 3 part D. 
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and everywhere technically possible. There are certain requirements, 
such as the maintenance of a certain mains voltage, that have to be 
met at any time 4 7 0. In order to guarantee these requirements, i t can 
sometimes be necessary to refrain from allowing third parties access 
to the grid. 
The Englsih example however, demonstrates that the through transport 
of electricity in general does not, due to technical reasons, threaten 
a secure electricity supply. 
Apart from the technical aspects, one can attempt to deduce some 
information from the English example about the financial consequences 
competition has for the electricity utilities. 
The new regulations have been in force now for about one year and the 
undertakings seem to do quite well 4 7 1 on the new competitive market, 
contrary to concerns478 voiced some months ago. It is, however, not 
possible to say anything definite about the financial consequences for 
the utilities at this stage, because i t is sti l l early days after 
a l l . 4 7 3 
Apart from that, i t is doubtful anyway whether the experience made in 
England in this respect can serve as guide line for Germany. 
When the English and Welsh ESI was privatised, i t was clear that the 
market participants would mainly be drawn from the already existing 
utilities, plus some new private generators. Due to the limited 
capacity of the only interconnector link between England and the 
4 7 0 This is why in England and Wales a central schedule and dispatch 
of the grid and the major stations, the pool, has been established. 
4 7 1 "Professor Stephen Littlechield, Offer's director-general, said the 
electricity industry was working well and already had a private 
sector mentality" see "Power prices fal l by up to 15% for big 
customers", Financial Times 15.5.1991. 
4 7 2 See for example, "Power groups dim long-term view", Financial Times 
2/3.2.1991 and "Power generators seen as risky for investors", 
Financial Times 4.2.1991. 
4 7 3 For details as to the profit prospects of the individual undertak-
ings see Capel, op.cit. n. 63, passim. 
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continent4 7 4, the French low price uti l i ty EdF can not effectively 
participate in the competition for English customers. Thus, all signi-
ficant market participants had roughly similar starting conditions and 
therefore the chance to hold their ground on the competitive electric-
ty market. 
In contrast to this, German electricity utilities would face very 
strong competition from the French state owned uti l i ty EDF, without 
having equal starting conditions. This stress of French competition 
could endanger the financial wellbeing, or even the existence, of a 
number of German electricity undertakings. This in turn, might result 
in a lack of diversity of electricity undertakings and, in the long 
run, threaten the security of supply.4 7 5 
Whether or not the security of supply is actually at risk depends on a 
number of different factors. The economical strength of an undertaking 
and thus its capability to hold its ground against a competitor 
depends, for example, on the clientele structure and on the level of 
local economic activity within its supply area. 
It thus is not possible to make generally applicable statements as to 
whether Demarcation Contracts that restrict competition are 
"justified" under the security of supply aspect.476 
It has to be observed, though, that these agreements prevent any kind 
of competition. One can hardly imagine that i t is necessary for the 
sake of a safe supply to prohibit competition generally.4 7 7 It therefo-
re can be assumed that the Demarcation Contracts, in preventing 
competition for customers in any case, overshoot the mark.4 7 8 Thus, as 
4 7 4 The interconnector has a capacity of 2 GW which represents about 4% 
of the generation capacity in England and Wales. 
473 Supra, chapter 3 part G.III. 
4 7 6 Heitzer, op.cit. n. 47, p. 108; Bierhoff, op.cit. n. 393, p. 760; 
Grawe, "Rechtliche MBglichkeiten", op.cit. n. 392, p. 225; Nleder-
leithlnger, op.cit. n. 173, p. 68; Speich, op.cit. 160, p. 126; 
Klaue, "Sonderabnehmer", op.cit. n. 258, p. 154. 
4 7 7 Groner, op.cit. n. 144, pp. 74-75. 
4 7 8 Niederleithinger, op.cit. n. 173, pp. 46 et seq. 
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a rule, they will not find compensatory justification under the 
security of supply aspect. 
The Demarcation Contracts finally could be justified under the price 
of supply aspect. Such a justification requires that the supply mono-
polies, which the Demarcation Contracts create, are necessary to avoid 
undue rises in the electricity prices. It has been established 
however, that competition on the electricity market, in the long run, 
will not result in an increase of power prices.479 This is why agree-
ments like the Demarcation Contracts that prevent competition total-
ly, usually find no justification under the price of supply aspect. 
c. Summary of Part 1. 
It has been established that those Demarcation Contracts which merely 
contain provisions according to which the parties have to refrain from 
supplying customers in each others area of supply, do not infringe 
Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty since they do not affect the trade between 
Member States. 
Other Demarcation Contracts however, providing the duty of one party 
to purchase its entire demand (or substantial parts of it) from the 
other party, or to refrain from allowing access to its system to third 
parties for the through transport of electricity, affect the trade 
between Member States. Those agreements that prevent competition 
totally are, as a rule, not justified under the security or price of 
supply aspect. They hence infringe Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 4 8 0 
479 Supra, chapter 3 part G. IV. 
4 8 0 Like here Klaue, "Sonderabnehmer", op.cit. n. 258, passim; A. 
Metzenhin, Mehr Stromlmporte durch EG Recht (1989) 35 WRP, pp. 217-
222 (p. 2199; Schwark, op.cit. n. 16o, p. 214; Seidel, op.cit. n. 
106, pp. 129-143; different Speich, op.cit. n. 160, p. 125. 
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2. Concession Agreements 
a. Agreements between Undertakings 
The Concession Agreements have been concluded between electricity 
utilities and local government bodies. 
The involvement of local government bodies raises the question of 
whether the Concession Agreements are agreements between "undertak-
ings" within the meaning of Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 
With respect to the qualification of local authorities as "undertak-
ings" the ECJ has stated that Art. 85 EEC Treaty "(...] does not apply 
to contracts for concessions concluded between communes acting in 
their capacity as public authorities and undertakings | . . . ] " 4 9 1 From 
this Judgement i t can be deduced that local government bodies are not 
to be regarded as "undertakings" within the meaning of Art. 85 (1) EEC 
Treaty i f they act as public authorities. 
In the German legal system, however, administrative bodies such as 
local authorities can act in two different ways. They can either 
perform sovereign functions, or they can act in the same way as any 
other private individual or legal person.482 
In the first case, their actions are subject to public law; in the 
second case they are subject to private law; both sets of rules being 
completely distinct from one another. 
When entering into Concession Agreements, the local government bodies 
are ruled, according to a commonly agreed opinion4 8 3, by private law, 
since those agreements have an entirely commercial character. The 
Concession Agreements therefore are not made within the public law 
framework. Thus, the local government bodies do not act within their 
capacity as public authorities, but are engaged in economic activi-
Case 30/87 Corinne Bodson v Pompes funebres des regions Hb6r6es SA 
[1988] ECR 2479 (p. 2512 consideration 18). 
The latter is called verwaltungsprivatrechtliches Handeln. An ex-
ample would be the purchasing of office material. 
Arndt, op.cit. n. 32, p. 17; Kuhnt, "ttbertragung von Strom", 
op.cit. n. 118. p. 418. 
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ties. They hence qualify as undertakings within the meaning of Art. 85 
(1) EEC Treaty. 
b. Restriction to Competition within the Common Market 
aa. Restraints to Competition caused by Concession Agreements 
According to the Concession Agreements, the local government bodies 
are obliged to rerrain from allowing anybody, apart from the electri-
city ut i l i ty which is party to the agreement, to lay cables and 
electrical lines on premises in public ownership. Since nearly all 
streets, roads and paths in Germany are publicly owned i t is more or 
less impossible to construct new electrical lines or grids. 
By the means of the Concession Agreements, the electricity utilities 
thus prevent other undertakings from supplying customers within their 
areas, via new grids. They hence hinder non local entities from 
entering into competition for the supply of their customers. 
The Concession Agreements therefore cause restraints to competition. 
bb. Effect on Trade between Member States 
These restraints affect the trade between Member States because they 
exclude foreign, as well as German utilities from the supply of 
customers via private grids. 
cc. Compensatory Justification for the Restraints caused by 
Concession Agreements 
The question arises as to whether the restraints to competition caused 
by the Concession Agreements are "Justified". 
With respect to a conceivable justification under the of aspects 
security and price of supply the same applies as for the Demarcation 
Contracts. There is a distinct possibility that these agreements are 
sometimes necessary to safeguard a secure supply at reasonable prices. 
But, since the Concession Agreements prevent the construction of new 
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grids and hence competition totally, they overshoot the mark and usu-
ally cannot find compensatory justification under those aspects.484 
The verdict might be different, however, in connection with the aspect 
of protection of the environment. Overhead cables cause considerable 
disturbance for the environment.483 
It is therefore possible that the restraints to competition caused by 
the prohibition to construct new grids is "justified" under the pro-
tection of the enrironment aspect. It will be necessary to weigh up 
the Treaty objectives competition and environmental protection, ag-
ainst each other, thereby taking into consideration all circumstances 
of the respective case.486 
Nevertheless, i t can be assumed that, due to its growing importance, 
environmental protection in many cases takes precedence. The re-
straints to competition caused by the Concession Agreements therefore 
usually find a compensatory justification under the protection of the 
environment aspect. 
c. Summary of Part 2. 
It has been established that the Concession Agreements cause distor-
tions to competition on the electricity market, in that they prevent 
the supply of customers via private grids. Those restraints, however, 
as a rule, are "Justified" since they are necessary to protect the 
environment and hence do not infringe Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 4 8 7 
4 8 4 See for example the argumentation of Groner, op.cit. n. 144, pp. 
74-75. 
483 Supra, chapter 3 part G.V. 
488 For details of this weighing up see supra, chapter 3 part G.V. 
4 8 7 For the same result see Grawe, "Rechtliche MSglichkeiten", op.cit. 
n. 392, p. 230. 
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I I I . Exemption under Art. 85 (3) EEC Treaty? 
The German electricity undertakings could seek an exemption under Art. 
85 (3) EEC Treaty for those agreements that contradict Art. 85 (1) EEC 
Treaty. This is relevant in particular for some of the Demarcation 
Contracts. 
A condition for an exemption from the application of Art. 85 (1) is 
that the Demarcation Contracts are agreements which contribute "to 
improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting 
technical or economic progress while allowing consumers a fair share 
of the resulting benefit and which (do] not: 
"(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not 
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; 
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competi-
tion in respect of a substantial part of the products in ques-
tion." 
The Demarcation Contracts fai l to satisfy the condition of Art. 85 (3) 
(b) EEC Treaty, because they bind electricity distributors to cer-
tain generators, or prevent the through transport of electricity. They 
hence make i t absolutely impossible for non local utilities to enter 
into competition for the supply of large end users or distributors. 
The Demarcation Contracts thus totally eliminate competition on the 
German electricity market. 
It therefore can be assumed that the Demarcation Contracts do not 
qualify for an exemption under Art. 85 (3) EEC Treaty. 4 8 8 
4 8 8 Like here Niederleithinger op.cit. n. 173, p. 71; different Schwark 
op.cit. n. 160, p. 215. 
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IV. Infringement of Art. 86 EEC Treaty? 
The German electricity utilities refuse third party access to their 
systems for the through transport of electricity to customers within 
their own area of supply, as well as to consumers situated in the 
supply area of other electricity undertakings. 
The question arises whether that "Through-Transport-Refusal" is an 
abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Art. 86 EEC Treaty. 
1. Relationship between Articles 85 and 86 EEC Treaty 
As far as the electricity utilities deny through transport of electri-
city for the supply of customers within the supply area of another 
German undertaking, they do so with reference to corresponding provi-
sions contained in the Demarcation Contracts. As shown above, those 
contracts usually contradict Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty and are therefore 
void. 
This raises the question of whether Art 86 EEC Treaty also can be 
applied to that kind of Through-Transport-Refusal". The answer to this 
question depends on the relationship between Article 85 (1) and 86 EEC 
Treaty. 
Wohlfarth has argued that, due to the fact that Art. 86 EEC Treaty is 
a more general provision, i t cannot apply in cases that are caught by 
the more special Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 4 8 9 
Art. 86 EEC Treaty, however, is not a more general rule in the sense 
that i t covered all cases falling under Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty. 4 9 0 
Therefore, the argumentation of Wolfarth cannot be followed. Rather, 
it is possible that a conduct infringing Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty also 
contravenes Art. 86 EEC Treaty. 4 9 1 
4 8 9 See Wohlfarth, op.cit. n. 207, Art. 86 no. 1. 
4 9 0 Smit/Herzog, op.cit. n.206, vol. 2, para. 86.06. 
4 9 1 Mestmacker, op.cit. n. 216, pp. 356-357; Smit/Herzog, op.cit. n. 
206, vol. 2. para. 86.06. 
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The Court has confirmed this repeatedly.492 In Hoffmann v La Roche493, 
i t stated that the fact that the conduct of an undertaking occupying a 
dominant position falls within Art. 85 EEC Treaty does not preclude 
the application of Art. 86 EEC Treaty. 
It follows, that the fact that some of the Through-Transport-Refusals" 
violate Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty does not influence the applicability of 
Art. 86 EEC Treaty to them. 
2. Dominant Position within the Common Market 
The EEC Treaty does not define "dominant position". 
However, the ECJ regards, according to its established case law, an 
undertaking as being in a dominant position "[...J when i t enjoys a 
position of economic strength which enables i t to hinder the mainten-
ance of effective competition on the relevant market by allowing i t to 
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors and 
customers and ultimately of consumers"494. This definition takes two 
aspects into consideration: the possibility to act independently, and 
the absense of competition. 
In order to carry out an economic evaluation to decide about the 
existence of a dominant position, i t is necessary to determine the 
relevant market for a particular product which is sufficiently differ-
entiated from other product markets.499 
The market in question here is the electricity market, meaning the 
market for the supply of customers such as large end users and local 
492 p o r the relationship between Art. 85 and 86 EEC Treaty see also 
case 51/89 Tetra Pak Rauslng SA v Commission (1991) CMLR p. 334. 
4 9 3 Case 85/76 [1979] ECR 451 (p. 550 consideration 116). 
4 9 4 See for example case 322/81 Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461 
(p. 3503 consideration 30) and case 311/84 CBEM v CLT and IPB 
[1985] ECR 3261 (p. 3275 consideration 16). 
4 9 8 Case 27/76 United Brands Co v Commission [1978] ECR 207 (p. 270); 
see also Vaughan, op.cit. n. 139, para 19.58. 
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distributors, with electricity. 4 9 6 
To establish whether the undertakings in question obtain a dominant 
position within that market, i t furthermore Is necessary to evaluate 
their economical strength and independence in respect of competitors. 
The German electricity utilities own the grids they use for the 
transmission and distribution of electricity to their customers. Due 
to the high investments necessary, i t is nearly always uneconomical to 
build a new grid in order to supply a customer. The utilities are in 
fact therefore, in a monopolistic position as far as the electricity 
supply in their area is concerned. 
The ECJ regards a very large market share as significant evidence of 
the existence of a dominant position 4 9 7, and hence assumes that monopo-
listic undertakings usually obtain a dominant position. 4 9 8 
It therefore follows that the German electricity utilities are in a 
dominant position. 4 9 9 
The next question is whether they obtain this position "within the 
common market or a substantial part of i t". 
Art. 86 EEC Treaty not only prohibits the abuse of a dominant position 
by one undertaking but also by a group of undertakings. 
Since all German electricity utilities refuse through transports, i t 
has to be examined whether they together dominate a substantial part 
of the common market. 
Examples of "substantial parts" in decisions of the ECJ include the 
territory of Belgium300 and Germany801, but also considerably smaller 
4 9 6 Kuhnt, "ttbertragung von Strom", op.cit. n. 118, p. 420; Speich, 
op.cit. n. 160, p. 125. 
4 9 7 Case 85/76 Hoffamnn-La Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 461. 
4 9 8 Arndt, op.cit. n. 32, p. 19. 
4 9 9 See in place of many Rltter, "Anwendung der EG-Wettbewerbsregeln", 
op.cit. n. 176, p. 46. 
3 0 0 Case 26/75 General Motors Continental NV v Commission [1975] ECR 
1367 (pp. 1377-1378). 
3 0 1 Case 7/82 GVL v Commission [1983] 483 (pp. 506-507). 
page 173 
areas like the southern part of Germany302, or the Netherlands903. 
Since the whole of German electricity utilities cover the entire 
territory of Germany they, according to these decisons, dominate a 
substantial part of the common market.304 
3. Abuse 
The question arises whether the Trough-Transport-Refusal establishes 
an "abuse" of the dominant position obtained by the electricity 
utilities. 
Trough-Transport-Refusals are not covered by the examples of abuses in 
Art. 86 (2) EEC Treaty. But since this list is not exhaustive, they 
may still fal l under paragraph ( l ) . 3 0 3 
As said above, the concept of abuse in Art. 86 EEC Treaty is an 
objective one.306 The conduct of a dominant undertaking can only amount 
to an abuse i f there is no objective justification for i t . 
This raises the question of whether the German electricity utilities 
have an objective reason for the Trough-Transport-Refusal. Otherwise, 
the refusal contradicted Art. 86 EEC Treaty and the undertakings were 
under the the legal obligation to allow third parties access to their 
8 0 2 Cases 40-48, 50, 54-65, 111, 113, 114/73 Codperatieve vereniging 
Suiker Unie UA v Commission [19751 ECR 1663 (pp. 1991-1993). 
3 0 3 Case 322/81 Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin NV v Commission 
[1983] ECR 3461 (pp. 3510-3512). 
9 0 4 Arndt, op.cit. n. 32, p. 19; Ritter, "Anwendung der EG-Wettbewerbs-
regeln", op.cit. n. 176, p. 48. 
3 0 8 Case 6/70 Europembalage and Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 
215 (p. 245 consideration 26). 
3 0 6 Supra, chapter 3 part F.III. 
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systems.307 
In order to decide whether there is an objective reason i t is 
necessary to take the same aspects into account that are of importance 
in connection with the application of Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty to the 
ESI.3 0 8 All depends therefore, on the necessity of the Trough-Trans-
port-Refusals for a secure supply at reasonable prices. 
If the German electricity undertakings allowed third parties access to 
their grid, they would loose some attractive end users or local 
distributers to their French competitor EDF. This alone would probably 
neither endanger the security of supply nor the stability of prices at 
a reasonable level. 3 0 9 But the phenonenum of "cherrypicking" in the 
long run could have negative effects on the overall security of 
supply, as long as the starting conditions for competitors are as 
unequal as they are today. 
Whether or not a Trough-Transport-Refusal qualifies as abuse of a 
dominant position is thus subject to a weighing up of all relevant 
interests.0 1 0 In doing so one also has to take Into consideration the 
technical difficulties that are connected with the through transport 
of electricity. The feeding in of power makes i t , for example, 
essential that the gird owner provides a number of ancilliary servi-
3 0 7 This can be deduced from the Courts ruling in Hoffmann-La Roche 
(Case 85/76 [1979] ECR 461 (pp. 539-540)) Here the ECJ also had to 
decide whether a dominant undertaking controlling the entrance to a 
certain market abuses its postition. It held: "An undertaking which 
is in a dominant position on a market and ties purchasers (...) by 
an obligation or promise on their part to obtain all or most of 
their requirements exclusively from the said undertaking abuses its 
dominant position [...)". 
3 0 8 Everling, "Der Binnenmarkt nach der Rechtsprechung des Gerichts-
hofs", op. cit. n. 123, p. 150. 
3 0 9 See the argumentation of Arndt, op.cit. n. 32, p. 20. 
3 1 0 Everling, "Der Binnenmarkt nach der Rechtsprechung des Gerichts-
hofs", op. cit. n. 123, p. 151; Grawe, "Rechtliche MSglichkeiten", 
op. cit. n. 392, pp. 230-232. 
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ces.3U It has to be scrutinized whether i t is possible to compensate 
the performance of those inevitable services by the means of a 
transmission charge or whether their performance is an unreasonable 
burden for the grid owner that cannot be compensated at all. In the 
latter case a Trough-Transport-Refusal would not be abusive because 
the electricity uti l i ty had an objective reason for denying third 
party access. 
The German electricity utilities obtain a dominant position on the 
common market for electricity. 
Whether or not a Trough-Transport-Refusal is an abuse of that position 
depends on the technical and economical circumstances of each indivi -
dual case.312 But as a rule the electricity utilities cannot deny third 
parties access to their systems just because they could loose some of 
their customers to a competitor. 
D. Summary of Chapter 4. 
The commercial arrangements made in connection with the privatisation 
of the ESI in England and Wales contain some restraints to competition 
that have effect on the trade with electricity between Member States. 
These restraints, however, are justified under the security of supply 
aspect. The English agreements thus do not infringe Art. 85 (1) EEC 
Treaty. 
The same applies to the Concession Agreements, which generally are 
justified under the protection of the environment aspect. 
As opposed to that, the restraints to competition caused by the German 
Demarcation Contracts, as a rule, find no justification. Those German 
3 1 1 For details see supra, chapter 3 part C; see also Fischerhof, 
"Stromdurchleitung", op.cit. n. 114, pp. 17-21; E.h.G. Klatte, 
op.cit. n. 45, pp. 412-421. 
3 1 2 Hermann, op.cit. n. 31, p. 117. 
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agreements that infringe Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty do not qualify for an 
exemption under Art. 85 (3) EEC Treaty because they eliminate competi-
tion totally. 
The German electricity utilities obtain a dominant position on the 
common market for electricity. A Trough-Transport-Refusal establishes 
an abuse of that position, unless the util i ty in question for once can 
refer to an objective reason. The Trough-Transport-Refusals thus 
usually contradict Art. 86 EEC Treaty. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
(1) It has been shown that electricity is an important element of the 
energy balance in Europe, and therefore plays a significant role in 
the completion of an internal energy market. 
(2) The electricity market in the European Communities as i t shows 
itself today, is characterized by; three main ownership structures of 
the electricity utilities, technical and economical peculiarities of 
the supply with electricity, supply monopolies nearly everywhere, 
different national energy policies, a lack of price transparency and a 
small but well working power exchange between the electricity u t i l i -
ties of the Member States. 
(3) Corresponding to that variety of characteristics, the European 
Community has a number of legal instruments to support the further 
integration of the electricity market, such as the approximation of 
national energy policies, the introduction of price transparency, the 
promotion of electricity transit on large networks and the introduc-
tion of competition to the electricity market. 
(4) The groups of electricity customers for which competition on the 
European electricity market is of interest, are large end users and 
local distributors. 
There are two conceivable models of competition on the electricity 
market; third party access to the existing grids and the construction 
of new grids. 
(5) Concerning the introduction of competition to the electricity 
market not only Articles 85-90 EEC Treaty, but also Articles 30-36 and 
37 EEC Treaty, are relevant. These provisions all from part of the 
general principle of competition within the EEC Treaty and therefore 
they must all follow the same line of interpretation. 
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(6) The application of Articles 85-90 EEC Treaty to the electricity 
market thus is only one of a number of possibilities to support a 
further integration. Nevertheless, there are two factors which make 
the European rules on competition an especially efficient tool: First, 
they are aimed at the destruction of supply monopolies, which are 
largely responsible for the present desintegration of the electricity 
markets. Second, Articles 85-90 EEC Treaty are available to the 
Commission right now, since i t is entirely at the Commission's discre-
tion tc take actions against offending parties. 
(7) The application of Articles 85-90 EEC Treaty to the ESI is not 
subject to prior harmonization of legal and administrative frameworks 
in the Member States. 
Neither has the fact that the Council has not yet issued provisions 
under Art. 87 (2) (c) EEC Treaty with respect to the ESI, any 
repercussions on the applicability of Articles 85 and 86 EEC Treaty to 
this branch. 
(8) Finally, Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty offers no posslblity to restrict 
the application of those rules. Neither the electricity utilities in 
England and Wales nor in Germany, according to the view put forward in 
this thesis, are not undertakings entrusted with a service of general 
economic Interest within the meaning of Art. 90 (2) EEC Treaty. This 
opinion is not likely to be shared by the European Commission. A 
different outcome in the interpretation of Art. 90 (2), however, does 
not lead to considerably different overall results in the application 
of Articles 85-90 EEC Treaty to the ESI. The application of all Treaty 
rules on competition to the electricity market, has to take the 
effects of competition for this branch, as well as their compatibility 
with other Treaty objectives, into account. 
(9) Art. 85 (1) as well as Art. 86 EEC Treaty, are to be applied to 
all anticompetitive measures on the electricity market. In doing so, 
special consideration has to be given to the technical and economical 
peculiarities of this branch. The reason for that is that competition 
is neither an end in itself nor is i t to be viewed in absolute terms, 
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but has always to be brought into accord with other Treaty objectives. 
Both Art. 85 (1) and Art. 86 EEC Treaty provide scope for taking those 
other, sometimes conflicting, Treaty goals into account. As far as 
Art. 86 EEC Treaty is concerned this scope can be found in the 
interpretation of the term "abuse". According to the opinion establi-
shed in this thesis, the application of Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty is 
subject to an inherent "rule of reason", which is of particular 
Importance for the interpretation of the expression "restriction". 
(10) Due to the technical and economical features of the ESI, there 
are, above all, four aspects that have to be taken Into consideration 
in applying Articles 85 (1) and 86 EEC Treaty. 
These aspects are security of supply, price of supply, protection of 
the environment and the promotion of the use of certain primary energy 
sources in power stations. They are all ingredients of the general 
objectives of the European Community formulated in Art. 2 EEC Treaty. 
It is thus possible that certain restraints to competition caused by 
the peculiarities of the ESI, do not infringe Art. 85 (1) or Art. 86 
EEC Treaty because they find compensatory justification under one of 
these aspects. 
(11) This is what applies to the commercial arrangements made in 
connection with the privatisation of the ESI in England and Wales. All 
of those agreements that cause restraints to competition are 
"justified" under the security of supply aspect. 
Some of the German agreements also find justification either under the 
security of supply or under the protection of the environment aspect. 
Other agreements, however, as well as some conducts, due to the fact 
that they prevent competition totally, overshoot the mark and are as a 
rule, not justified for the sake of a safe supply at reasonable 
prices. They therefore contradict Art. 85 (1) respectively Art. 86 EEC 
Treaty. 
Those German agreements that Infringe Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty do not 
usually qualify for an exemption under Art. 85 (3) EEC Treaty because 
they eliminate competition totally. 
page 180 
(12) It has been established that some of the justified restraints to 
competition have their roots in the technical peculiarities of the 
electricity supply. This in particular applies to arrangements like 
the English Pool and Settlement Agreement, which are inevitable for a 
secure and reliable power supply. Those agreements and conducts 
therefore will always find compensatory justification. 
Other agreements and conducts, however, are only justified because of 
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electricity market today. This applies to some of the agreements and 
conducts in the German ESI. As soon as the national energy policies 
are better harmonized, and all electricity utilities have about equal 
chances to hold their ground on a competitive market, those restraints 
to competition are no longer necessary for a secure supply at 
reasonable prices. They then will find no more justification and thus, 
will contradict Art. 85 (1) respectively Art. 86 EEC Treaty. 
(13) It follows that the European rules on competition today have only 
a limited effect on the further integration of the electricity market. 
Although there is no reason in principle why they should not be 
applied even now, Articles 85 (1) and 86 EEC Treaty will not blossom 
fully until the national frameworks are better harmonized. 
This is why i t is advisable for the European Communities not only to 
apply Articles 85 -90 EEC Treaty vigorously, but at the same time, and 
parallel to that, to actively promote a further harmonization of 
national energy policies. 
(14) Since the European rules on competition at the moment only have a 
limited effect, another aspect gains importance. As long as competi-
tion for large end users and local distributors remains subject to 
considerable restraints, i t is all the more important to promote the 
wholesale exchange of electricity between utilities, in order to 
further integrate the markets. Thus, the new Directive on electricity 
transit on large networks must be particularly welcome. 
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(15) The application of Articles 85 and 86 to the ESI has shown that 
i t is inevitable to take all technical and economical circumstances of 
each individual case into account. In order to avoid uncertanties, 
delays or duplications, i t therefore seems appropriate for the Euro-
pean Council to issue a Directive or Regulation in accordance with 
Art. 87 (2) (c) ECC Treaty which defines for the ESI, the scope of the 
provisions of Articles 85 and 86 EEC Treaty. Such a Regulation or 
Directive would have the advantage over the Commission's proposal, to 
add a prevision similar to Art. 85 (3) to the Treaty, in that i t could 
give guidelines for the application of Art. 85 as well as 86 EEC 
Treaty to the ESI. 
A provision under Art. 87 (2) (c) EEC Treaty also could be much more 
detailed than an exemption similar to Art. 85 (3) EEC Treaty, and 
hence would be better equlped to meet the requirements of such a 
complicated economic branch as the ESI. 
Moreover, the Commission's proposal only takes the security of supply 
into account and ignores equally important aspects like the price of 
supply and the protection of the environment. 
Finally, a provision stating that agreements necessary for the securi-
ty of supply are not covered by Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty is, according 
to the view put forward in this thesis, futile. Art. 85 (1) EEC Treaty 
itself provides scope to take those aspects into account and thus is 
not Infringed where agreements safeguard a secure electricity supply. 
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